Evaluation of the New Deal for diasbled people: the cost and cost-benefit analyses by David Greenberg (51822) & Abigail Davis (1254231)
Department for Work and Pensions
Research Report No 431
Corporate Document Services
Evaluation of the New 
Deal for Disabled People: 
The cost and cost-benefit 
analyses
David Greenberg and Abigail Davis
A report of research carried out by the Centre for Research in Social Policy on 
behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions
© Crown Copyright 2007. Published for the Department for Work and Pensions 
under licence from the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office by Corporate 
Document Services, Leeds.
Application for reproduction should be made in writing to The Copyright Unit, Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, St Clements House, 2-16 Colegate, Norwich NR3 1BQ.
First Published 2007.
ISBN 978 1 84712 212 4
Views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Department for Work 
and Pensions or any other Government Department.
Printed by Corporate Document Services.
iiiContents
Contents
Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................................................................vii
The.Authors......................................................................................................................................................................viii
Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................................................... ix
Summary..............................................................................................................................................................................1
Part I – Introduction
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 9 
1.1 Policy background .......................................................................... 10
1.2 The evaluation of NDDP national extension..................................... 11
1.3 Objectives of the cost analysis......................................................... 12
1.4 Objectives of the cost-benefit analysis............................................. 13
Part.II.–.The.cost.analysis
2 Cost analysis: data and methods ....................................................................................... 17
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 17
2.2 Selecting the sample of Job Brokers ................................................ 17
2.3 Recruitment and data collection ..................................................... 19
2.4 Individual cost components ............................................................ 19
2.4.1	 Staff	costs	............................................................................................... 20
2.4.2	 Overhead	costs	........................................................................................ 21
2.4.3	 Payments	to	other	organisations	(external	costs)	...................................... 21
2.4.4	 Other	costs	.............................................................................................. 22
2.5 Determining individual Job Broker’s costs and profits ...................... 23
2.5.1	 Costs	per	registrant	................................................................................. 23
2.6 Limitations of the Job Broker cost data ........................................... 23
iv References
3. Cost.analysis:..main.findings................................................................................................................................ 27
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 28
3.2 Outcome measures ......................................................................... 28
3.2.1	 Compensating	for	flaws	in	the	data	.......................................................... 29
3.2.2	 Using	the	Tobit	Regression	Model	............................................................ 29
3.3 Average and median Job Broker costs and profitability.................... 31
3.3.1	 Job	Broker	costs	per	registrant	................................................................. 31
3.3.2	 Job	Broker	profits	and	losses	per	registrant	............................................... 32
3.4 Determinants of Job Broker costs and profits .................................. 33
3.4.1	 Additional	variables	................................................................................. 33
3.4.2	 Factors	influencing	the	costs	of	Job	Brokers	.............................................. 35
3.4.3	 Factors	influencing	profits	per	registrant	................................................... 37
3.4.4	 Factors	influencing	placement	and	sustainment	rates	................................ 39
4. Cost.analysis:..cost-effectiveness........................................................................................................................ 41
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 42
4.2 Jobcentre Plus administrative costs ................................................. 42
4.3 Costs engendered but not incurred by Job Brokers ......................... 43
4.4 Inability to measure NDDP’s impact on costs ................................... 44
Part.III.–.Cost-benefit.analysis
5 Data and methods ............................................................................................................ 51
5.1 Cost and benefit estimates ............................................................. 51
5.2 Predicting future impacts ................................................................ 65
5.3 Estimating additional impacts ......................................................... 77
5.4 Discounting .................................................................................... 80
6. The.Government’s.perspective............................................................................................................................ 81
7 The customer’s perspective ............................................................................................... 91
8 The societal perspective .................................................................................................. 101
Part IV – Conclusions 
9 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 111
9.1 Job Broker costs and profitability .................................................. 112
9.2 Other factors ................................................................................ 112
9.3 Cost-effectiveness of NDDP .......................................................... 112
9.4 Cost-benefits of NDDP ................................................................. 113
9.4.1	 Key	findings	........................................................................................... 113
9.4.2	 Current	relevance	of	findings	................................................................. 114
References
vReferences
Appendix.A. Survey.of.Job.Brokers...............................................................................................................117
Appendix.B. Letter.to.Job.Broker.and.proformas....................................................................................133
References......................................................................................................................................................................139
List of tables
Table 2.1 Reasons given by Job Brokers for referring NDDP clients  
 to other organisations.............................................................. 22
Table 3.1 Job Broker costs per registrant ................................................. 32
Table 3.2 Job Broker profits and losses per registrant .............................. 33
Table 3.3 Unweighted OLS regression estimates of factors influencing  
 Job Broker costs per registrant ................................................. 36
Table 3.4 Unweighted OLS regression estimates of factors influencing  
 profits per registrant ................................................................ 38
Table 3.5 Unweighted OLS regression estimates of factors influencing  
 the placement and sustainment rates ....................................... 40
Table 4.1 Alternative cost-effectiveness measures ................................... 46
Table 4.2 Unweighted OLS regression estimates of factors influencing  
 total costs per sustainment ...................................................... 47
Table 5.1 Estimated impacts of NDDP on IB/IS/SDA ................................. 54
Table 5.2 Estimated Impacts of NDDP on Jobseeker’s Allowance ............. 59
Table 5.3 Estimated impacts of NDDP on employment ............................ 62
Table 5.4 Unweighted OLS regression estimates of the changes in  
 estimated impacts on IB/IS/SDA over time ................................ 67
Table 5.5 Unweighted OLS regression estimates of the changes in  
 estimated impacts on Jobseeker’s Allowance over time ............ 74
Table 5.6 Unweighted OLS regression estimates of the changes in  
 estimated impacts on employment over time ........................... 75
Table 6.1 NDDP’s benefits and costs per registrant from the  
 Government’s perspective ........................................................ 82
Table 6.2 Benefits and costs for large and small Job Brokers:   
 the Government’s perspective .................................................. 87
Table 6.3 Estimated impacts of NDDP on IB/IS/SDA benefit amounts  
 for large and small Job Brokers in 2005 prices .......................... 89
Table 7.1 NDDP’s benefits and costs per registrant from the  
 customer’s perspective ............................................................. 92
Table 7.2 Benefits and costs for large and small Job Brokers:   
 the customer’s perspective ....................................................... 98
Table 7.3 Estimated impacts of NDDP on employment for  
 large and small Job Brokers ...................................................... 99
Table 8.1 NDDP’s benefits and costs per registrant from the  
 societal perspective ................................................................ 103
Table 8.2 Benefits and costs for large and small Job Brokers:  
References
vi
 the societal perspective .......................................................... 105
List of figures
Figure 5.1 Continuing claimants impacts on IB/IS/SDA benefits  
 over time ................................................................................. 57
Figure 5.2 New claimants impacts on IB/IS/SDA benefits over time ............ 57
Figure 5.3 Continuing claimants impacts on employment over time ......... 64
Figure 5.4 New claimants impacts on employment over time .................... 64
References
vii
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for the support of Michael Daly and Carol Beattie of the 
Disability and Work Division, Department for Work and Pensions for their support 
throughout the research described in this report, as well as for their comments and 
suggestions. We are also indebted to Bruce Stafford, who headed the NDDP research 
team, for his guidance and suggestions in performing the research. Alex Wilks, 
Henry Shennan, Nick Murphy, Hugh Stickland, Kate Legge, Viet-Hai Phung, Larry 
Orr, Katherine Hill, Stephen Bell, and Ken Lam all provided important information 
that was incorporated into the research. Finally, we could not have completed the 
cost analysis without the cooperation of the 19 Job Brokers who provided detailed 
data on the costs they incurred as a result of NDDP. 
Acknowledgements
viii
The Authors
David Greenberg is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Maryland, 
Baltimore County (UMBC). Much of his research focuses on the evaluation of 
Government programs that are targeted at the low-income population, especially 
public assistance, employment, and training programs. He has published widely on 
social experimentation, cost-benefit analysis, and employment and training programs. 
He is the co-author of the Digest of Social Experiments (Urban Institute Press, 2003) 
and Social Experimentation and Public Policymaking (Urban Institute Press, 2003), 
and with his co-authors has recently completed the third edition of a widely used 
textbook on cost-benefit analysis (Prentice Hall).
Abigail Davis is a Research Associate at the Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP) 
at Loughborough University. She has collaborated on quantitative and qualitative 
elements of the evaluation of the New Deal for Disabled People and has conducted 
evaluative research on local and national programmes and initiatives. 
The Authors
ix
Abbreviations
DWP Department for Work and Pensions
IB Incapacity Benefit 
IS Income Support
JSA Jobseeker’s Allowance 
NDDP New Deal for Disabled People
SDA Severe Disablement Allowance
Abbreviations

1Summary
The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) is the major Government employment 
programme available to people claiming incapacity benefits. As such, it plays an 
important role in the Government’s welfare to work strategy. The programme is 
delivered locally by Job Brokers, which are a mixture of voluntary, public and private 
sector organisations. Although Job Brokers vary enormously in size and in how they 
operate, most help clients with their job search, engage in job development, and 
attempt to increase clients’ confidence in their ability to work. Many also attempt 
to develop clients’ work-related skills and monitor clients’ progress in jobs after they 
are placed, sometimes intervening when the client encounters problems on the job. 
Job Brokers receive a payment from the Department for each client they register, for 
each client they place in a job, and for each placed client who continues to work for 
at least six months.1  
In 2001, a consortium, which is led by the Centre for Research in Social Policy 
(CRSP)2, was commissioned by the Department for Work and Pensions to evaluate 
the programme. One key component of this evaluation is a cost-benefit analysis of 
NDDP. This analysis is intended to provide information on whether the monetary 
benefits from NDDP outweigh the programme’s monetary costs from the point 
of view of society as a whole. The analysis is also aimed at determining whether 
NDDP improves the well being of those who registered with Job Brokers and the 
programme’s net effect on the Government’s budget. This information is critical in 
assessing whether NDDP is effective and whether the expenditures of resources on 
NDDP are worthwhile. 
Summary
1 The research reported here pertains to the time before the threshold for the 
definition of sustainable employment was reduced from 26 week to 13 weeks 
in October 2003.
2 Other members of the consortium include Abt Associates in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; the Institute for Employment Studies; the National Centre for 
Social Research; the Social Policy Research Unit at the University of York; the 
University of Nottingham; and the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C. 
To conduct a cost-benefit analysis it is first necessary to estimate programme effects 
(often called ‘impacts’) on the cash benefit payments and earnings that registrants 
receive and to estimate programme costs. An analysis of NDDP’s impacts is reported 
elsewhere (see Orr, Bell and Lam 2007). These impact estimates have been adopted 
for use in the cost-benefit analysis. The NDDP cost analysis, as well as the NDDP 
cost-benefit analysis, is fully described in this report.  
Cost analysis
Part II of this report examines the costs incurred by Job Brokers in the delivery of NDDP 
services. It also provides an estimate of the central administrative costs borne by the 
Government in operating NDDP. Estimates of the costs of NDDP were obtained from 
an analysis of the costs incurred by 19 Job Brokers in providing services to clients 
registered in the NDDP programme. The cost data were obtained through face-to-
face interviews with Job Brokers in May and June 2003, just under a year after NDDP 
had been rolled out nationally. The Job Brokers were asked to provide data for the 
period between 1 April 2002 and 31 March 2003. Additional cost data were provided 
by the Job Brokers who were interviewed during follow-up telephone calls and by 
correspondence. Selected variables that were obtained from a postal survey of Job 
Brokers (MacDonald et al., 2004) and from a survey of NDDP registrants (Ashworth 
et al., 2004) were also used in the cost analysis presented in this report. In addition, 
based on financial records maintained by the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP), the report provides information on the costs incurred by Jobcentre Plus in 
administering NDDP. 
Throughout this report, the costs estimates are reported as a range, rather than as 
a single estimate. This range reflects uncertainty about the actual cost incurred by 
two of the Job Brokers that provided cost data. The sources of this uncertainty are 
discussed in detail in Section 3.2. 
Costs
The average cost to Job Brokers of delivering NDDP programme services to a typical 
registrant is between £600 and £9003. Less than three per cent of these expenditures 
are payments made by Job Brokers to other organisations; the remaining costs result 
from services they directly provide. The £600 to £900 cost estimate pertains only 
to costs that are borne by Job Brokers. However, Jobcentre Plus incurs costs of over 
£100 per registrant in administering NDDP. Thus, the total cost of operating NDDP is 
£700 to £1,100 for each registrant. These estimates do not include costs that result 
when Job Brokers refer clients to other organisations but do not pay for the services 
these organisations provide. On the other hand, and contrary to original intentions, 
SummarySummary
3 Throughout this report, the costs estimates are reported as a range, rather 
than as a single estimate. This range reflects uncertainty about the actual cost 
incurred by two of the Job Brokers that provided cost data. The sources of this 
uncertainty are discussed in detail in Section 3.2. 
3cost data are not available for a control group. As a result, the cost estimates include 
some costs that would have occurred even in the absence of NDDP because some 
disabled people would have sought services provided by Job Brokers elsewhere if 
NDDP did not exist. However, these factors tend to be offsetting and, for reasons 
discussed in the reports, both are believed to be small.
Profitability
The profits (or losses) of Job Brokers were measured by subtracting the costs that they 
incurred from the incentive payments they received from the Department. Thirteen 
of the 19 Job Brokers in the sample suffered net losses, whilst six appear to have 
made profits. The average Job Broker incurred a loss of over £300 per registrant.4 
However, the larger Job Brokers tended to operate at a profit.
Cost-effectiveness
Including both costs incurred by Job Brokers and the central administrative costs 
incurred by Jobcentre Plus, the cost per placement under the NDDP programme 
is £2,000 to £3,000 and the cost per sustainment is £4,000 to £5,000 (where a 
‘sustainment’ is defined as retaining a job for at least six months). 
Size matters
There is great variation among Job Brokers in both costs and profitability. This 
variation is not surprising, as the Job Brokers differ considerably in the combination 
of services that they provide. Much of the variation in costs and profits is associated 
with differences among Job Brokers in size, that is, in the number of customers 
they have registered. Larger Job Brokers tend to have lower costs than smaller Job 
Brokers and to be more profitable. For example, costs per registrant for a typical Job 
Broker would fall by £2 to £4 as a result of a one per cent increase in the number 
of registrants at that Job Broker and profits would increase by around £4 or £5 per 
registrant as a result of the one per cent increase in number of registrants. Because 
the costs of smaller Job Brokers tend to be relatively high and the fraction of their 
registrants that they place in jobs tends to be relatively low, Job Broker size is also 
strongly inversely related to costs per placement and costs per sustainment.
The role of other factors
There is less certainty about the role of factors other than size on the costs and 
profitability of Job Brokers. However, there is some evidence that a Job Broker’s cost 
per registrant increases as it increases its sustainment rate. The analysis also suggests 
that costs incurred by public and private sector Job Brokers are £300 to £400 higher 
SummarySummary
4 Some Job Brokers received outside funding, including funds from the European 
Social Fund. To the extent such external funding existed, Job Broker profits will 
be understated. Although such funds are likely to be small relative to the total 
cost Job Brokers incurred, their amount is unknown.
4per registrant than they are for other Job Brokers, whilst the profits of Job Brokers that 
are in the public or private sectors appear to be around £500 lower per registrant than 
those of other Job Brokers. Neither the types of services that a Job Broker provides 
nor whether it had been previously involved in earlier initiatives with a similar client 
group seems to influence either its costs per registrant or its profitability.
Cost-benefit analysis
The cost-benefit analysis is presented in Part III of this report. It relies heavily on 
estimates from the NDDP impact analysis conducted by Orr, Bell and Lam (2007), as 
well as on the cost estimates. The estimates used in the cost-benefit analysis, which 
have all been converted to 2005 prices, pertain to a typical or average NDDP registrant. 
The analysis separately estimates NDDP’s effects on: (1) the Government’s budget; (2) 
the well-being of the disabled persons who register in it; and (3) society as a whole. 
The results are reported in terms of NDDP’s net benefits (i.e. its benefits less its cost). 
Separate analyses are conducted from each of these vantage points for continuing 
claimants of incapacity benefits and new (or returning) claimants. In addition, separate 
cost-benefit analyses of larger Job Brokers (more than 900 registrants) and smaller 
Job Brokers (fewer than 900 registrants) are also conducted. 
The Government’s budget
Taking account of reductions in benefit payments received by NDDP registrants, 
reductions in the cost of administering benefits, and increases in tax payments, the 
analysis indicates that NDDP reduces the Government’s budgetary requirements 
by over £2,500 for a typical continuing claimant who registered and by over £750 
for an average new claimant who registered. In terms of the costs of NDDP, this is 
a considerable saving. For each pound expended on NDDP, the Government saved 
between £3.41 and £4.50 for continuing claimants and between £1.71 and £2.26 for 
new claimants in benefit payments and administrative expenditures. The conclusion 
that NDDP is cost-beneficial for both groups of customers from the Government’s 
perspective appears to be highly robust to the assumptions that underlie it. 
The benefits the Government received exceeded the Government’s costs at both 
large and small Job Brokers. However, mainly because NDDP reduced the incapacity 
benefits received by an average claimant who registered at larger Job Brokers by a 
much greater amount than it reduced the benefits received by an average claimant 
who registered at smaller Job Brokers, larger Job Brokers were much more cost-
beneficial from the Government’s perspective, than the latter.
NDDP registrants’ well-being
There is considerable uncertainty about the extent to which NDDP is cost-beneficial 
from the perspective of NDDP registrants, especially for continuing claimants. Much 
of this uncertainty results from shortcomings in the administrative data used to 
estimate the effects of NDDP on incapacity benefit amounts and employment and 
from programme benefits and costs that could not be estimated. 
SummarySummary
Our estimates suggest that the income of a typical NDDP registrant was probably 
increased by the programme, but not by a large amount. The Incomes of NDDP 
registrants would have been found to have increased somewhat more than our 
estimates suggest if, as is likely, NDDP increased the hours of work of employed 
registrants, as well as the proportion of registrants who were employed. However, 
to have much effect, the increase in hours would have to have been fairly large. 
Unfortunately, although there are estimates of NDDP’s impact on employment, no 
information is available about NDDP’s impact on the hours of work of those who 
are employed.
Whether NDDP improved the well-being of its registrants is not solely determined by 
its effects on their incomes. For example, those who go to work may face increased 
childcare and commuter costs and, in addition, in order to work will have to give 
up time during which they might do other things of value to themselves. On the 
other hand, their health and quality of life may improve. Unfortunately, information 
about all these factors is quite limited. Nonetheless, once the scant information 
that is available is taken into account, it seems likely that a typical NDDP registrant, 
regardless of whether they were a continuing claimant or a new claimant, benefited 
as a result of having participated in the programme but only to a modest degree. 
NDDP had similar impacts on the earnings of claimants who registered at small and 
large Job Brokers, but because NDDP reduced the incapacity benefits received by 
an average registrant at smaller Job Brokers by more than it reduced the incapacity 
benefits received by an average registrant at larger Job Brokers, the former were 
better off under the programme than the latter. Overall, NDDP appears to be most 
cost-beneficial for continuing claimants who registered at small Job Brokers and least 
cost-beneficial for new claimants who registered at large Job Brokers.
Society’s net benefits
The net benefits of NDDP to society as a whole are very likely positive and considerably 
larger for continuing claimants than for new claimants. Specifically, the reported 
estimates are £2,915 to £3,163 for typical continuing claimants and £613 to £861 for 
average new claimants or about £4 or £5 for each pound the Government expended 
on NDDP in serving continuing claimants and around £2 for each pound it expended 
on the new claimant group. 
Actual net benefits received by society could be somewhat smaller or larger than 
the estimates just reported, however. On the one hand, they would be significantly 
smaller if NDDP registrants who find jobs due to the programme squeeze substantial 
numbers of non-registrants out of jobs they would have otherwise obtained, are 
large or if registrants highly value the time they must give up in order to go to work. 
On the other hand, they would be substantially larger if NDDP had large impacts on 
the hours worked by employed registrants, as well as on the level of employment 
of registrants; if increases in the employment of the disabled are highly valued by 
taxpayers; or if, by allowing taxes to be lower than otherwise, NDDP significantly 
reduces economic distortions that are caused by taxes. In addition, certain limitations 
SummarySummary
in the administrative data used to estimate NDDP’s effect on earnings could have 
resulted in either over- or under-stating net social benefits. After assessing these 
effects, as well as a number of less important ones, it seems highly probable that 
the net social benefits of NDDP are positive.
Net social benefits do not seem to differ greatly by Job Broker size. The key factor that 
that caused net benefits to be bigger at larger Job Brokers from the Government’s 
perspective and smaller from the perspective of registrants - the fact that NDDP reduced 
IS, IB and SDA benefit amounts by more for registrants at large than for registrants at 
small Job Brokers - has no influence on net social benefits. Reductions in incapacity 
benefit payments count as a benefit to Government, a cost to registrants, and are 
exactly offsetting when viewed from the vantage point of society as a whole.
Summary
Part I – Introduction
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1  Introduction
The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) is the major employment programme 
available to people claiming incapacity benefits. As such, it plays an important role 
in the Government’s welfare to work strategy. The programme is delivered locally by 
a network of contracted providers, referred to as Job Brokers. In 2001, a consortium, 
which is led by the Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP)5, was commissioned 
by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) to evaluate the programme. One 
key component of this evaluation is a cost-benefit analysis of NDDP. This analysis is 
intended to provide information on whether the monetary benefits from NDDP are 
larger or smaller than the programme’s monetary costs from the point of view of 
society as a whole. The cost-benefit analysis is also aimed at determining whether 
NDDP improves the well being of those who registered with Job Brokers and the 
programme’s net effect on the Government’s budget. This information is critical in 
assessing whether NDDP is effective.
To conduct a cost-benefit analysis it is first necessary to estimate programme effects 
(often called ‘impacts’) on the cash benefit payments and earnings that registrants 
receive and to estimate programme costs. An analysis of NDDP’s impacts is reported 
elsewhere (Orr. Bell and Lam 2007). These impact estimates have been adopted for 
use in the cost-benefit analysis. The NDDP cost-analysis, as well as the NDDP cost-
benefit analysis, is fully described in this report. 
The report is divided into four parts: The remainder of this part of the report provides 
some additional background information on the NDDP programme and brief 
overviews of both the cost analysis and the cost-benefit analysis. Part II presents the 
cost analysis. This chapter describes in some detail how the cost data used in this 
report were obtained from Job Brokers and discusses some of the limitations of these 
data. Chapter 2 presents findings for the costs borne and profits received by Job 
Brokers. Chapter 3 examines the cost-effectiveness of the NDDP programme. Part III 
Introduction
5 Other members of the consortium include Abt Associates in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; the Institute for Employment Studies; the National Centre for 
Social Research; the Social Policy Research Unit at the University of York; the 
University of Nottingham; and the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C. 
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of the report describes the data and methods used in the cost-benefit analysis and 
presents findings from the analysis. Part IV of the report summarises the analysis of 
Job Broker costs and findings from the cost-benefit analysis.
1.1  Policy background
NDDP is a voluntary programme designed to help people with disabilities and health 
conditions move from incapacity benefits into sustainable employment. It was 
introduced in 1998 by the then Department for Education and Employment and the 
then Department of Social Security, which piloted a range of initiatives for people 
claiming health-related benefits. In 2001 the programme was extended nationally 
for three years, and in July 2003 it was announced that it would be further extended 
for two years to March 2006. It was more recently announced that the programme 
would be additionally extended until March 2007. The lead department is now the 
DWP.
NDDP is available to persons claiming at least one of the following ‘qualifying 
benefits’: 
• Incapacity Benefit; 
• Severe Disablement Allowance; 
• Income Support with a Disability Premium; 
• Income Support pending the result of an appeal against disallowance from 
Incapacity Benefit;
• Housing Benefit or Council Tax Benefit with a Disability Premium (provided 
clients are not in paid work of 16 hours a week or more or receiving Jobseeker’s 
Allowance);
• Disability Living Allowance (provided clients are not in paid work of 16 hours a 
week or more or receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance); 
• War Pension with an Unemployability Supplement; 
• Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit with an Unemployability Supplement;
• National Insurance credits on grounds of incapacity; and 
• equivalent benefits to Incapacity Benefit being imported into Great Britain under 
European Community Regulations.
IntroductionIntroduction
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NDDP is delivered by a network of around 60 Job Broker organisations, which help 
people with disabilities and health conditions gain sustained employment. The Job 
Brokers receive payment for each client they register, for each client they place in a job, 
and for each placed client who continues to work for at least six months.6 Except for 
the award for each registration, which is set at £104, the amounts of these incentive 
payments are negotiated with the DWP and thus vary among the Job Brokers.
Job Brokers are a mixture of voluntary, public and private sector organisations, and 
vary enormously in size and in how they operate. However, most help clients with 
their job search, engage in job development and attempt to increase client confidence 
in their ability to work. Many also attempt to develop client work skills and monitor 
client progress in jobs after they are placed, sometimes intervening when the client 
encounters problems on the job. On occasion, clients are channelled into outside 
organisations that provide services that are not available from their Job Broker. Most 
Job Brokers are parts of organisations that are engaged in a variety of activities in 
addition to NDDP. The relative importance of these other activities and NDDP varies 
greatly across the organisations. 
A Job Broker can cover one or more local authorities, and some have more than 
one office. Because more than one broker can operate within a district, potential 
clients are usually offered a choice of Job Brokers; initially Jobcentre Plus advisers 
were required to be ‘neutral’ and not offer advice to customers about which local 
Job Broker would best meet their needs, but they can now do so. Most Job Brokers 
make outreach and marketing efforts to attract as many clients as possible. In 
addition, Jobcentre Plus offices provide an NDDP gateway in which new claimants 
of incapacity benefits are informed about the programme and local Job Brokers, as 
well as about other services.
1.2  The evaluation of NDDP national extension
As previously indicated a cost analysis and a cost-benefit analysis are just two of a 
number of components of the NDDP evaluation. Other elements of the evaluation 
include:
• A quantitative Survey of Job Brokers in which Job Brokers report on the services 
they deliver to clients, their perceptions of clients, the role of their partner 
organisations in service delivery, and their relationships with employers. The 
survey was also designed to establish whether individual Job Brokers were able 
to provide detailed information about the costs of delivering the programme.
• A quantitative Survey of Registrants to obtain information about clients’ 
characteristics, and their experiences with, and views on, the programme.
6 The research reported here pertains to the period before the threshold for the 
definition of sustainable employment was reduced from 26 week to 13 weeks 
in October 2003.
IntroductionIntroduction
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• Qualitative Research to explore the organisation, operation and impacts of 
the Job Broker service from the perspective of key stakeholders, including in-
depth interviews with: the eligible population, NDDP participants, Job Broker 
managerial and front-line staff, and Jobcentre Plus Personal Advisers and Disability 
Employment Advisers. This research has been complemented by five area case 
studies exploring the variation in Job Brokers’ performance.
• A Documentary Analysis of the successful bids made by organisations wanting to 
become Job Brokers in 2001 in order to identify the key characteristics of these 
organisations and the services they proposed to deliver.
• Qualitative Research with Employers to assess employer awareness of, 
understanding of, and experiences with NDDP, and how these change over 
time.
• A quantitative Survey of Employers to obtain information on employers known 
to have recruited employees previously registered with NDDP.
• A Survey of the Eligible Population to obtain information about the characteristics 
and work aspirations of those eligible for the programme and their awareness 
of, attitude towards, and involvement with NDDP.
• An Impact Analysis to assess the net additionality of NDDP. This analysis was 
based upon statistical analyses of administrative data.
Findings from the other components of the evaluation are summarised in two synthesis 
reports (Stafford with others 2004 and 2006). A third and final synthesis report will 
be produced, which will incorporate the cost-benefit analysis reported here.
1.3  Objectives of the cost analysis
As described in Chapter 2, several of the evaluation components listed above, 
particularly the Survey of Job Brokers and the Survey of Registrants, contributed to 
the cost analysis. On the other hand, the cost analysis, along with the impact analysis, 
is essential to the cost-benefit analysis. Because of the needs of the cost-benefit 
analysis, one key objective of the cost analysis described in this report is to establish 
an estimate of the costs incurred by Job Brokers in delivering services to registrants 
of the NDDP programme. Although one readily obtainable measure of costs is the 
payments the Government makes to Job Brokers, these payments could be either 
larger or smaller than the expenses Job Brokers actually incur. As discussed later in 
the report, it is these expenses that are the appropriate measure of costs for use in a 
cost-benefit analysis, although the payments to Job Brokers are, of course, a correct 
measure of the cost to the Government. 
As will be seen, however, individual Job Brokers vary enormously in the costs they 
generate in serving NDDP registrants. The Government’s payments more than cover 
the costs borne by some Job Brokers, but others suffer losses as a result of participating 
in NDDP. Thus, we also examine why some Job Brokers incur smaller costs than others. 
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In addition, we analyse the cost-effectiveness of Job Brokers in delivering services to 
their clients - for example, the cost per job placement or the cost for each customer 
who remains employed for at least six months.
The cost data that are used in this report were collected from a sample of Job 
Brokers. Additional data were collected from the Department for Work and Pensions’ 
financial record on the costs incurred by Jobcentre Plus in administering the NDDP 
programme. 
Two factors that influence costs are not taken into account in the cost estimates. 
On the one hand, data were not available on costs that result when Job Brokers 
channel people with health conditions and disabilities to external organisations, 
except when the Job Brokers pay these outside organisations for providing services 
to their clients. On the other hand, some of the costs incurred by NDDP might have 
been borne elsewhere in the absence of the programme. In other words, some of 
the services provided by Job Brokers may substitute for services that would have 
been provided elsewhere if NDDP did not exist. Unfortunately, as discussed further 
in Chapter 2, we have no way of estimating these costs. Thus, the costs we report 
are not the costs that result from the existence of the NDDP; they are costs incurred 
in delivering NDDP programme services. These two factors tend to be offsetting and 
as discussed in Chapter 4, it appears likely that if they could be taken into account, 
little change would result in the estimates presented in the report.
1.4  Objectives of the cost-benefit analysis
As previously mentioned, the aim of the cost-benefit analysis is to determine whether 
the monetary benefits of NDDP outweigh the programme’s monetary costs from a 
societal point of view and, hence, whether the programme is economically efficient. 
If it is not economically efficient, the analysis may suggest ways in which it can be 
made so. If it cannot be made economically efficient, then consideration should 
be given to terminating the programme. Additional, related objectives of the cost-
benefit analysis are to assess whether the programme improves the well being of 
those who participate in NDDP, the registrants, and to determine what the net effect 
of the programme is on the Government’s budget. The cost-benefit analysis from 
each of these three perspectives - the Government’s, the registrant’s and society’s - is 
presented separately in Part III of the report. As discussed in Part III, because it is not 
possible to value some potential effects of NDDP in monetary terms (for example, 
those on health status and on the utilisation of the National Health Service), these 
effects are not formally integrated in the cost-benefit analysis, although their likely 
importance is assessed.
In a sense, the cost-benefit analysis of NDDP is usefully viewed as the end product 
of the programme’s evaluation because it utilises many of the other components 
of the research that are listed above, especially the cost analysis and the impact 
analysis, and because it is done after work on the other components is completed. 
As indicated above, relevant findings from the cost analysis appear in Part II of this 
report while the required findings from the impact analysis are presented in Orr, Bell 
and Lam (2007).
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2  Cost analysis: data and   
  methods
Summary
This section contains information on:
• how Job Brokers were sampled (Section 2.2); 
• the data collection process (Section 2.3);
• the range and scope of the data assembled (Section 2.4); 
• how Job Brokers’ costs were calculated (Section 2.5); and 
• limitations of the data (Section 2.6).
2.1  Introduction
This section describes the selection of the sample Job Brokers used in the cost analysis 
and explains in detail what data were collected, how the information was used to 
calculate costs, and what problems were encountered during the process. It also 
includes a discussion of the limitations of the Job Broker data. 
2.2  Selecting the sample of Job Brokers
As will be seen, gathering the data for the cost analysis required field visits to each 
Job Broker that provided cost information. Data were collected from a stratified 
sample of 20 Job Brokers. To determine which Job Brokers to approach, information 
provided by the Survey of Job Brokers was used (MacDonald et al., 2004).
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The Survey of Job Brokers is a quantitative survey of all the NDDP Job Brokers included 
in the Documentary Analysis, as well as any additional providers that had joined the 
programme by the summer of 2002 when the survey was conducted. In addition 
to questions on process, staffing, service delivery, clients and employers, the Job 
Brokers were asked if they would be able to provide detailed financial information 
on staffing, overheads and other costs of delivering NDDP. However, they were not 
asked to provide this information in responding to the survey.
From a total of 95 questionnaires sent to 61 Job Brokers, 76 were returned from 51 
different organisations.7 Out of the organisations that responded, nine indicated they 
would be able to provide most of the financial information listed in the questionnaire 
and 12 said that they would be able to provide all of the financial data. 
To construct a sample frame for collecting the cost data, Job Brokers were stratified 
in two ways. Firstly, organisations were categorised by number of registrants:
• under 75 registrations;
• 76-150 registrations;
• 151-300 registrations;
• 301-600 registrations, and
• 601+ registrations.
The Job Brokers were then further categorised according to their economic sector 
(i.e. public, private, voluntary and mixed/other). 
It was thought that a sample size of 20 Job Brokers would capture variation in both 
of these dimensions, yet also be achievable given the resources available for the 
cost analysis. The sample was purposively selected. Four Job Brokers were selected 
for each size band; and seven Job Brokers were drawn from the public sector, seven 
from the voluntary sector, three from the private sector, and three from the mixed/
other categories. In addition, an attempt was made to achieve geographic diversity. 
Whenever possible, the selected Job Brokers were from among those that had 
indicated that the financial data needed for the cost analysis would be available. To 
avoid over-burdening respondents, Job Brokers involved in the Qualitative Research 
were mostly excluded from the sample, although there was some unavoidable overlap. 
The resulting sample comprised Job Brokers in England, Scotland and Wales, with a 
mix of urban and rural client bases. Based on the number of registrations approved 
by the Department for the period, the Job Brokers in the sample accounted for just 
under a third (31.4 per cent) of all registrants. As there were 61 Job Brokers at the 
time of the survey, and 20 Job Brokers in the sample, it would seem representative 
in terms of number of registrants.
7 The reason there were more questionnaires than organisations is that some Job 
Brokers had multiple offices.
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2.3  Recruitment and data collection
The 20 Job Brokers included in the sample were contacted individually by telephone 
and asked if they would be willing to provide cost data to the NDDP evaluation team. 
Because the requested financial data are proprietary, the contacted Job Brokers were 
promised that the information they provided would be kept strictly confidential. 
Thus, the findings in Chapter 3 are all presented in the form of statistics that are 
grouped over Job Brokers in the sample so that the costs of individual Job Brokers 
cannot be identified.
All 20 of the contacted Job Brokers agreed to provide cost information and face-to-
face interviews were arranged. The purpose of the site visits was to obtain information 
from each Job Broker regarding their processes and types of services they delivered, as 
well as to collect the necessary financial data. This background information helped to 
put the cost data collected into context and ensure that important cost components 
were not overlooked.
In advance of the site visits, the Job Brokers were sent letters, pro formas and guidance 
notes indicating the type of data needed and the preferred format for reporting the 
information that the researchers would be collecting (MacDonald et al., 2004). The 
fieldwork took place over four weeks in May and June 2003. Follow-up telephone 
calls and email correspondence were used to acquire information that was not 
obtained during the field visits and to clear up any inconsistencies in the data that 
were collected.
Although it was made clear to respondents that they were not expected to complete 
the pro formas in advance of the field visits, several did so, while others devised 
spreadsheets based on the pro forma that contained the relevant data. Other Job 
Brokers had not compiled the information in advance but had it to hand and were 
able to complete the pro forma during the meeting with the researchers. Several Job 
Brokers did not look at the information we requested, however, until the meeting 
itself. Problems encountered with these and a few other Job Brokers are discussed 
below.
2.4  Individual cost components
In order to determine the total costs to the Job Brokers of administering and delivering 
the programme, a range of data was required. Instrumentation was designed in order 
to facilitate data collection and to standardise the information collected as far as 
possible. For the sake of comparability, the Job Brokers were asked to provide data 
for the period 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003 inclusive. April 2002 was nine months 
after NDDP had been rolled out nationally. By then, the programme had stabilised, 
following an early settling in period. Usable cost data were obtained from 19 of the 
20 Job Brokers we visited.8 
8 The Job Broker that did not provide usable data is discussed further below.
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Job Brokers were asked to provide information on:
• staff costs (i.e., salaries, fringe benefits, national insurance and pension 
contributions);
• overhead costs (such as rent for facilities, telephones, heating, lighting, adverts, 
etc.);
• payments made to other organisations for services provided to NDDP clients (e.g., 
training); and
• any other costs incurred as a result of the programme.9 
Each of these elements is discussed below.
.4.1 Staff costs
The key cost element in providing Job Broker services is expenditure on staff. Our 
general approach to determining these costs was to ask each Job Broker to list the 
percentage of time each of their employees devoted to the New Deal for Disabled 
People (NDDP) and what the total cost (i.e. salary, bonuses and allowances, and fringe 
benefits such as pension contributions) was of employing that person. To protect 
confidentiality, and owing to the sensitive nature of the information involved, Job 
Brokers were asked to list staff by job title, rather than by name. When more than one 
person held the same job title, the number of full-time equivalent workers holding the 
position and the average salary of one full-time equivalent worker were requested. A 
small minority of Job Brokers were unable to access the requested information either 
before or during the meeting, but supplied it subsequently by post, email or telephone. 
Moreover, a few Job Brokers considered salary information too sensitive and would 
or could not divulge detailed staff costs and instead provided the total amount they 
expended on staff or the percentage of their total costs expended on staff. 
As mentioned above, Job Brokers were asked to indicate the proportion of each 
member of staff’s time that was devoted to NDDP work. This was in recognition of 
the fact that many Job Brokers also deliver programmes in addition to NDDP, such 
as Work Preparation and WORKSTEP. To avoid possible confusion, respondents were 
also asked to state the period of time to which the salary and fringe benefit values 
pertained (i.e., annual, monthly, fortnightly, or weekly).
Staff costs for each position were calculated, whenever possible, by summing the 
annual salary, bonuses, allowances and fringe benefits and then multiplying this figure 
by the product of the number of full-time equivalent employees holding the position 
9 The guidance notes sent to each Job Broker also included a request for unit 
costs - i.e., ‘the full cost of providing one unit of each service that is provided 
in house’ (MacDonald et al., 2004). The notes acknowledged that such costs 
might not be available, and, without exception, this was indeed the case among 
the Job Brokers in the sample. Although such information would have been 
useful, it was not needed to determine costs engendered by the Job Brokers.
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and the percentage of time they dedicated to NDDP activities. Total staff time was 
then computed by summing the resulting figures. Although most of the Job Brokers 
in the sample provided sufficient information to do this, a few did not. When they 
did not, it was necessary either to use a percentage of total costs figure provided by 
the Job Broker or to accept a total salary figure that the Job Broker supplied.
.4. Overhead costs
The guidance notes accompanying the pro formas explained what kind of costs might 
be included as overhead and gave instructions for the calculation of an ‘overhead rate’, 
which was defined as ‘overhead costs divided by total costs’. An alternative approach 
was also outlined, whereby overhead costs could be estimated by multiplying total 
expenditures on overheads by the proportion of the Job Broker’s total staff cost 
dedicated to NDDP work. In the majority of cases, the latter calculation was used to 
determine the overhead costs of delivering the programme.
Overhead costs for a few Job Brokers included considerable outlay on new equipment 
– for example, the purchase of new telephones, printers and computers. Because 
such equipment is used over several years, the purchase price of this equipment was 
amortised (i.e. spread evenly over the useful lifetime of the equipment), based on a 
five-per cent interest rate and an assumption that replacement would be necessary 
after five years.
.4.3 Payments to other organisations (external costs)
The analysis of the NDDP bid documents of successful Job Brokers indicated that the 
amount and type of support and training that Job Brokers were able to provide in-
house varied. Although some intended to deliver all NDDP services in-house, others 
mentioned partner organisations or other organisations to which registrants would 
be referred. As indicated in Table 2.1, the Survey of Job Brokers (MacDonald et al., 
2004) identified a variety of reasons for referrals.
Although all of these externally received services presumably engendered costs, it 
was not possible to determine these costs where the organisation did not charge the 
Job Broker. However, as indicated below, Job Brokers appear to have sent relatively 
few of their clients to outside organisations. In cases where Job Brokers did pay for 
external services, they were asked to record the average payment per month. This 
amount (which, as shown in Chapter 3, was small for most Job Brokers) was then 
annualised and included in the cost of the operation.
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.4.4 Other costs
Some Job Brokers assisted their clients in other ways – for example, by giving them 
money to purchase interview clothes or tools, to cover transport costs, or to ‘tide 
them over’ until they began to receive pay from an employer. In addition, some 
Job Brokers paid clients for providing evidence of employment retention.10 These 
expenditures were usually recorded as a total amount spent over the year and were 
included as part of each Job Broker’s total costs.
Table .1  Reasons given by Job Brokers for referring NDDP clients  
  to other organisations
Reasons for referring clients Percentage of Job Brokers  
 giving reason
Clients require more intensive support than we can offer 63
Clients are insufficiently job ready for us to help them 53
To acquire further educational qualifications 74
Basic skills training (literacy and numeracy) 65
Soft skills training (confidence building, communication skills) 29
Key skills training (computer skills, telephone skills) 57
Job searching 8
Job matching	 11
Benefits advice 34
Careers advice 26
To gain work experience/a work taster 49
To gain work experience within a voluntary organisation 59
To get specialist help with their illness/disability 70
To get specialist help with other problems (alcohol/drug addiction) 71 
Other help or advice 42
Base 76
Source: Survey of Job Brokers, MacDonald et al., (2004)
10 In order to receive the final incentive payment for clients, Job Brokers had to 
provide evidence to the Department that the client had remained in work for 
at least 26 weeks out of the first 39 weeks following job entry. Since October 
2003, the 26-week threshold has been reduced to 13 weeks, to bring NDDP 
in line with the definition used for other New Deals. However, for the period 
covered by this study, the 26 week threshold applied. 
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2.5  Determining individual Job Broker’s costs and profits
All cost information gathered from the Job Brokers was entered onto Excel 
spreadsheets, one for each organisation. In addition to the cost information, using 
figures supplied by the Job Brokers themselves, the number of registrations, full-
time and part-time job entries, part-time to full-time transfers and part-time and 
full-time sustainments (i.e. job placements that continued for at least 26 weeks) 
credited to each Job Broker were recorded on their spreadsheets. To determine the 
income that each Job Broker received as a result of NDDP, these figures were then 
multiplied by the relevant Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) incentive reward 
for registrations, placements, and job sustainments (e.g. £104 for each registration). 
The profits (or losses) for each Job Broker were then computed by subtracting the 
Job Broker’s annual total costs from its annual total income.11 
..1 Costs per registrant
Total costs per registrant were computed by dividing total annual costs by the 
number of registrants. Similarly, profits (or losses) per registrant were computed by 
dividing annual profits (or losses) by the number of registrants. Both computations 
were completed twice: first including and then excluding payments to outside 
organisations. Hence, these computations yielded four figures for each Job Broker 
in the sample:
• total costs per registrant, including payments to outside organisations;
• profits (or losses) per registrant, including payments to outside organisations;
• total costs per registrant, excluding payments to outside organisations; and
• profits (or losses) per registrant, excluding payments to outside organisations.
2.6  Limitations of the Job Broker cost data
As with all research, the quality of the analysis is dependent, at least in part, on the 
quality of the data under analysis. While every effort was made to obtain accurate 
and reliable data, to standardise and make it as comparable as possible, and to 
construct a dataset with the maximum amount of available information, the research 
team were constrained by what the Job Brokers could (and, in a few cases, would) 
provide. Nonetheless, we have considerable confidence that the costs estimates we 
present in Chapter 3, if not precise, closely approximate the costs actually borne by 
the Job Brokers in the sample. Some specific issues that arose in collecting cost data 
from the Job Brokers are discussed next.
11 Some Job Brokers received outside funding, including funds from the European 
Social Fund. To the extent such funding existed, our measure of Job Broker profits 
will be understated because Job Broker costs were being subsidised from outside. 
We do not have data on the amount of these funds, but we suspect that they 
were typically small relative to the total Job Broker costs. Indeed, in collecting the 
cost data, several Job Brokers stated that they were losing money by participating 
in NDDP and none mentioned being subsidised by outside funding. 
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Most of the Job Brokers visited were extremely co-operative and made every effort 
to supply the requested information. Even so, collecting the data was an extremely 
lengthy process. Although the Job Brokers were visited within a four-week period, 
it took almost another six months to complete the spreadsheets in sufficient detail 
for the analysis to be conducted. The intervening time was used to enter the existing 
data onto the spreadsheets, chase missing data and query anomalies, and obtain 
clarification of the received information. In some cases this was made more complex 
by changes in Job Broker staff, which meant that the original respondents were no 
longer employed by the organisation. In order to pursue outstanding enquiries it 
was therefore necessary to revisit earlier stages of the process with their successors 
and attempt to obtain clarification and elaboration of data with which they were 
unfamiliar. 
On the whole, the process can be considered to have been successful in that 
sufficiently detailed and reasonably reliable information was collected. However, 
as discussed in some detail in Chapter 3, it seems likely that two of the Job Brokers 
in the sample substantially understated their costs. In addition, it was not possible 
to obtain usable cost data from one Job Broker in the sample despite considerable 
efforts to obtain clarification and additional information. The cost data that were 
received from this Job Broker were inconsistent with interview information the Job 
Broker provided about its operations and were too incomplete to allow computation 
of the Job Broker’s total costs. Hence, this Job Broker was omitted in computing the 
cost estimates reported in Chapter 3.
One reason for the length of the data collection process was the fact that each Job 
Broker in the sample delivered services in a unique way. This uniqueness was also 
reflected in how they kept or (in some cases) did not keep financial and performance 
monitoring information. Obviously, because of the amount of variation among Job 
Brokers in both their operations and in their record keeping, there were some difficulties 
in achieving comparability and consistency among the data they provided.
Only a few Job Brokers had record keeping systems that were entirely compatible 
with the format of the data collection pro formas sent to them. As a result, it was 
sometimes necessary to make estimates or assumptions in order to complete the 
pro formas. For example, the rental values of the building occupied by a Job Broker 
had to be approximated, when the facility was owned by the Job Broker or the Job 
Broker’s rent was subsidised in some way. Approximations were also required when 
the contact at a Job Broker had imprecise knowledge of the percentage of time a 
particular staff member devoted to NDDP and the percentage of time that person 
devoted to other work. Filling in such gaps was mostly a collaborative process, whereby 
any necessary assumptions and approximations were those of the Job Brokers and 
were agreed upon with them during the field visits or by telephone or email.
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Some Job Brokers felt that completing the pro formas was an extremely useful 
exercise, as it required them to collate and present information in a way that they 
had not previously considered. Most saw the potential value of the exercise, both to 
themselves and to the DWP, and some requested a copy of their individual spreadsheet 
when the dataset was finalised to use for self-evaluation. The research team worked 
closely with those Job Brokers who needed support, guidance, or clarification in 
terms of what was required.
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3  Cost analysis: main findings
Summary
• Two key outcome measures were examined in the descriptive analysis: (1) total 
costs incurred by the Job Brokers; and (2) profits received or losses suffered by 
the Job Brokers (Section 3.2).
• The data obtained from different Job Brokers varied in quality, completeness and 
in two cases, its accuracy was suspect. A regression model was used to attempt 
to compensate for the latter problem (Section 3.2.2).
• The cost to Job Brokers of serving a typical registrant is probably between £600 
and £900. However, the analysis implies that there is considerable variation among 
the Job Brokers in the costs that they bear. In particular, size matters: larger Job 
Brokers with more registrants incur lower costs (Section 3.3.1).
• Thirteen of the 19 Job Brokers in the sample suffered net losses, whilst six appear 
to have made profits. The average Job Broker incurred a loss of over £300 per 
registrant, although there is great variation among Job Brokers in terms of profits 
and losses. Job Brokers with relatively few registrants tend to lose money, whilst 
larger Job Brokers tend to be profitable (Section 3.3.2).
• Total costs per registrant appear to be affected by several factors: the number 
of registrants (Section 3.4.2), the Job Broker’s economic sector (Section 3.4.2), 
and (possibly) the Job Broker’s sustainment rate (Section 4.4.2).
• The range of services provided by Job Brokers and whether they had been 
previously involved in earlier initiatives with a similar client group do not appear 
to influence costs per registrant (Section 3.4.2).
• Profits for a typical Job Broker increase by around £4 or £5 per registrant as a 
result of a one per cent increase in the number of registrants at that Job Broker. 
Profits of Job Brokers that are in the public or private sectors are around £500 
lower per registrant than those of other Job Brokers (Section 3.4.3).
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• The sizes of the incentive payments for which Job Brokers are eligible do not 
appear to have much influence on their performance (Section 3.4.3).
3.1  Introduction
This chapter focuses on the costs incurred by, and profits received by, the 19 New 
Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) Job Brokers in our sample. The following chapter 
presents a fuller picture of the costs of NDDP by examining cost estimates that 
include costs borne by Jobcentre Plus in administering the programme, as well as 
costs incurred by Job Brokers. Section 3.2 discusses how the outcome measures were 
constructed, and techniques used to compensate for deficiencies and inaccuracies 
in the data. Section 3.3 presents estimates for Job Broker costs per registrant and 
profits per registrant, and Section 3.4 uses regression analysis to examine factors 
influencing costs and profitability. 
3.2  Outcome measures
Most of the analysis in this section focuses on two key outcome measures: (1) total 
costs incurred by the Job Brokers; and (2) profits received or losses suffered by the 
Job Brokers. The first of these measures includes both costs incurred internally by 
Job Brokers and payments Job Brokers made to outside organisations for providing 
services to their NDDP clients. As discussed in Chapter 2, the second measure was 
computed by subtracting the total costs incurred by Job Brokers from the total 
incentive payments they received from the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). 
A positive value for a Job Broker would imply that it is profiting from its participation 
in the NDDP programme and a negative value would imply that it is suffering financial 
losses and, hence, subsidising the programme.
The cost and profit estimates for each Job Broker have been divided by the number 
of NDDP clients registered by the broker.12 This allows the performance of different 
Job Brokers, which vary greatly in size, to be compared to one another. Moreover, 
costs per registrant can be directly compared to the NDDP impact estimates, which 
are also computed on a per registrant basis.
12 For this purpose, data received from the DWP were used. However, as previously 
mentioned, data on the number of registrants were also provided by the Job 
Brokers in the sample. These two variables were very similar. The correlation 
between them was over .99. The mean of the Job Broker-reported number 
of registrants was 565 and the mean of the Department-reported registrants 
was 563, a statistically non-significant difference of 2. The Documentary 
Analysis included Job Brokers’ projections of numbers of registrants. The mean 
projected number of registrants, 929, was much larger than the actual number 
of registrants and the correlation between the actual and projected number of 
registrants was only .57.
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3..1 Compensating for flaws in the data
The results of the analysis are based on 19 of the 20 Job Brokers from which cost 
data were collected. As previously indicated, one Job Broker failed to provide usable 
data. As will be discussed in greater detail later, according to the cost data these 19 
Job Brokers provided, four are receiving positive profits, 13 are suffering losses, and 
two are approximately breaking even. However, it is almost certain that the latter 
two Job Brokers overstated their costs in order to understate their profits. Although 
anecdotal information suggests that their performance is superior to that of most 
Job Brokers, based on the data they provided us, the ‘profits’ of one were exactly 
zero, a highly unlikely occurrence, whilst those of the other Job Broker differed only 
trivially from zero. Moreover, these two Job Brokers were the only ones that did 
not supply details about the components of their costs so that we could determine 
how their total costs were derived, but instead simply provided a total cost figure. 
Although each Job Broker was promised that the cost and profit information that 
they provided would not be divulged, as such information is proprietary, it seems 
likely that these two brokers were concerned that the Department would learn of 
their positive profits and, as a result, reduce the incentive payments they received. 
Nonetheless, as explained below, we use information provided by these two Job 
Brokers in all the estimates presented in this report.
3.. Using the Tobit regression model
In essence, the inference is that the two brokers ‘censored’ their reported profits 
at zero by not permitting them to be positive. To predict what profits per registrant 
actually were for these two brokers, the Tobit regression model was used.13 This is 
a well-known statistical procedure that was specifically developed to treat values 
that are censored at zero. To use this procedure, it was first necessary to set profits 
per registrant for the four Job Brokers that reported positive profits to zero. This 
adjusted profits variable, with the values for six observations censored at zero and 
13 negative values then became the dependent variable in a Tobit regression. Two 
explanatory variables were used in estimating the regression: the natural log of the 
number of registrants and a dummy variable that equalled 1 if the Job Broker was 
from either the private sector or the public sector, and zero otherwise.14 The results 
imply that both of the Job Brokers that provided suspect cost data actually made 
substantial profits.
13 We are indebted to Steve Bell for suggesting the use of the Tobit regression 
model for this purpose.
14 The estimated Tobit regression appears below, with standard errors reported in 
parentheses below the regression coefficients:
 profits = -3334 + 619 ln(number of registrants) - 682 private/public dummy
  (497) (100) (147)
 The constant term and the coefficient on both variables are statistically significant 
at well above the one per cent level. The pseudo R2 = .145 for the regression 
and the LR χ2 = 31.26 (p < .0000).
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One way to assess the accuracy of the Tobit regression estimates is to use them to 
predict profits for the four Job Brokers that reported positive profits, and then compare 
these predictions with their reported profits, as there is no reason to suspect that the 
reported values for these four Job Brokers are in error. Predicted profits per registrant 
were about £500 higher than reported profits in one case, less than £100 higher than 
reported profits in two cases, and less than £100 lower in the remaining case. It is 
somewhat reassuring that the prediction errors were in both directions. Moreover, in 
three of the four cases, the prediction errors are very modest in magnitude relative to 
the profits and losses reported by the Job Brokers; 12 of the 19 Job Brokers reported 
profits or losses per registrant that exceeded £250, in six instances by more than 
twice this amount.
A second way to assess the Tobit estimates is to recompute total costs for the two 
suspect Job Brokers by subtracting their predicted profits from the DWP incentive 
payments they received.15 These recomputed total costs are, of course, smaller 
than their reported costs, which, as indicated above, were probably overstated. 
However, one can ask whether recomputed costs per registrant appear plausible, 
keeping in mind that anecdotal information suggests that these two Job Brokers 
run highly efficient operations. The recomputed costs per registrant for one of the 
suspect Job Brokers, while low, appear quite plausible. Several other Job Brokers 
have total costs per registrant that are not much higher and one has even lower 
costs. Recomputed costs per registrant for the other Job Broker are near zero and, 
hence, are implausible. Consequently, we assume that the recomputed total cost 
per registrant for the first Job Broker also applies to the second Job Broker. It seems 
likely that true total costs per registrant for these two Job Brokers are within a few 
hundred pounds of their recomputed total costs; but, of course, there is no way of 
knowing this with certainty.
To summarise, reported profits are almost surely too small and reported total costs too 
high for two of the Job Brokers, while profits and total costs that have been predicted 
by using estimates from the Tobit regression may be too high and too low, respectively. 
To address the uncertainty about the ‘true’ values, the estimates presented in the rest 
of this report were all calculated twice, first using the reported values for these two 
15 As an alternative way of determining the costs of the two Job Brokers with 
suspect data, we first computed an ordinary least squares regression for the 
remaining 17 Job Brokers in which their reported costs per registrant was the 
dependent variable and the independent variables were the same as those 
used in the Tobit regression. We then used this regression to predict the costs 
of the two suspect Job Brokers. The predicted costs were very similar to those 
computed using the Tobit regression. The ordinary least squares regression 
appears below:
 costs = 2773 – 373 ln (number of registrants) + 682 private/public dummy
  (418) (81) (156)
 The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level; the adjusted 
R2 = .569 and the F-value = 11.5.
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variables for all 19 Job Brokers and then again using the Tobit-predicted values for the 
two variables for the two suspect Job Brokers and reported values for the remaining 
17 Job Brokers. Thus, both procedures permit the analysis to be based on all 19 Job 
Brokers. The first procedure treats all 19 Job Brokers (including the two suspect Job 
Brokers) as if they provided accurate information on their costs, while the second 
procedure treats 17 Job Brokers as if they reported accurate information on their 
costs and the two suspect Job Brokers as if they overstated their costs. This approach 
should allow bracketing of the true values, although, in our view, it is likely that the 
true values are closer to the estimates that rely on the Tobit regression. Fortunately, 
as will be seen, the two sets of calculations do not differ by large magnitudes, but 
the differences are not trivial either.
3.3  Average and median Job Broker costs and profitability
3.3.1 Job Broker costs per registrant
Table 3.1 provides information on the total costs per registrant incurred by Job Brokers. 
Costs are reported in several different ways: First, the table provides cost calculations 
that rely entirely on cost information reported by the Job Brokers and calculations 
in which the values for two of the 19 Job Brokers have been recomputed using the 
Tobit regression estimates discussed above. Second, both unweighted and weighted 
cost estimates are presented, with the weight for each Job Broker the proportion 
of all registrants in the sample accounted for by that Job Broker (the 19 Job Brokers 
have a total of 10,697 registrants). Thus, in computing the weighted estimates, a Job 
Broker that has twice as many registrants as another has twice the influence. Third, 
both mean (or average) costs and median costs are shown. Mean unweighted costs 
(i.e., average costs) may be interpreted as the costs per registrant borne by a typical 
or average job broker, while mean weighted costs are the costs of serving a typical 
registrant. Median unweighted costs are simply the total costs per registrant for the 
middle Job Broker, with nine Job Brokers having higher costs per registrant and nine 
having lower costs per registrant. Median weighted costs are the costs of serving the 
middle registrant – that is, approximately as many registrants were served at higher 
costs as at lower costs. Thus, like the estimates to be provided by the impact analysis, 
the weighted means and medians in Table 3.1 use the registrant, rather than the 
Job Broker, as the unit of analysis. Hence, they are probably more meaningful than 
the unweighted means and medians. An advantage of the median over the mean 
is that its value cannot be driven by one or two Job Brokers with extremely high or 
extremely low costs.
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Table 3.1  Job Broker costs per registrant
  Unweighted   Weighted 
   Tobit-   Tobit- 
 Reported  adjusted Reported  adjusted
Mean £999.15 £937.02 £847.73 £617.68
Median £942.61 £780.12 £942.61 £593.25
Standard deviation £430.72 £468.66 £254.85 £276.54
Number 19 19 10,697 10,697
The values that appear in Table 3.1 consist almost entirely of costs incurred internally 
by Job Brokers. Typically, the payments made by Job Brokers to other organisations for 
providing services to their NDDP clients accounted for only around £25 per registrant 
or about three per cent of its total expenditures.
The fact that the unweighted means shown in Table 3.1 are larger than their weighted 
counterparts implies that larger Job Brokers with more registrants incur lower costs. 
We return to this topic below. The weighted values in Table 3.1 indicate that the cost 
to Job Brokers of serving a typical registrant is probably between £600 and £900. 
The rather large standard deviations, especially for the unweighted means, imply 
that there is substantial variation among the Job Brokers in the costs that they bear. 
This can also be seen if the Job Brokers are ranked in terms of the magnitude of their 
total costs. For example, the Job Broker ranked at the 75th percentile bears costs that 
approach twice the size of those incurred by the Job Broker at the 25th percentile.
3.3. Job Broker profits and losses per registrant
Table 3.2, which is similar in design to Table 3.1, shows the profits received or losses 
sustained by Job Brokers. The mean profits reported in the table are simply the 
difference between Job Broker costs and the incentive payments they receive from 
DWP for each registrant. Thus, the average DWP payment per registrant was £632 
in the case of the unweighted means and £857 in the case of the weighted means, 
implying that larger Job Brokers received larger payments per registrant than smaller 
Job Brokers. As will be shown later, this is because larger Job Brokers place a higher 
proportion of their registrants into jobs.
As mentioned previously, 13 of the 19 Job Brokers in the sample incurred costs that 
exceeded the incentive payments they received and therefore suffered net losses. 
Indeed, the average Job Broker incurred a loss of over £300 per registrant, although 
the very large standard deviation implies that there is great variation among Job 
Brokers in terms of profits and losses. The fact that the weighted means and medians 
in Table 3.2 are positive, while their unweighted counterparts are negative, indicates 
that it is the Job Brokers with relatively few registrants that tend to lose money, whilst 
larger Job Brokers are likely to be profitable. Thus, it may not be possible for smaller 
Job Brokers to continue to participate in NDDP unless their incentive payments are 
Cost analysis: main findings Cost analysis: main findings
33Cost analysis: main findings
considerably increased. However, the weighted median value implies that over half 
of the individuals who registered with the Job Brokers in the sample are being served 
by these Job Brokers at a profit.
Table 3.  Job Broker profits and losses per registrant
  Unweighted   Weighted 
   Tobit-   Tobit- 
 Reported  adjusted Reported  adjusted
Mean -£367.03 -£305.21 £9.37 £238.46
Median -£202.02 -£202.02 £67.58 £270.93
Standard deviation £560.06 £633.15 £323.43 £449.82
Number 19 19 10,697 10,697
3.4  Determinants of Job Broker costs and profits
What are the factors that allow some Job Brokers to keep their costs relatively low 
and to turn a profit and others to incur high costs and suffer losses? As already seen, 
size clearly matters. Moreover, there is great variation in the size of the Job Brokers 
in the sample. The mean number of registrants is 563, with a standard deviation of 
767. Three Job Brokers had fewer than 100 registrants and three had more than 
1,000 registrants. Thus, this section examines the relationship between the number 
of registrants and Job Broker costs and the relationship between the number of 
registrants and Job Broker profitability.
3.4.1 Additional variables
As suggested earlier, Jobs Brokers differ in numerous other dimensions than just size 
– for example, in the types of disabilities their clients have, the services they provide, 
how they are organised, their contractual arrangements with DWP, and so forth. Thus, 
this section also explores whether there are factors in addition to size that influence 
costs and profitability by examining a large number of potential explanatory variables 
in addition to Job Broker size. It is important, for example, to allow for the possibility 
that Job Brokers with lower costs are providing less expensive services. 
Measures of a few of the variables that we examine in this section were obtained 
during the field visits to the Job Brokers including, for example: 
• the amount of the incentive payment each Job Broker received for placing a 
registrant in a full-time job;
• the amount of the incentive payment for each registrant who sustained full-time 
employment for at least six months.
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A few others were obtained from the DWP. For example:
• the percentage of registrants each Job Broker placed in a job; and 
• the percentage of registrants at each Job Broker who sustained employment for 
at least six months.16  
Many other variables were acquired from the Survey of Job Brokers. These 
included:
• whether each Job Broker participated in the pilot programme before NDDP was 
rolled out nationally in 2001;
• whether each Job Broker specialised in a particular type of disability;
• each Job Broker’s economic sector (public, private, voluntary, and mixed/other); 
and 
• whether each Job Broker provided certain specific services (CV preparation, basic 
skills training, soft skills provision, training in computer and telephone skills, job 
search, job matching, advice on benefit payments and work experience). 
Finally, data on the receipt of services by registrants at each Job Broker in the sample 
were extracted from the Survey of Registrants. For example, this information includes 
measures of the number of face-to-face interviews and the number of telephone 
contacts with Job Broker advisers in which an average registrant at each Job Broker 
was involved. In addition, we constructed measures of the percentage of each Job 
Broker’s NDDP clients that:
• prepared a CV;
• attended training;
• received work experience;
• started a work preparation programme; and 
• started voluntary work.
Once the number of registrants was taken into account, only a few of these variables 
had a statistically significant relationship with either Job Broker costs or profitability. 
This is not too surprising given the small sample of only 19 Job Brokers and the fact 
that some of the explanatory variables are probably measured with considerable 
error, especially those obtained from the Survey of Registrants. A larger sample 
and better measures of some of the explanatory variables might have resulted in 
16  To create the job placement variable, full- and part-time job placements were 
summed by counting a part-time placement as half a full-time placement. 
Similarly, to create a measure of the percentage of registrants who sustained 
employment, registrants who were employed part-time received half as much 
weight as those who were employed full-time.
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more statistically significant relationships being uncovered. On the other hand, in 
an exploratory analysis conducted with a large number of potential explanatory 
variables, such as this one, a few statistically significant relationships are likely to be 
found on the basis of chance alone, even though a true relationship does not exist. 
Consequently, with the exception of the relation between the number of registrants 
and Job Broker costs and profitability, the small number of statistically significant 
relationships that we report should be considered tentative and treated with care.
3.4. Factors influencing the costs of Job Brokers
Table 3.3 contains unweighted ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates in 
which total costs per registrant is the dependent variable. Unweighted regressions 
allow each Job Broker to have equal influence on the results regardless of their size. 
Doing this is appropriate because we wish to determine the factors that cause costs 
per registrant to vary among Job Brokers. Thus, the individual Job Broker is the proper 
unit of analysis.
The regression results in which the total cost values for two of the Job Brokers have 
been recomputed on the basis of the Tobit regression estimates are stronger than 
those that rely on the reported values for all 19 Job Brokers. That is, their adjusted 
R-squares and F-values are larger and their coefficients more significant. This is 
consistent with either of two possible explanations: the Tobit corrections resulted in 
more accurate values or the recomputed values are themselves based on a regression 
that is not too dissimilar from those reported in Table 3.3. Both explanations probably 
contain some truth.
Number of registrants
The key explanatory variable in these regressions is the natural logarithm of the 
number of registrants at each Job Broker. A logarithmic specification, rather than 
a linear specification was used, because it was thought likely that the addition of 
100 registrants would have a different effect on the costs per registrant for a Job 
Broker with 200 registrants than for one with 2,000 registrants, but that a 10 per 
cent increase in registrants would have a similar effect on each. The logarithmic 
specification did, in fact, provide the better fit. The coefficients on Job Broker size 
are highly statistically significant at conventional levels in all four regressions shown 
in Table 3.3. The smallest of the coefficients implies that a one per cent increase in 
the number of registrants at a typical Job Broker would reduce its costs by £2.15 
per registrant, whilst the largest coefficient implies a per registrant cost reduction of 
£4.22. Given the enormous range in Job Broker size – some are more than 10 times 
larger than others – the relationship between size and costs is very substantial.
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Table 3.3  Unweighted OLS regression estimates of factors  
  influencing Job Broker costs per registrant
     Dependent Variable: 
   Reported    Tobit-adjusted 
  Regression 1  Regression   Regression 1  Regression 
Constant 2055.521 2390.923 2531.306 2783.328
 (417.50) (425.09) (345.71) (359.43)
 [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
Ln(number of registrants) -214.751 -354.715 -316.353 -421.522
 (75.02) (101.15) (62.12) (85.52)
 [.01] [.00] [.00] [.00]
Public or Private = 1 282.532 305.961 343.763 361.368
 (172.25) (160.11) (142.63) (135.377)
 [.12] [.08] [.03] [.02]
% Reg. with Sustained Employment  38.130  28.65
  (20.02)  (16.92)
  [.08]  [.11]
Adjusted R2 .285 .386 .586 .629
F-value 4.587 4.771 13.735 11.180
Number of observations 19 19 19 19
*Standard errors appear in parentheses, ( ), and p-values in brackets, [ ]
Different economic sectors
A second variable in the regression is a dummy variable that equals one for Job 
Brokers that are either Government-operated (seven Job Brokers) or operated by a 
private sector firm (three Job Brokers) and zero for Job Brokers that are operated by 
a voluntary organisation (six Job Brokers) or do not fall under any of the first three 
categories (three Job Brokers). Regressions with separate dummy variables for public 
sector and private sector Job Brokers were also run, but their coefficients were very 
similar. Thus, to preserve degrees of freedom, the two variables were combined. 
The combined variable is marginally statistically significant or insignificant in the 
regressions that use costs reported by the Job Brokers but highly statistically significant 
in the regressions in which costs have been recomputed using the estimates from the 
Tobit regression. The coefficients in these regressions imply that the costs incurred 
by public and private sector Job Brokers are from £283 to £361 higher per registrant 
than they are for other Job Brokers. It would not be surprising perhaps if public sector 
Job Brokers operate at higher costs per registrant than voluntary organisations, but 
the relatively high cost of private sector Job Brokers is not readily explained.
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Sustainment rate
Two of the regressions that appear in Table 3.3 include a third variable, the sustainment 
rate, which is measured as the percentage of all registrants at each Job Broker 
who sustain employment for a minimum of six months. The unweighted average 
sustainment rate for the 19 Job Brokers in the sample is 11.5 per cent, with a standard 
deviation of 5.8 and a range of between 4 and 22 per cent. Placing registrants in 
permanent jobs and keeping them employed once they are placed is presumably the 
key goal of NDDP, but as just indicated, some Job Brokers are much more successful 
in accomplishing this objective than others. Presumably, the more successful Job 
Brokers spend more to increase job retention. The regression results weakly support 
this argument. The coefficient estimates for the sustainment rate variable, which 
are statistically significant at conventional levels in only one regression, and then 
only marginally, imply that increasing the sustainment rate by one percentage point 
is associated with a spending increase by a typical Job Broker of £30 or £40 per 
registrant.
Services provided and previous experience
As mentioned previously, the relationships between costs and a number of other 
variables were examined but did not prove to be statistically significant once Job 
Broker size was taken into account. The absence of evidence that such relationships 
exist is noteworthy. For example, it is somewhat surprising we could find no evidence 
that Job Brokers’ costs are affected by the mix of services they provide17. It was also 
anticipated that Job Brokers that participated in the pilot programme before NDDP 
was rolled out nationally in 2001, as six in the sample did, would have lower costs per 
registrant than the other Job Brokers by virtue of their greater experience. However, 
these Job Brokers also tended to be among the larger Job Brokers in the sample; 
indeed, the simple correlation between the number of registrants and a dummy 
variable representing early participation is .629 (p = .002). Nonetheless, it appears 
highly unlikely that the strong negative relation between the Job Broker size variable 
and Job Broker costs reflects the early entry of some of the larger Job Brokers into 
the NDDP programme because the coefficient on the size variable changes very little 
when the dummy variable for early participation is added to the regression.
3.4.3 Factors influencing profits per registrant
Table 3.4 presents regression estimates of the relationship between profitability and 
Job Broker size and between profitability and Job Broker economic sector. We again 
estimate unweighted regressions because we want to determine how Job Broker size 
and economic sector cause profits per registrant to vary among Job Brokers. Thus, 
the individual Job Broker is the unit of analysis. Both variables are highly statistically 
17 It is possible, of course, that we did not have the most appropriate measure of 
service mix. For example, a composite measure of services provided such as the 
number of hours spent working with an average registrant might have been 
found to influence costs, but such a measure was not available.
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significant at conventional levels and imply that profits for a typical Job Broker 
increase by around £4 or £5 per registrant as a result of a one per cent increase in 
the number of registrants at that Job Broker and that the profits of Job Brokers that 
are in the public or private sectors are around £500 lower per registrant than those 
of other Job Brokers. None of the other potential explanatory variables examined 
were statistically significant.
Table 3.4  Unweighted OLS regression estimates of factors  
  influencing profits per registrant
Dependent Variable Reported Tobit-adjusted
Constant -2242.250 -2715.886
 (394.09) (338.12)
 [.00] [.00]
Ln(number of registrants) 379.445 480.644
 (70.81) (60.75)
 [.00] [.00]
Public or Private = 1 -482.670 -544.282
 (162.59) (139.50)
 [.01] [.00]
Adjusted R2 .623 .783
F-value 15.885 33.471
Number of observations 19 19
*Standard errors appear in parentheses, ( ), and p-values in brackets, [ ]
It is important to recognise that the profit measure consists of two separate 
components: incentive payment receipts and Job Broker costs. Obviously, the first 
of these components contributes positively to profits and the second contributes 
negatively. As a result, the sustainment rate does not have a statistically significant 
relationship with profits because the increase in the amount of incentive payments 
that results from a higher sustainment rate tends to be offset by an increase in costs. 
Job Broker size, in contrast, is strongly related to profits because larger Job Brokers 
tend both to have lower costs per registrant, as we have previously demonstrated, 
and to receive higher incentive payments per registrant. As seen in Table 3.5, which 
is discussed next, the higher incentive payments result, in turn, because larger Job 
Brokers tend to be more effective in placing registrants in jobs.
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3.4.4 Factors influencing placement and sustainment rates
Table 3.5 uses OLS regressions to examine the relationships between Job Broker size 
and three alternative measures of Job Broker success: 
1. the percentage of registrants that are placed into jobs;
2. the percentage of registrants that sustain employment for at least six months 
after they are placed;
3. the percentage of those that are placed that sustain employment for at least six 
months.18  
In addition, the relationship between the size of the incentive payments and the three 
measures of Job Broker success are also estimated in the regressions. In the first of 
the three regressions, the measure of the incentive is the payment for a full-time 
placement, while the measure used in the other two regressions is the payment for 
a full-time sustainment.19 
18 In computing these rates, we again used data reported to us by the Department, 
rather than the data provided us by the Job Brokers in the sample. However, the 
placement and sustainment rates calculated with the Job Broker-reported and 
Department-provided data were similar, although rates computed with the latter 
were slightly larger. Correlations between the two sets of rates were also high. 
However, rates computed using the numbers of registrations, placements, and 
sustainments Job Brokers had projected in their NDDP bids were much larger than 
the rates computed with either set of actual data. For example, the projected 
sustainment rate was more than double either of the actual sustainment rates. 
Moreover, the correlations between the actual and projected rates were small, 
sometimes negative, and always statistically insignificant.
19 The particular incentive payment measure that is used matters little, in fact, as 
the correlation between them is .94. In addition, the correlation between each 
of these measures and their part-time counterparts is above .95.
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Table 3.  Unweighted OLS regression estimates of factors   
  influencing the placement and sustainment rates
  Outcome: 
    Percentage of 
 Percentage of Percentage of  those placed 
 registrants placed registrants who who sustain  
 in employment sustain employment employment
Constant -10.978 -12.795 20.33
 (8.78) (5.56) (25.57)
 .[33] [.04] [.43]
Ln(number of registrants) 6.654 3.53 0.57
 (1.27) (.81) (3.71)
 [.00] [.00] [.88]
Incentive Payment -.000 .003 .016
 (.004) (.003) (.012)
 [.914] [.21] [.20]
Adjusted R2 .589 .523 -.007
F-value 13.903 10.887 .938
Dependent Variable   
 Mean 25.741 11.478 44.868
 Standard Deviation 9.872 5.826 18.438
 Number of observations 19 19 19
*Standard errors appear in parentheses, ( ), and p-values in brackets, [ ]
The coefficients on Job Broker size in the first two regressions are highly statistically 
significant at conventional levels and indicate that a 10 per cent increase in the 
number of registrants would be associated with an increase in the placement rate of 
two-thirds of a percentage point (.67) and in the sustainment rate of about a third of 
a percentage point (.35). These effects are quite substantial relative to the means of 
the placement rate (25.7) and sustainment rate (11.5). The coefficient on the number 
of registrants is statistically insignificant in third regression, however, and suggests 
that Job Broker size has a minor effect, at most, on whether a registrant remains 
in employment for at least six months after they are placed. The three coefficients 
on the size of the incentive payments are statistically insignificant and negligible in 
magnitude. Taken literally, they imply that a £100 increase in incentive payments 
would have no effect on the placement rate, would increase the sustainment rate by 
one-third of a percentage point and would increase the percentage of those placed 
who sustain their jobs by a little more than a percentage point and a half. Overall, 
these findings suggest that an increase in the incentive payments is likely to have 
little payoff for either NDDP customers or the Department. However, because the 
coefficients on which the findings are based are imprecisely estimated, the prescription 
for policy that they imply must be considered weak.
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4  Cost analysis: cost-    
  effectiveness
Summary
• The costs borne by Jobcentre Plus in administering NDDP are £127 per registrant. 
These costs exclude the incentive payments the Government makes to Job Brokers 
(Section 4.2).
• The total cost of serving a typical New Deal for Disabled (NDDP) registrant (that is the 
cost incurred by both the individual Job Brokers and Jobcentre Plus) is £700 to £1,10020 
(Section 4.5).
• This total cost estimate will be overstated if participants in NDDP would have 
received some of the programme’s services even in the absence of the programme 
and understated if they are directed to services by Job Brokers that are not paid 
for by the Job Brokers. However, these errors tend to be offsetting and existing 
evidence suggests that they are small (Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
• Job Broker size is strongly inversely related to costs per sustainment. Costs per 
sustainment are higher at the eight Job Brokers in the sample that provide training 
in computer and telephone skills (Section 4.5).
• Total cost per job placement is £2,000 to £3,000 and total cost per job sustainment 
is £4,000 to £5,000 (Section 4.5). 
20 The range of values that are reported here and elsewhere in this chapter results 
because we report both weighted and unweighted estimates and because we 
report estimates that are adjusted and not adjusted for the fact that we suspect 
two Job Brokers of having overstated their costs.
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4.1  Introduction
This chapter investigates the cost-effectiveness of the NDDP programme. To do that, 
the measure of costs must include all the costs that result from the programme, 
not just the costs incurred by the Job Brokers. Thus, the costs borne by Jobcentre 
Plus in administering NDDP are added to the cost measure used in this chapter, 
which was limited to costs incurred by brokers. The measurement of Jobcentre Plus’ 
administrative costs is discussed in Section 4.2. As mentioned in Part I, because of 
the lack of data, it was not possible to measure costs that result from NDDP but 
which are not borne by Job Brokers. The importance of this omission is discussed in 
Section 4.3. Because of the lack of cost data for a control group, it is also possible 
that the cost measure we use includes some costs that would have occurred even 
in the absence of NDDP. The importance of this limitation is considered in Section 
4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 reports on NDDP cost effectiveness in terms of participants’ 
employment and employment retention. 
4.2  Jobcentre Plus administrative costs21 
The objective of this section is to determine the central administrative costs that 
Jobcentre Plus incurred as a result of operating NDDP. To make them comparable to 
the per registrant cost figures given for the individual Job Brokers in Table 3.1, the 
total central administrative costs is divided by the total number of NDDP registrants. 
A separate account of the costs that Jobcentre Plus incurred in administering NDDP 
was maintained for the first nine months after the programme was implemented 
nationally in July 2001, but not thereafter. Thus, we rely on cost figures for 1 July 
2001 through 31 March 2002 to determine Jobcentre Plus’ administrative costs and 
assume that NDDP central administration costs per registrant did not change very 
much between this period and the period covered by the cost data we collected from 
our sample of Job Brokers (1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003).
According to DWP accounting records, Jobcentre Plus expended a total of £4,755,371 
on NDDP from 1 July 2001 to 31 March 2002. However, this figure includes both 
incentive payments made to three internal Job Brokers and expenditures in operating 
the three internal Job Brokers.22 These amounts, which totalled £3,051,806, between 
1 July 2001 and 31 March 2002, are already counted in determining costs incurred 
by individual Job Brokers and, thus, to avoid double counting, need to be subtracted 
21 We are indebted to Henry Shennan of the Department for Work and Pensions 
for providing the data needed to derive the estimates reported in this section.
22 The three ‘internal Job Brokers’ were established and operated directly by 
several Jobcentre Plus districts. Staff salaries and other expenditures incurred 
in operating the internal Job Brokers were paid by Jobcentre Plus.
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from the £4,755,371 figure mentioned above.23  Thus, Jobcentre Plus’ central 
administrative costs from 1 July 2001 to 31 March 2002 totalled £1,703,565. Dividing 
this amount by the 13,410 individuals who registered in NDDP over the same time 
period gives a figure of £127.04 per registrant,24 which we use as our estimate of 
Jobcentre Plus’s central administrative costs in operating NDDP. 
4.3  Costs engendered but not incurred by Job Brokers
Evidence from the Survey of Registrants, the Survey of Job Brokers, and the cost 
analysis suggests that partner organisations make a very real contribution to the 
delivery of the programme, which is not yet sufficiently understood.25  Unfortunately, 
when NDDP participants were receiving services from partner organisations or other 
organisations for which the Job Brokers did not have to pay, the Job Brokers did not 
have a way of attributing value to these services and, hence, it was not possible to 
include their value in the cost analysis.
Nevertheless, the evidence that exists suggests that such costs are likely to be small. 
The Job Brokers themselves indicated during field visits that they make relatively few 
referrals to other organisations. This is consistent with evidence from the Survey 
of Registrants. For instance, 25 per cent of the first cohort of survey respondents 
reported contacting another organisation since registering with their Job Broker and, 
23 The incentive payment amount was determined by multiplying the number of 
registrations, job placements and job sustainments at each of the three internal 
Job Brokers between 1 July 2001 and 31 March 2002 by the incentive payment 
they received for each registration, placement and sustainment. To determine 
expenditures on the three internal Job Brokers, we multiplied the number of 
individuals who registered at these Job Brokers between 1 July 2001 and 31 
March 2002 by an estimate of costs per registrant at the internal Job Brokers. 
The latter figure came from our estimates of costs per registrant incurred by the 
two internal Job Brokers that happened to be in our sample of 19 Job Brokers. 
Costs per registrant at these two Job Brokers were very similar to one another 
and we simply took an average of the two values.
24 Even in the absence of NDDP, some similar central administration costs might 
still have occurred. However, there is no way to estimate these costs, although 
they likely to have been small.
25 Thus, further work targeted at specific types of partner organisations or of 
service delivery by partner organisations might be useful in illuminating the 
value of their input to participants and to the programme as a whole. Doing 
such work could prove difficult, however. For example, a pilot of a Job Broker 
partner survey questionnaire suggested that ‘the links between many Job Brokers 
and their partner organisations appeared to be too tenuous and complex for a 
postal questionnaire …’ (MacDonald et al., 2004). As a result, the survey was 
abandoned.
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of these, 14 per cent said that they had been referred to that organisation by their 
Job Broker (Ashworth et al., 2003). Thus, fewer than four per cent (.25 x .14) of all 
NDDP clients appear to have received services from other organisations as a result of 
referrals by Job Brokers. Moreover, the Job Brokers paid for at least part of these 
services, and to the extent they did, these costs are included in the cost estimates. 
Results from the second cohort of survey respondents, obtained about three months 
later, are virtually identical (Kazimirski et al., 2004). 
4.4  Inability to measure NDDP’s impact on costs
‘Impact’ can be defined as the net difference between observed changes in the 
performance of a group subjected to a policy intervention and a control group not 
subjected to the intervention but otherwise similar to the intervention group. Ideally, 
the NDDP cost analysis would measure the programme’s impact on costs, that is, ‘the 
change in costs’ (Greenberg and Appenzeller, 1998) resulting from the programme. 
Unfortunately, cost data are not available for a control group that is comparable to 
the NDDP intervention group. Consequently, NDDP’s impact on costs, its net cost, 
cannot be measured. It is only possible to measure the gross costs of delivering the 
programme - that is, the direct outlays required. Because some participants in NDDP 
would probably have received similar services in the absence of the programme, its 
net costs are likely to be lower than its gross costs.
Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that gross costs are much larger than net costs. 
There is evidence that a considerable variety of employment-focused services for the 
disabled were widely available prior to the national roll out of NDDP (Arksey, et al., 
2002). Moreover, at least some of these services are used by substantial numbers 
of disabled persons who are not participating in NDDP. For example, five per cent 
of the respondents to the Survey of the Eligible Population, very few of whom were 
NDDP participants, indicated that they had received education or training during 
the four weeks prior to being interviewed (Woodward, et al., 2003). However, the 
Survey of Registrants indicates that while almost a quarter of NDDP participants 
received education or training while registered, nearly 90 per cent of these persons 
received their education or training from organisations other than Job Brokers 
(Adelman, et al., 2004) and, as seen above, few of these persons were referred to 
these organisations by Job Brokers. In other words, training provided by Job Brokers 
does not seem to substitute for education and training that takes place elsewhere to 
a very great extent. Somewhat similarly, while a quarter of respondents to the Survey 
of Registrants stated that they undertook voluntary work while registered for NDDP, 
about 85 per cent of these persons indicated that they would have done this even 
if they were not registered (Adelman, et al., 2004). Again, it does not appear that 
services provided or initiated by Job Brokers are replacing many services provided 
elsewhere. Thus, we believe that most of the costs incurred by Job Brokers (but not 
all) are costs that exist only because of the NDDP programme.
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4.5  Cost-effectiveness ratios
Table 4.1 shows three alternative cost-effectiveness ratios: 
1. Total cost per registrant. 
2. Total cost per job placement. 
3. Total cost per job sustainment. 
To compute the first of these measures, the estimate of the central administrative 
costs of £127.04 per registrant that Jobcentre Plus incurred in operating NDDP was 
added to the mean and median values previously presented in Table 3.1. The second 
cost-effectiveness ratio was computed by adding the central administrative cost per 
job placement (£357.05) to each Job Broker’s cost per placement, and the third ratio 
was computed by adding the central administrative cost per sustainment (£731.38) 
to each Job Broker’s cost per sustainment. Because sustainment is presumably the 
ultimate objective of NDDP, and placement is an intermediate goal intended to lead 
to permanent employment, the third measure is probably the most interesting of 
the three. However, the first is most relevant to the cost-benefit analysis described 
in Part III, because the impact of NDDP on earnings, a key programme benefit, is 
measured as the programme’s effect on the earnings of a typical registrant. Similarly, 
NDDP’s impact on the amount of incapacity benefits received, a key potential benefit 
of the programme to the Government, is estimated as the programme’s effect on 
an average registrant. These averages are computed over all NDDP registrants, both 
those placed in jobs and those not placed in jobs.
 Table 4.1 Alternative cost-effectiveness measures
  Unweighted   Weighted 
   Tobit-   Tobit- 
 Reported  adjusted Reported  adjusted
    Total costs per registrant
Mean £1,126.19 £1,064.06 £974.77 £744.72
Median £1,069.65 £907.16 £1,069.65 £720.29
Standard deviation £430.72 £468.66 £254.85 £276.54
Total Costs per placement
Mean £4,938.93 £4,784.91 £3,004.82 £2,430.21
Median £3,948.95 £3,948.04 £2,741.69 £1,808.71
Standard deviation £2,866.25 £3,018.04 £1,554.82 £1,759.41
    Total costs per sustainment
Mean £13,141.13 £12,847.42 £6,788.69 £5,694.92
Median £8,817.81 £8,817.81 £5,330.33 £3,670.03
Standard deviation £11,440.92 £11,679.95 £5,641.84 £6,043.04
Number 19 19 10,697 10,697
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If the NDDP cost estimates are over- or understated, the cost-effectiveness ratios in 
Table 4.1 would, of course, also be over- or understated, respectively. As previously 
indicated, the cost estimates will be overstated if participants in NDDP would have 
received some of the programme’s services even in the absence of the programme 
and understated if they are directed to services by Job Brokers that are not paid for 
by the Job Brokers. As previously suggested, these errors tend to be offsetting and 
appear to be small.
The third cost-effectiveness ratio in Table 4.1 is larger than the second and the second 
ratio is larger than the first because many NDDP registrants are not placed and many 
of those who are placed do not work for the six months necessary to count as a 
sustainment. For example, a typical registrant has only about a 36 per cent probability 
of being placed and only around a 17 per cent chance of working over six months.
As previously demonstrated, the costs of smaller Job Brokers tend to be relatively 
high and their placement and sustainment ratios relatively low. Hence, as would 
be anticipated, the regressions reported in Table 4.2 indicate that Job Broker size 
is strongly inversely related to costs per sustainment. More specifically, the results 
suggest that a one per cent increase in the number of registrants at a Job Broker of 
average size would reduce that Job Broker’s costs per sustainment by around £60. 
This does not demonstrate, however, that larger Job Brokers are necessarily more 
cost-effective than smaller Job Brokers. They may, for example, simply work with 
registrants who are more easily placed and kept in jobs or operate in labour markets 
with more job openings26. The regressions also provide some evidence that, holding 
size constant, costs per sustainment are higher at the eight Job Brokers that provide 
training in computer and telephone skills. There were no other statistically significant 
explanatory variables.
Returning to Table 4.1, it can be seen that mean costs per sustainment are considerably 
larger than median cost per sustainment. This is because the fraction of registrants 
who sustained employment for over six months was very small at a few Job Brokers. 
Indeed, while the sustainment rates for 11 of the 19 Job Brokers in the sample are 
above 10 per cent, they are under five per cent for four other Job Brokers. As a 
consequence, the cost per sustainment is very high for the latter Job Brokers (indeed, 
above £20,000 for three). This pulls up the mean, but not the median. Thus, the 
median cost per sustainment is probably a more reliable measure of the performance 
of relatively efficacious Job Brokers, although the mean is more appropriate for 
making comparisons among Job Brokers.
26  It will be seen in Part III that although larger Job Brokers have greater impacts 
on reducing incapacity benefits than smaller Job Brokers, they do not necessarily 
have greater impacts on employment levels.
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Table 4.  Unweighted OLS regression estimates of factors   
  influencing total costs per sustainment
   Dependent Variable  
  Reported   Tobit-adjusted 
 Regression 1  Regression  Regression 1  Regression 
Constant 43,742.259 42,603.043 45,906.677 44,842.418
 (10,828.39) (9,853.87) (10,725.01) (9,913.04)
 [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
Ln(number of registrants) -5,468.977 -5,926.776 -5,908.289 -6,335.966
 (1,894.41) (1,734.62) (1,876.32) (1,745.03)
 [.01] [.00] [.01] [.00]
Job Broker Provides Computer  
and Telephone Skills = 1  8,789.361  8,211.042
  (4,103.07)  (4,127.71)
  [.05]  [.06]
Adjusted R2 .284 .413 .331 .430
F-value 8.334 7.341 9.915 7.799
Number of observations 19 19 19 19
*Standard errors appear in parentheses, ( ), and p-values in brackets, [ ]
The unweighted cost-effectiveness ratios in Table 4.1 are larger than their weighted 
counterparts, especially in the case of costs per sustainment. This is because, as seen 
in Table 4.2, the smaller Job Brokers tend to be the least cost-effective. Thus, when 
given as much weight as the larger, more cost-effective Job Brokers, they cause the 
mean and median cost-effectiveness ratios to be higher than when they are given 
less weight. The weighted ratios are more relevant for our purposes because they 
indicate the cost per sustainment (or per placement or per registrant) for the typical or 
the median NDDP participant, rather than for the average or median Job Broker.
Focusing on the weighted median values reported in Table 4.1, it appears that the cost 
per registrant is £700 to £1,100, the cost per placement is £2,000 to £3,000 and the 
cost per sustainment is £4,000 to £5,000. Are these figures large or small? A simple 
way of looking at this is to determine the number of hours a NDDP registrant would 
have to work to earn £5,000. At a minimum wage of £4.20, the adult minimum that 
existed during the time period covered by the cost data, such an individual would 
have to work nearly 1,200 hours. A registrant who works 30 hours a week over a year 
would work well over 1,200 hours. Of course, many NDDP registrants who sustain 
employment would work more than a year (they must work at least six months to 
count as a sustainment) and earn more than the minimum wage. Consequently, the 
earnings of such persons will be far larger than £5,000. For example, a registrant 
who works 30 hours a week over a year at £6 per hour would earn about £9,000. 
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Thus, the earnings of most of those registrants who sustain employment are quite 
likely to exceed the cost that a relatively efficient Job Broker incurs in achieving a 
sustainment.
This analysis is quite misleading in at least one very important respect, however, 
because many NDDP registrants who worked would have worked even without the 
programme. Costs that result from the programme can only be offset by benefits that 
are generated by the programme – for example, increases in earnings or reductions 
in incapacity benefit payments that also result from the programme. In the next part 
of this report, we compare such benefits with our estimates of programme costs.
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Part III – Cost-benefit analysis
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5  Data and methods
Summary
This section contains information on:
• the cost and programme impact estimates that are used in the cost-benefit 
analysis (Section 5.1);
• how impacts were predicted beyond the months for which they were estimated 
(Section 5.2);
• procedures used to estimate the New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) impacts 
that have not previously been estimated (Section 5.3);
• the discount rate used to compute the present values of NDDP benefits (Section 
5.4).
5.1  Cost and benefit estimates 
The purpose of the cost-benefit analysis is to determine whether the benefits from 
NDDP outweigh the programme’s costs from a societal point of view and, thus, 
whether NDDP is economically efficient. The analysis also attempts to establish 
whether the programme improves the well-being of those who register in it and 
what the net effect of NDDP is on the Government’s budget. Thus, the intent of the 
analysis is to provide information that is helpful in determining whether NDDP should 
continue to be funded and, if so, whether it should be modified.
To determine the relative size of NDDP’s costs and benefits, the analysis, as previously 
indicated, relies heavily on estimates from the cost analysis (which are presented in 
Part II) and on estimates from the NDDP impact analysis conducted by Orr, Bell and 
Lam (2007). The monetary estimates have all been converted to 2005 pounds by 
using the UK Retail Prices Index for consumer prices so that they are comparable to 
one another. Because the monetary values presented in this part of the report have 
been adjusted for inflation, they differ from those reported in Part II of the report and 
in Orr, Bell and Lam (2007), which are not inflation adjusted. The monetary values 
all pertain to a typical or an average NDDP registrant. 
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Three alternative measures of the Government’s cost of running NDDP are used in 
the cost-benefit analysis: (1) the lower-bound weighted estimate of total costs per 
registrant from the first row of Table 4.1; (2) the upper-bound weighted estimate 
of total costs per registrant from the first row of Table 4.1; and (3) the incentive 
payments the Government made to the Job Brokers between April 2002 and March 
2003 plus the estimate of Jobcentre Plus’s cost of administering NDDP over the same 
period. After adjustment to 2005 prices, these three values are £804, £1,052 and 
£1,062, respectively. As discussed at length in Part II, the lower-bound cost estimates 
are adjusted for the possibility that two of the Job Brokers overstated their costs in 
the data they provided us with and the upper-bound estimates are not adjusted for 
this possibility. The difference between each of the first two estimates and the third 
estimate provides two alternative measures of Job Broker profits per registrant.
Although the third measure provides the best available estimate of the cost the 
Government actually incurred in the past in operating NDDP, the other two measures 
are more accurate estimates of the cost to Job Brokers of operating the programme 
for a typical registrant and therefore, provide measures of the value of the resources 
required to operate NDDP. From the societal point of view, these are the appropriate 
estimates of costs because it does not matter whether the Government or individual 
Job Brokers bear these costs. What does matter is that resources that would otherwise 
be available for other purposes are used instead to operate the programme. 
The first two measures also probably more closely approximate the costs that the 
Government will need to bear over the long-run. That is, Job Brokers that operate at a 
loss are unlikely to continue to operate that way over the long-run and the Government 
presumably will not permit Job Brokers to reap large profits over the long-run. Thus, 
the costs Job Brokers actually incur and Government incentive payments seem likely 
to tend to approximate one another over the long-run. As it turns out, measures (2) 
and (3) are virtually identical in value. This simply reflects the fact that the upper bound 
estimate of costs implies that Job Broker profits per registrant are near zero because 
Job Broker costs per registrant and Government incentive payments per registrant 
were approximately the same. Thus, the cost-benefit findings will be unaffected by 
whether measures (2) or (3) are used. NDDP is somewhat more likely to be found to 
be cost-beneficial if cost measure (1), which is our preferred measure, is used instead 
of either of the other two measures. However, although measure (1) is smaller than 
measures (2) and (3), the gap is not that large.
The key estimates from the impact analysis appear in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. The 
impact estimates are reported separately for continuing claimants – that is, individuals 
who were already claiming one of the NDDP ‘qualifying benefits’ (see Part I) when 
NDDP was initiated – and for new (or returning) claimants. The tables contain separate 
impact estimates for two overlapping cohorts of registrants: those who registered 
between 1 July 2001 and 31 December 2002 (‘the 24-month cohort’) and those who 
registered between 1 July 2001 and 31 December 2001 (‘the 36-month cohort’). 
As indicated by the tables, the 24-month cohort is much larger than the 36-month 
cohort, especially for new claimants. More importantly, perhaps, it is not limited to 
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individuals who registered during the first six months after the national extension 
of NDDP and thus, is less likely to be subject to various programme start-up issues. 
Thus, we rely on the impact estimates for the 24-month cohort in determining 
NDDP’s benefits over the first two years after registration in the programme. However, 
because the 36-month cohort is confined to an earlier group of registrants than the 
24-month cohort, it was possible to estimate programme impacts for them for an 
additional post-registration year. Hence, as explained later, the 36-month cohort 
provides information we use in determining how impacts change over the time 
since registration. 
The first set of four estimates in Table 5.1 indicates NDDP’s impacts on the proportion 
of registrants who received at least one of the following three benefits: Incapacity 
Benefits (IB), Income Support (IS) or Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA) during each 
of the 24 months. The second four estimates (which are shown in 2005 prices) pertain 
to NDDP’s impacts on the total monthly receipts of the three types of benefits. For 
example, the 24-month cohort estimates for the ninth month following registration 
imply that the amount of IB, IS and SDA the average continuing customer who 
registered for NDDP received was nearly £67 less than it would have been in the 
absence of the programme and that the receipt of at least one of these three benefits 
by these persons was about ten percentage points lower. The latter result occurs 
because the findings from the impact analysis imply that 91 per cent of continuing 
customers who were registrants would have received IB, IS or SDA during the ninth 
month in the absence of NDDP, but, because of the programme, only 81 per cent 
were in receipt of at least one of these benefits. The 36-month cohort estimates for 
the ninth month for continuing customers are similar but a bit larger.
The consistently negative signs on the impacts shown in Table 5.1 imply, as anticipated, 
that NDDP reduced the amount of incapacity benefits registrants received and 
reduced the proportion of registrants that received these benefits at all. The impact 
estimates that are shown in Table 5.1 are all statistically significant at the one per cent 
level, except for the 36-month cohort estimates for new (or returning) registrants, 
which are based on only a small sample of registrants. The impacts for continuing 
claimants are usually larger than those for new claimants. The impacts for both 
continuing and new claimants appear to first grow and then begin to shrink after 20 
or so months, especially for new claimants. The trends for the impacts on the total 
monthly receipts of IB, IS and SDA are also shown by the curves for the 24-month 
cohort (the alternating dash-dot lines) and for the 36-month cohort (the solid lines) 
in Figure 5.1 for continuing customers and in Figure 5.2 for new customers (the 
curves with the broken lines are discussed in Section 5.2).
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Figure .1  Continuing claimants impacts on IB/IS/SDA benefits  
   over time
 
 
 
 
Figure .  New claimants impacts on IB/IS/SDA benefits  
   over time
Data and methods
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Table 5.2 is designed similarly to Table 5.1, but pertains to Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA), rather than IB, IS, and SDA. The impacts on the receipt of JSA and on the 
amount of JSA received are much smaller than the combined impact on IB, IS, and 
SDA, usually well under one percentage point and £5, respectively. Indeed, they are 
sometimes so small that they are not statistically significant, even for the relatively 
large sample available for the 24-month cohort. This particularly occurs towards the 
end of the 24 month estimation period. In further contrast to the impact estimates 
on IB, IS, and SDA, they are usually positive in sign. In those relatively rare instances 
when they are negative, they statistically differ from zero only once, and then only 
marginally. The positive impacts of NDDP on JSA presumably results because the 
programme causes registrants to become more active in the labour market and, 
as a result, some of them substitute JSA for incapacity benefits when they are not 
employed or are employed for fewer than 16 hours a week. Given the small size of 
the impacts, however, this substitution is minimal. With the possible exception of 
the impact on the receipt of JSA by continuing claimants, the JSA impacts appear to 
increase over the first few months after registration and then decline.
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Table 5.3 pertains to NDDP’s impacts on the proportion of registrants who received 
earnings (that is, on the proportion who were employed). Estimates of NDDP’s impacts 
on monthly earnings could not be provided by Orr, Bell and Lam, who did not have 
data on earnings, but, for purposes of the cost-benefit analysis, are instead inferred 
on the basis of the estimates of NDDP’s impacts on employment. The method we 
use to do this is described later.
Table .3  Estimated impacts of NDDP on employment
 4-month cohort 3-month cohort
Month after Continuing New Continuing New 
registration claimants claimants  claimants claimants
 1 0.0331 *** 0.0333 *** 0.0239 *** 0.0039 
 2 0.0451 *** 0.0419 *** 0.0317 *** 0.0430 **
 3 0.0544 *** 0.0448 *** 0.0389 *** 0.0507 **
 4 0.0591 *** 0.0487 *** 0.0402 *** 0.0673 ***
 5 0.0632 *** 0.0428 *** 0.0440 *** 0.0515 **
 6 0.0694 *** 0.0378 *** 0.0532 *** 0.0604 **
 7 0.0726 *** 0.0447 *** 0.0573 *** 0.0567 **
 8 0.0760 *** 0.0471 *** 0.0612 *** 0.0639 ***
 9 0.0787 *** 0.0471 *** 0.0641 *** 0.0711 ***
 10 0.0815 *** 0.0502 *** 0.0644 *** 0.0777 ***
 11 0.0830 *** 0.0544 *** 0.0639 *** 0.0687 ***
 12 0.0862 *** 0.0599 *** 0.0662 *** 0.0767 ***
 13 0.0883 *** 0.0605 *** 0.0654 *** 0.0735 ***
 14 0.0899 *** 0.0598 *** 0.0650 *** 0.0687 ***
 15 0.0920 *** 0.0617 *** 0.0683 *** 0.0642 ***
 16 0.0942 *** 0.0615 *** 0.0744 *** 0.0895 ***
 17 0.0962 *** 0.0617 *** 0.0787 *** 0.0895 ***
 18 0.0983 *** 0.0627 *** 0.0826 *** 0.0860 ***
 19 0.1001 *** 0.0645 *** 0.0894 *** 0.0977 ***
 20 0.1026 *** 0.0693 *** 0.0971 *** 0.1236 ***
 21 0.1049 *** 0.0726 *** 0.1013 *** 0.1116 ***
 22 0.1058 *** 0.0736 *** 0.1029 *** 0.1153 ***
 23 0.1074 *** 0.0754 *** 0.1032 *** 0.1167 ***
Continued
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Table .3  Continued
 4-month cohort 3-month cohort
Month after Continuing New Continuing New 
registration claimants claimants  claimants claimants
 24 0.1082 *** 0.0742 *** 0.1036 *** 0.1106 ***
 25     0.1031 *** 0.1028 ***
 26     0.1030 *** 0.0953 ***
 27     0.1024 *** 0.0999 ***
 28     0.1045 *** 0.0822 ***
 29     0.1062 *** 0.0992 ***
 30     0.1056 *** 0.0977 ***
 31     0.1054 *** 0.0896 ***
 32     0.1068 *** 0.0934 ***
 33     0.1101 *** 0.0848 ***
 34     0.1108 *** 0.0820 ***
 35     0.1101 *** 0.0748 ***
 36     0.1115 *** 0.0755 ***
Sample size:      
Registrants 23,696 5,585 5,635 295
Non registrants 211,782 49,354 48,607 3,164
Source: Source: Regression estimates provided by Orr, Bell and Lam.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
The consistently positive values of the impact estimates on employment indicate 
that NDDP increased the fraction of registrants that was employed. For example, 
employment for continuing claimants in the 24th month after registration was 10 or 
11 percentage points higher for registrants than for non-registrants. With only a few 
minor exceptions for new claimants in the 36-month cohort, the impact estimates 
that are shown in Table 5.3 are all statistically significant at the one per cent level. 
As indicated by the table and also by Figures 5.3 and 5.4, which are analogous to 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the impacts for continuing claimants appear to grow over the 
36 months for which they are available, albeit at a diminishing pace, while those 
for new claimants first grow and then seem to shrink during the third year after 
registration (the broken lines for predicted impacts that appear in the figures are 
discussed in Section 5.2).
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Figure .3  Continuing claimants impacts on employment  
   over time
 
 
 
Figure .4  New claimants impacts on employment over time
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A comparison of Table 5.3 with Table 5.1 indicates that NDDP’s impact on the 
percentage of claimants who are employed is smaller than its impact on the percentage 
in receipt of IB, IS or SDA. One plausible explanation for this is that NDDP increased the 
weekly hours of some registrants who would have worked in the absence of NDDP, 
but fewer than 16 hours per week, to above this threshold, and, as a consequence, 
they no longer qualified for incapacity benefits. Unfortunately, data were not available 
to estimate NDDP’s impact on the weekly hours of registrants who were employed. 
It is also possible that NDDP caused some registrants to leave the incapacity benefit 
rolls for destinations other than jobs (e.g. for other benefit programmes) or that some 
persons who did initially enter employment as a result of participating in NDDP later 
became unemployed but did not return to the incapacity benefit rolls.
5.2  Predicting future impacts 
It is implausible that the impacts of NDDP suddenly end 24 or 36 months after 
registration, although those are all the months for which direct estimates of these 
impacts are available for the two cohorts of registrants. Indeed, Tables 5.1 and 5.3 and 
Figures 5.1 to 5.4 suggest that the impacts on incapacity benefits and employment 
are usually still appreciable at 24 months and even at 36 months. For purposes of 
the cost-benefit analysis, it is therefore very important to predict impacts during the 
months for which they are not directly available and then incorporate these predicted 
impacts into the analysis. 
The approach we take to predicting impacts is to use the 36 months of available 
impact estimates to estimate regression equations, with the impact estimates as the 
dependent variable and a time trend variable as the explanatory variable. Because 
we have more confidence in the impact estimates for the 24-month cohort than 
those for the 36-month cohort, in the cost-benefit analysis we rely on directly 
estimated impacts from the former for valuing benefits during the first 24 months 
after registration and on predictions from the regression equations to determine 
impacts for all the months thereafter. 
To illustrate the approach we begin with the impacts on IB/IS/SDA listed in Table 
5.1. We estimated the predictive regressions for these benefits with two alternative 
specifications for the time trend variable: a quadratic specification (i.e. months since 
registration plus months squared) and a logarithmic specification (i.e. the natural 
logarithm of months since registration). The quadratic specification posits that these 
impacts first grow in absolute magnitude, but at an increasingly slow rate and then 
begin to shrink, eventually altogether disappearing (thus, the time profile resembles 
a U), while the logarithmic specification presumes that the impacts continue to grow 
in absolute value but at a diminishing rate, eventually barely changing at all. Both 
specifications are consistent with the (limited) information provided in Table 5.1 and 
Figure 5.1 for continuing claimants about how the programme impacts on incapacity 
benefits change over time. The quadratic specification seems more consistent with 
the data in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 for new claimants.
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The regression estimates that are based on the two alternative specifications appear 
in Table 5.4. The regressions are estimated for the 24 impacts estimates obtained from 
the 24-month cohort (see the top panel in the table), and then again for 36 impact 
estimates (see the bottom panel), with those for the first 24 months after registration 
obtained from the 24-month cohort and those for the last 12 months acquired from 
the 36 month cohort. In estimating the regressions for the combined cohorts, we 
attempt to take account of the fact that impact estimates from two different cohorts 
that are spliced together may systematically differ from one another. We do this by 
including a dummy variable that equals zero for impact estimates from the 24-month 
cohort and has a value of one for impact estimates from the 36-month cohort. 
Because the impacts on the receipt and the amount of IB, IS, and SDA benefits are 
negative, the consistently negative coefficients on the number of months after 
registration and on the natural logarithm of the number of months after registration, 
imply that the size of the effects of NDDP on the amount of benefits received and 
on whether benefits are received grow over time. The consistently positive signs on 
the square of the number of months after registration in the quadratic regressions 
imply that these effects grow at a diminishing rate and eventually begin to shrink. 
The predictions that are based on the quadratic specification are illustrated by the 
broken line curves in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
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Both the quadratic and the logarithmic specifications fit the data very well. Most of 
the regressions account for over 90 per cent of the variance of the impact estimates; 
and, with the exception of some of the coefficients on the month 25-36 dummy 
variable, all of the estimated regression coefficients are highly statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Overall, the fit for the impact estimates for continuing claimants 
is somewhat better than that for new claimants, the fit for the regressions based 
on the 24-month cohort tends to be marginally superior to that for the regressions 
relying on the combined cohort, and the fit for the logarithmic specification is more 
often better than that for the quadratic specification. However, all the regression 
equations appear highly satisfactory for predictive purposes.
The fact that the regressions that are based on the 24-month cohort perform a little 
better than those using the combined cohorts is not surprising given the somewhat 
erratic time trends in impacts estimated with the 36-month cohort that is apparent 
in the figures presented earlier. Nonetheless, we prefer using the regressions based 
on combined cohorts for predictive purposes because, by incorporating an additional 
year of impact estimates, the resulting predictions are based on greater information 
about time trends. In using these regressions, we set the 25-36 month dummy 
variable equal to zero, thereby, in effect, treating all the impact estimates as if they 
are based on the 24-month cohort.
Those combined cohort regressions that use the quadratic specification provide 
estimates for new claimants that are somewhat superior to those that rely on the 
logarithmic specification, while the opposite is true for continuing claimants. Although 
the choice between the two alternative predictive regression specifications is not 
obvious, for reasons discussed below, we prefer the quadratic specification and use 
it for computing the central cost-benefit estimates that we present later. However, 
in presenting these estimates, we also discuss whether our conclusions are sensitive 
to this choice. 
The predictions that are based on the combined cohorts and the quadratic specification 
are displayed by the broken line in Figures 5.1 to 5.4. A comparison of the predictions 
with the impact estimates produced by the 24-month cohort suggests that they 
mimic these estimates quite well. 
One reason for our preference for the quadratic specification is that it is conservative in 
the sense that, unlike the logarithmic specification, programme impacts are predicted 
to diminish in absolute value and eventually fall to zero (the U-shape). For example, 
the predictions in last two rows of each panel in Table 5.4 imply that programme 
impacts on the receipt and the amount of IB, IS, and SDA payments first increase but 
begin to decline after around two years and end in four or five years.27  If programme 
27 Taken literally, the quadratic function implies that NDDP would eventually cause 
the receipt and the amount of IB, IS and SDA to increase, rather than decrease. 
This is obviously implausible. Thus, in projecting programme throughout the 
cost-benefit analysis, we assume that there are no further programme effects 
once impacts reach zero.
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net benefits (i.e. programme benefits less programme costs) are found to be positive 
on the basis of the quadratic specification, then they would be even more positive 
if they were based on the logarithmic specification instead. This is illustrated by a 
comparison of the actual time trend in impacts on incapacity benefits received by 
continuing claimants that appears in Figure 5.1 with the time trend implied by the 
quadratic specification. Such a comparison suggests that the predicted decline in 
impacts may be greater than the actual decline for continuing claimants and, hence, 
that the predictions may understate future impacts. However, a similar comparison 
of the actual and predicted time trend in impacts in Figure 5.2 suggests that the 
predicted decline in impacts may be fairly accurate for new claimants. 
Perhaps a more important reason for our preference for the quadratic specification is 
that it seems more plausible than the logarithmic specification, even for continuing 
claimants. First, most Job Brokers are more focused on getting registrants into jobs 
than on increasing their human capital. It seems likely that some NDDP registrants 
that Job Brokers help place in jobs would have eventually found jobs without the 
help of Job Brokers, but not as quickly. If so, the impact of NDDP on employment 
and benefit payments would eventually diminish. 
Second, the health conditions and impairments of some registrants who obtained 
jobs and left the benefit rolls as a result of the NDDP programme may become more 
severe over time, causing them to leave employment eventually and return to benefits. 
If so, programme impacts will again diminish over time. 
Third, the U-shape that is implied by the quadratic specifications is generally consistent 
with other evidence. For example, in a meta-analysis that included 27 random 
assignment evaluations of over 70 US mandatory welfare-to-work programmes 
targeted at recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, which was 
previously the US’s major cash welfare programme, found that programme impacts 
on benefit amounts, benefit receipt, and employment first increased but began to 
decline after two or three years and ended after five to seven years (Greenberg, 
Cebulla, and Bouchet 2005). An earlier meta-analysis by some of the same researchers 
obtained very similar results for impacts on earnings (Greenberg et al. 2004), as 
did a meta-analysis of US Government-funded training programmes (Greenberg, 
Michalopoulous, and Robins 2004).28 The findings for NDDP that are based on the 
quadratic specification appear quite consistent with those from the meta-analysis, 
28  The one exception to this time-tend pattern was for adult women in the 
Greenberg, Michalopoulous, and Robins (2004) study. They found that earnings 
impacts for adult women who participated in training programs first increased for 
several years and then remain undiminished. However, earnings impacts for the 
other two groups they analysed, adult males and youth, did seem to follow the 
pattern. Moreover, except for adult women in the Greenberg, Michalopoulous, 
and Robins (2004) study, the impact peak and end of the impacts occurred at 
roughly the same points in time in all three studies.
Data and methods
7
although NDDP’s impacts on the receipt and the amount of incapacity benefits appear 
to end somewhat sooner.29 The findings in the Greenberg, Cebulla, and Bouchet 2005 
study are especially supportive of the existence of a U-shaped time pattern because 
a number of the evaluations included in their meta-analysis measured impacts for 
three, four, or even five years. 
Table 5.5 presents regression estimates that can be used to predict how NDDP’s 
impacts on JSA changes over time. The time trend variable in the reported regressions 
is specified as a simple linear term because this specification seemed to fit the data 
considerably better than either the quadratic or the logarithmic specifications used in 
estimating the predictive regressions for IB, IS, and SDA benefits. Even so, however, 
the statistical fit for the regressions presented in Table 5.5 is not nearly as good as 
the fit for regressions reported in Table 5.4. This is probably because the impacts 
themselves are much smaller and change more erratically over time.
The regression coefficient on the number of months variable is negative in six of the 
eight regressions reported in Table 5.5, implying that the NDDP’s impacts on JSA shrink 
over time and fall to zero within two or three years after registration. For purposes 
of the cost-benefit analysis, we assume that these impacts never become negative, 
both because all but one of the estimated negative impacts do not significantly differ 
from zero (see Table 5.2) and because there is little reason to expect that NDDP would 
cause the receipt of JSA to fall.
The regression coefficients on the number of months after registration variable are 
positive but very small in the regressions for NDDP’s impacts on the receipt of JSA by 
continuing claimants, implying that these impacts increase very slowly over time. For 
example, the first column of Table 5.2 indicates that NDDP caused the percentage 
of registrants who are continuing customers and receive JSA to increase by about a 
half of a percentage point in month 24. The regression predicts that the size of this 
impact would rise by one-tenth of a percentage point over the following two years. 
It seems highly unlikely that NDDP’s effect on the fraction of continuing claimants 
who receive JSA would continue to be sustained forever. After all, as the bottom 
row of Table 5.5 indicates, the impact of NDDP on average JSA benefit levels for this 
group is predicted to reach zero in 34 months after registration. For purposes of the 
cost-benefit analysis, we arbitrarily assume that NDDP’s impact on the receipt of JSA 
29 It is important to recognise, however, that these meta-analyses pertain to the 
‘average’ programme in the sample of all those examined. Individual programmes 
may have somewhat different patterns. For example, Knight et al. 2006) found 
that the impacts of the New Deal for Lone Parents remained substantial after 
four years, although they had begun to diminish by that time, although only 
slightly in most instances. Dolton and O’Neill (2002) found that Restart still had 
substantial impacts on the unemployment rates of males (but not females) five 
years after initial participation in the programme, although there is again some 
indication that they had begun to diminish by that time.
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by continuing claimants would disappear after ten years. As will be seen later, this 
impact is so small, that the specific assumption that is made about the end point has 
only a trivial effect on the results of the analysis.
Table 5.6 presents regression estimates that can be used to predict how NDDP’s 
impacts on employment changes over time. As in the case of the impacts on IB/IS/
SDA, we estimated the predictive regressions for employment with two alternative 
specifications for the time trend variable: a quadratic specification and a logarithmic 
specification. In estimating the regressions for the combined cohorts, we again adjust 
for the fact that two separate time-series are spliced together by including a dummy 
variable that equals zero for impact estimates from the 24-month cohort and one 
for impact estimates from the 36-month cohort. The fact that the coefficients on 
this dummy are negative for continuing claimants and positive for new claimants, 
and highly statistically significant for both groups, suggests that it probably mostly 
captures systematic differences between the time series from the 24-month and 
36-month cohorts, rather than time trends.
The quadratic specification fits the data at least as well as the logarithmic specification 
and in some instances better. All of the regressions using this specification account for 
well over 90 per cent of the variance of the impact estimates and, with one important 
exception, all of the estimated regression coefficients are highly statistically significant 
at conventional levels. The exception is the estimated coefficient on the square of the 
number of months after registration in the regression for new claimants that relies 
on impacts from the 24-month cohort. This coefficient is so imprecisely estimated 
that its true value could be either positive or negative. However, we do not use this 
regression for predictive purposes. For the reasons discussed earlier, we rely instead 
on the regression equations that are based on the combined 24-month/36-month 
cohorts and on the quadratic specification. These regressions imply that positive 
impacts on the employment of continuing registrants continue for over six years and 
those for new claimants persist for over four years.
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5.3  Estimating additional impacts
As previously discussed, the NDDP impact study provides impact estimates for five 
monthly outcomes: the amount of IB, IS and SDA benefits that NDDP registrants 
received; whether registrants received benefits from at least one of these three 
programmes; the amount of JSA that was received; whether registrants received JSA 
benefits; and whether NDDP registrants were employed. Other impacts that result 
from NDDP – for example, increases in earnings; increases in Government tax receipts 
and National Insurance contributions; changes in benefit payments other than IB, IS, 
SDA and JSA (e.g. the Working Tax Credit, Council Tax Benefit and Housing Benefit); 
and decreases in the costs of administrating benefit programmes – must be inferred 
from the five impacts that have been estimated.
To illustrate how such inferences can be made, we begin by describing how we 
compute the savings in the cost of administering IB, IS, SDA that resulted because 
NDDP reduced the proportion of registrants in receipt of benefits under these three 
benefit programmes. The first two columns of Table 5.1, which rely of the 24-month 
cohort, provide estimates of NDDP’s impact on the proportion of registrants who 
received IB, IS or SDA during each of 24 months. For example, the estimate in the 
first column for continuing claimants implies that during the ninth month after 
registration about one of every ten registrants who would have otherwise received 
IB, IS or SDA benefits did not do so as a result of having registered for NDDP. Stated 
somewhat differently, the estimate implies that, on average – that is, averaged over 
both registrants who left the benefit rolls as a result of NDDP and registrants whose 
benefit status was unaffected by NDDP – continuing claimants were off-benefits 
for 10 per cent of the ninth post-registration month due to their participation in 
NDDP. Hence, the saving in administrating IB, IS or SDA that resulted from NDDP 
during the ninth month after registration is simply one-tenth of the monthly cost of 
administering these programmes.
In the 24-month cohort that Orr, Bell, and Lam used to estimate the impacts of 
NDDP on the receipt of benefits, 91.9 per cent of the observations received IB at 
registration, 38.4 received IS, and 7.3 per cent received SDA (correspondence with 
Steve Bell on 20 March 2006). These three figures exceed 100 per cent because many 
NDDP registrants who received IB or SDA at registration also received IS. According 
to estimates provided by DWP, the annual cost of administering IB is £24.12 and 
the annual cost of administering IS is £39.50, or £2.01 and £3.29 per month, 
respectively. Similar estimates are not available for SDA but it seems reasonable to 
assume that the cost of administering SDA and IB are similar.30 Given this assumption, 
30 Because so few NDDP registrants received benefits under SDA, the findings 
from the cost-benefit analysis are little affected by this assumption. 
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and also assuming that each of the three benefit programmes engender separate 
administrative costs,31 the savings to the Government in administrative costs for 
each month a typical registrant is off benefits is about £3.26 ((.919 x £2.01) + (.073 
x £2.01) + (.384 x £3.29)). Thus, during the ninth month after registration, the 
Government saved about £0.34 (.103 x £3.26) in administering incapacity benefits 
for the average NDDP registrant as a result of the programme. 
For purposes of the cost-benefit analysis, these administrative savings were similarly 
estimated for each of the other 23 months for which NDDP’s impact on the receipt 
of IB, IS or SDA was directly estimated for continuing claimants and for each of the 
23 additional months for which the quadratic regression equation appearing in 
Table 6.1 predicts this impact would continue. An identical approach was used to 
estimate administrative savings for new claimants. The same approach was also used 
to estimate the increase in administrative costs that result because NDDP causes a 
small increase in the receipt of JSA. According to DWP figures, the annual cost of 
administering JSA is £46.50 or £3.87 per month.
To make the estimates necessary infer earnings, we first converted the month-by-
month employment impacts into NDDP’s impact on total months employed. (For 
example, as shown in Table 5.3, it was estimated that continuing claimants in the 
24-month cohort increased their employment by 0.0331 percentage points in 
post-registration month 1 because of NDDP, by 0.0451 percentage points in post-
registration month 2, etc.) The impact on total months employed was computed by 
summing the monthly estimates (0.0331 + 0.0451 +….). Using the 24-month cohort 
to obtain these values for the first 24 months and the predictive regressions for the 
months thereafter, and discounting by 3.5 per cent (see the following section), we 
find that NDDP increased employment by a total of 5.8114 months for an average 
continuing registrant and by a total of 2.4325 months for an average new registrant.32 
We then multiplied these figures by the monthly earnings received by the average 
NDDP participant who reported post-registration employment, £581.13 in 2005 
prices. This figure excludes tax payments, National Insurance contributions and tax 
credits, which, as discussed below, are separately estimated. Thus, we estimate that 
NDDP increased the net earnings of continuing claimants by £3,777, on average, and 
the net earnings of new claimants by £1,414, on average. Exactly the same approach 
was used to estimate NDDP’s impacts on tax payments and National Insurance 
contributions; tax credit, Council Tax Benefit and Housing Benefit.
31 To the extent that economies of scale occur in administering benefits when 
individuals receive benefits under multiple programmes, this assumption will 
result in overstating the savings in administrative costs that result when NDDP 
registrants leave the benefit rolls. This bias is expected to be small.
32 Note that these estimates are averages for all NDDP registrants, not just those 
who were employed as a result of the programme. Thus, they incorporate 
zero months for registrants whose employment status was unaffected by the 
programme.
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The data needed to derive monthly earnings were obtained from data collected 
in the Survey of Registrants. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain separate 
estimates for continuing and new claimants from this source, making it necessary 
to use the £581.13 figure for both groups. The implications of doing this are 
discussed later. Estimates of the tax payments and National Insurance contributions 
made by individuals with net monthly earnings of £581.13, the National Insurance 
contributions made by the employers of such persons, the amount of tax credit 
such persons would receive, and the amount their Council Tax Benefit and Housing 
Benefit would be reduced relative to persons with no earnings were obtained from 
the DWP’s Pathways model.33  The monthly values of these amounts are as follows: 
the worker’s tax payments and National Insurance contributions equal £67.33; the 
employer’s National Insurance contributions equal £31.01; tax credits received by 
the worker equal £106.72 on average34; and the reduction in Council Tax Benefit 
and Housing Benefit equal £65.00.
We refer to the tax payments mentioned above as ‘direct taxes’ because they are 
based on earnings and typically withheld from pay checks. Individuals are also 
subject to ‘indirect taxes’ on their expenditures. These result from the VAT and 
duties on petrol, alcohol, tobacco and other commodities. Within the income range 
of NDDP customers, the marginal indirect tax rate is about 28 per cent35. Thus, we 
compute the effect of NDDP on indirect tax payments by multiplying this rate by 
the programme’s impact on disposable income (i.e. the increases in net earnings, 
JSA, and tax credits resulting from NDDP less reductions in incapacity benefits and 
Council Tax and Housing Benefit).
In multiplying NDDP’s impact on months worked by the estimate of monthly earnings, 
we are assuming that NDDP had no impact on the hours worked per month by those 
who would have been employed in the absence of the programme or on the hourly 
wage rates of those who found employment. This is a conservative assumption; if 
NDDP has a positive impact on employment, then it is also likely to have a positive 
impact on hours worked per month by those who are employed. For example, as 
pointed out previously, there is evidence that some registrants who would have 
worked fewer than 16 hours increased their hours above this amount as a result of 
NDDP. Moreover, Job Brokers only receive job and sustained employment incentive 
33  This model applies the current taxation, tax credit, and Council Tax Benefit and 
Housing Benefit rules to individuals at different earnings levels. We are indebted 
to Alex Wilks of DWP for providing us with these estimates.
34 A worker with net monthly earnings of £581.13 would actually be eligible for 
£213.45 of tax credits per month. However, based on survey information and 
judgment, DWP assumes that the take up rate for tax credits among incapacity 
beneficiaries who move into employment is 50 per cent. In conducting the cost-
benefit analysis, we make the same assumption.
35 We are indebted to the DWP Costings Team for providing information on 
marginal indirect tax rates.
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payments for claimants who work eight hours or more a week and they receive larger 
payments for claimants who work full-time. Thus, they have a strong incentive to 
try to increase the work hours of claimants.36  Hence, the actual total ‘net’ benefits 
of NDDP (i.e., total programme benefits minus total programme costs) are likely to 
be understated by their estimated values. 
5.4  Discounting
Because NDDP’s impacts and, hence, benefits occur over a number of years, and 
benefits that are received later are of less value than similar amounts that are received 
sooner, a discount rate is used to convert the streams of benefits resulting from NDDP 
to their present values. This is standard practice in cost-benefit analysis. Otherwise, 
benefits that occur at different points of time are not comparable and also cannot 
be appropriately compared to costs, which in NDDP are mostly incurred soon after 
registration. Once benefits in each month are converted to their present values, total 
programme benefits can be computed by simply summing these present values.
Although there is considerable debate over the appropriate discount rate, recent 
assessments by the Treasury (2003), Moore et al., (2004), and Boardman et al., 
(2006) all recommend using an annual discount rate of 3.5 per cent to compute the 
present values of the benefits from programmes such as NDDP. Boardman et al., 
(2006) further suggest using an upper bound of five per cent and a lower bound 
of one per cent for sensitivity analysis. Following these recommendations, we use 
3.5 per cent for our central estimates of net benefits and test the sensitivity of these 
estimates to using one and five per cent instead.
36 Programme impacts on hourly wage rates seem less likely as most Job Brokers 
do little to increase the job skills of registrants.
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6  The Government’s     
  perspective
Summary
• The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) is cost-beneficial from the Government’s 
perspective.
• This conclusion appears to be highly robust to the assumptions that underlie 
it. 
• NDDP is found to reduce the Government’s budgetary requirements by over 
£2,500 for a typical continuing claimant and by £750 to £1,000 for an average 
new claimant. 
• The Government saved between £3.41 and £4.50 for continuing claimants 
and between £1.71 and £2.26 for new claimants in benefit payments and 
administrative expenditures for each pound it expended on NDDP.
• The benefits received by the Government exceeded the costs incurred by the 
Government at both relatively large and small Job Brokers, but did so to a much 
greater extent at the former than at the latter.
Table 6.1 shows how NDDP affects the Government’s budget. The figures all pertain 
to a typical or average NDDP registrant. Because separate cost estimates are not 
available for continuing and new claimants (although separate benefit estimates 
are), it is assumed that identical costs were engendered by the average registrant 
in each of these two groups.37 The estimates of net benefits in Table 6.1 were 
computed by subtracting the cost estimates from the benefit estimates. Because 
three alternative estimates of NDDP’s costs are available, three estimates of net 
benefits are presented.
37 It is plausible that the cost of serving new claimants is less than the cost of 
serving continuing claimants because the former have been more recently 
employed, on average, than the latter. However, there is no way of knowing 
this for certain. 
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Table .1  NDDP’s benefits and costs per registrant from the   
  Government’s perspective
 Continuing New 
 claimants claimants
Benefits  
Reduction in IB/IS/SDA expenditures £3,165  £1,764 
Reductions in costs of administering IB/IS/SDA £22 £13
Reductions in expenditures on housing and council tax benefits £378 £158
Increases in direct tax revenues and  
National Insurance contributions £391 £164
Increases in indirect tax revenues £136 -£60
Increases in employers’ National Insurance contributions £180 £75
Costs  
Increases in JSA £30 33
Increase in cost of administering JSA £3 £1
Increases in Tax Credits £620 £260
Government costs of operating NDDP (alternative estimates)  
Lower-Bound estimates £804 £804
Upper-bound estimates £1,052 £1,052
Actual Government expenditures £1,062 £1,062
Net benefits (benefits – costs)  
Based on the lower-bound costs £2,815 £1,016
Based on the upper-bound costs £2,567 £768
Based on actual Government costs £2,557 £758
Note: All values are in 2005 prices.
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The key finding in Table 6.1 is that, regardless of the cost estimate used in their 
computation, net benefits are substantially positive for both continuing and new 
claimants, suggesting that NDDP reduces the Government’s budgetary requirements.38 
To view this somewhat differently, the figures in Table 6.1 imply that for each pound 
it invests in NDDP, the Government saves between £3.41 and £4.50 for continuing 
claimants and between £1.71 and £2.26 for new claimants in benefit payments and 
administrative expenditures. 
38 The net benefits in Table 6.1 are computed by dividing benefits (B) less costs 
(C) by the number of programme participants (N): (B – C)/N. We could have 
instead divided by the number of additional jobs resulting from NDDP (ΔJ): 
(B – C)/ΔJ, where ΔJ is the product of N and the percentage point increase in 
employment resulting from NDDP (Δ%E). Thus, (B – C)/ΔJ = (B – C)/N(Δ%E). 
Hence, to convert the net benefits per participant estimates that appear in Table 
6.1 into net benefits per additional job estimate, it is only necessary to divide 
them by (Δ%E). Unfortunately, the percentage point increase in employment 
resulting from NDDP is not known. One approach to this is to use the largest 
of the estimated monthly impacts on employment as an approximation. More 
programme participants will be working as a result of the programme during 
this month than during any other. Because NDDP’s impacts on employment 
first steadily increase and then decline (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4), use of the 
‘peak impact’ value would produce the correct estimate of the additional jobs 
resulting from the programme if each individual who took a job as result of 
the programme, kept that job until the peak impact occurred, or longer. In 
practice of course, participants will leave jobs during each time period and other 
participants will find jobs during the same period. Thus, the latter replace the 
former. To the extent such job ‘churning’ takes place, use of the largest impact 
estimate will result in understating the total number of additional jobs resulting 
from the programme, but by less than using an impact estimate from another 
time period. The peak impact on employment for continuing claimants occurs 
in month 34 (see Table 5.6) and equals .1172 and the corresponding figure 
for new claimants occurs in month 23 and equals .0754. Thus, if these figures 
are used for conversion purposes, the net benefit estimates in Table 6.1 would 
increase by about eight and a half fold for continuing claimants (1/.1172) and 
by over 15 fold for new claimants (1/0754). However, we do not recommend 
converting the net benefits per participant estimates in Table 6.1 into net benefits 
per additional job estimate. Because job churning may be appreciable, dividing 
(B-C) by the peak employment impact estimates may introduce substantial errors 
into the cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, the number of programme participants 
reflects programme size but not programme success, while the numbers of 
additional jobs that result from a programme are a function of both factors. 
Thus, when (B-C) is divided by ΔJ, the resulting figure is somewhat difficult to 
interpret. This does not occur when dividing (B-C) by N because only project 
size is standardised. 
The Government‘s perspective
84
The net benefit estimates are little affected by the fact that a 3.5 per cent discount 
rate, instead of a smaller discount rate, was used in computing them. For example, 
if a one per cent discount rate had been used instead, net benefits would be only 
£204 larger for continuing claimants and £99 larger for new claimants. The net effect 
of NDDP on the Government’s budget would also be more positive than shown in 
Table 6.1 if the programme reduces the utilisation of the National Health Service by 
registrants. However, there is no evidence that it does this. Although self-reported 
information by respondents to the Survey of Registrants indicates that the health of 
registrants improved, it is not known whether this improvement, which was small,39 
resulted in a reduction in the use of health services. It is also not known whether this 
small self-reported improvement was due to NDDP or would have occurred without 
the programme or even whether the improvement was concentrated among those 
who found work as a result of the programme, the group whose health is most likely 
to be affected by NDDP. 
As discussed earlier, the estimates of NDDP’s impacts on direct tax payments and 
National Insurance contributions; tax credits, Council Tax Benefit and Housing Benefit 
that appear in Table 6.1 rely on estimates of how much an individual with monthly 
net earnings of £581.13, the average for NDDP registrants who became employed, 
pays out or receives under each of these programmes. However, this approach is 
accurate only if there is a linear relation between earnings and the amount paid or 
received under each programme, and there is not. For example, monthly earnings 
are £283 for individuals at the 25th percentile, £549 for those at the median, and 
£775 for registrants at the 75th percentile; but monthly income taxes and National 
Insurance payments are zero, £52, and £163, respectively, for these individuals. Similar 
non-linear relations exist for the other programmes. A simple alternative approach 
to the one used in making the computations appearing in Table 6.1 is to assume that 
individuals in the bottom half of the earnings distribution made no income tax or 
National Insurance contributions and those in the top half of the earnings distribution 
paid £163. Using this approach to re-estimate NDDP’s impacts on employers’ National 
Insurance contributions and registrant’s tax credits and Council Tax Benefit and 
Housing Benefit, as well as to re-estimate the programme’s impact on the direct tax 
payments and National Health contributions of registrants, results in net benefit 
estimates that are slightly larger than those reported in Table 6.1. Specifically, they 
are £45 larger for continuing claimants and £19 larger for new claimants.
39 For example, the self-reported health status of 30 per cent of the respondents 
improved between the first and the second waves of the Survey of Registrants, 
the health status of 23 per cent of the respondents deteriorated, and the self-
reported health status of the remaining 47 per cent of the respondents did not 
change (Kazimirski et al., 2005, p. 161).
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More important than the issue of whether there are factors that might increase the 
net benefit estimates is whether there are any considerations that might reverse 
the finding that the net benefits from NDDP are positive from the Government’s 
perspective.40 It is apparent from Table 6.1 that this finding does not change when 
net benefits are computed with the three alternative estimates of costs. The finding 
is also robust to the value of the discount rate that is used to compute benefits. For 
example, if a five per cent discount rate is used instead of the 3.5 per cent discount 
rate, net benefits would be only £104 smaller for continuing claimants and only £50 
smaller for new claimants. The net benefit estimates are somewhat more sensitive 
to the prediction that programme impacts would continue to exist beyond the 36 
months for which they were directly estimated. However, even if it is assumed that 
NDDP had no impacts beyond those observed during the first 36 months after NDDP 
registration and the largest of the three cost estimates in Table 6.1 is used for the 
calculation, net benefits for a typical continuing claimant would still exceed £1,500 
and net benefits for a typical new claimant would still exceed £400.41  
Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis that assumes that NDDP’s impact on the receipt 
of Incapacity Benefit (IB), Income Support (IS) and Severe Disablement Allowance 
(SDA) and, hence, on reducing Government expenditures for these programmes is 
one-third smaller than the impacts reported in Table 5.1. Based on this assumption, the 
Government’s net benefits fall but remain substantially positive (specifically, they are 
between £1,513 and £1,771 for a typical continuing claimant and between £176 and 
£431 for an average new claimant). The basis for this sensitivity analysis is an auxiliary 
impact analysis conducted by Orr, Bell and Lam (2007). Although their main estimates 
of NDDP’s impacts on IB, IS and SDA receipt and payment amounts (the values reported 
in Table 5.1) are based on programme administrative data, they also estimated these 
impacts using survey data. The survey-based impacts are about one-third smaller than 
those relying on the administrative data. The major advantage of the survey data 
are that they allow additional covariates to be included in estimating the impacts. 
However, Orr, Bell and Lam (2007) point out a number of serious disadvantages with 
the administrative data, most of which result from the small available sample and the 
likelihood that this sample does not represent NDDP registrants very well.42 Thus, they 
have greater confidence in their impact findings that are based on the administrative 
data and consider these their core impact estimates.43 
40  As discussed earlier, we arbitrarily assume that NDDP’s impact on the receipt of 
JSA by continuing claimants would disappear after ten years. If we had instead 
assumed that this impact would continue for only five years, the increase in 
the cost of administering Jobseeker‘s Allowance (JSA) that is attributable to 
NDDP would decline from the £3 figure in Table 6.1 to £1. This obviously has 
negligible implications for the cost-benefit analysis. 
41 In making these calculations, the first 24 months of impact estimates were obtained 
from the 24-month cohort and the remaining 12 months of impact estimates were 
obtained from the 36-month cohort (see Tables 5.1 to 5.3. 
42 See Orr, Bell and Lam (2007) for a full discussion.
43 This assertion is based on email correspondence with the authors on 14 February 
2007.
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In summary, the sensitivity analyses presented above suggest that it is highly 
probable that NDDP is cost-beneficial for both continuing and new claimants from 
the Government’s perspective. 
Table 6.2 presents separate benefit and costs estimates for large Job Brokers (i.e. 
those with over 900 registrants) and small Job Brokers (those with fewer than 900 
registrants). The procedures followed in making these computations were exactly 
the same as those used to compute the estimates in Table 6.1, which are for all 
Job Brokers regardless of their size, except that the values in Table 6.2 are based 
on separate cost estimates for the two groups of Job Brokers and separate impact 
estimates for their customers. 
The lower-bound cost estimates in Table 6.2 are smaller than the upper-bound 
estimates for large Job Brokers but identical for small job brokers because the two 
Job Brokers that we think overstated their costs are both part of the large Job Broker 
group. Thus, as described in Part II, the lower-bound cost estimates were obtained 
by adjusting the costs of these two Job Brokers downward. Actual Government 
expenditures are greater for large Job Brokers than small Job Brokers because they 
received larger amounts of Government incentive payments per registrant as a result 
of placing a larger share of their registrants into jobs and having a larger fraction of 
their registrants work for at least six months.
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Table .  Benefits and costs for large and small Job Brokers: the  
  Government’s perspective
 Continuing New 
 claimants claimants
 Large Job Small Job Large Job Small Job  
 Brokers Brokers Brokers Brokers
Benefits    
Reduction in IB/IS/SDA  
expenditures £4,194  £2,178  £2,242  £1,195 
Reductions in costs of  
administering IB/IS/SDA £28 £14 £17 £8
Reductions in expenditures on  
housing and council tax benefits £405 £346 £144 £167
Increases in direct tax revenues and  
National Insurance contributions £420 £358 £149 £173
Increases in indirect tax revenues -£68 £322 -£224 £116
Increases in employers’  
National Insurance contributions £193 £165 £69 £80
Costs    
Increases in Jobseeker’s Allowance £66  £14  £60  £11 
Increase in costs of administering JSA £2 £1 £1 £1
Increases in Tax Credits £666 £568 £237 £274
Government costs of  
operating NDDP (alternative estimates)    
Lower-bound estimates £683 £1,084 £683 £1,084
Upper-Bound estimates £1,038 £1,084 £1,038 £1,084
Actual Government expenditures £1,196 £751 £1,196 £751
Net benefits (benefits - costs)    
Based on the lower-bound costs £3,755 £1,716 £1,416 £369
Based on the upper-bound costs £3,400 £1,716 £1,061 £369
Based on actual Government costs £3,242 £2,049 £903 £702
Note: All values are in 2005 prices.
There are two key findings in Table 6.2: The first is that the Government’s benefits 
were larger than its costs for both continuing and new customers who enrolled at 
either large Job Brokers or small Job Brokers. The second important finding concerning 
Job Broker size is that net benefits for a typical customer who enrolled at a large Job 
Broker greatly exceeded those for an average customer who enrolled at a small Job 
Broker. Inspection of the table suggests that the second finding is mainly driven by 
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the fact that the Government’s total expenditures on IS, IB and SDA benefit amounts 
fell by nearly twice as much for the customers of large Job Brokers than for the 
customers of small Job Brokers.
Greater detail on how NDDP’s impacts on IB, IS and SDA benefit amounts differ 
between large and small Job Brokers is provided in Table 6.3. The values in the bottom 
row of the table indicate that these impacts are predicted to continue between 
four and five years regardless of Job Broker size.44 Thus, prediction differences do 
not account for the finding that net benefits were greater at large Job Brokers. The 
fourth and seventh columns of the table, which show impacts at small Job Brokers 
as a proportion of those at large Job Brokers, indicate that the difference in impacts 
between the two groups of Job Brokers was especially great during the first year 
after registration but then shrank. Even then, however, impacts at large Job Brokers 
remained close to double those at small Job Brokers. It is not necessarily the case that 
size, per se, is responsible for this difference. For example, large and small Job Brokers 
may serve clients with different characteristics, operate in different labour markets 
or choose to provide different sets of services. That said, however, it is nonetheless 
the case that costs per registrant are lower at larger Job Brokers and their impact 
on disability-related benefits is larger. As will be seen later, however, their impact on 
employment does not greatly differ from that of smaller Job Brokers, even though, 
as reported in Part II, they place a greater proportion of their registrants into jobs.
44  In making these predictions, we again used the combined 24-month/36-month 
cohort. However, impact estimates that are based on the 36-month cohort 
were not separately estimated for large and small Job Brokers. Thus, to obtain 
impact estimates for months 25 through 36 we solved the following simple 
two equation system:
   (1) (PL)(IL,m) + (1-PL) (IS,m) = IT,m and
   (2) IS,m = (IL,m)(IS,m/IL,m)
 where the subscript m denotes a particular month; the subscripts L, S, and T 
respectively denote large, small, and the combination of large and small Job 
Brokers; I is an estimate of NDDP impact on IB, IS and SDA benefit amounts; 
and PL is the proportion of the total sample of observations used in the impact 
analysis that is accounted for by large Job Brokers. Estimates of IT,m for months 
25 through 36 are available from the 36-month cohort (see Table 5.1), and PL is, 
of course, known. The values of the ratio IS,m/IL,m are not known for months 25 
through 36. They are known for months 1 through 24, however, and as can be 
seen from Table 6.3, become quite stable in the last year of this period. Based 
on the information in this table we assume that during months 25 through 36, 
the value of IS,m/IL,m is 0.55 for continuing claimants and 0.57 for new claimants. 
Once a value for IS,m/IL,m was assumed, equation (2) and the values of IT,m and 
PL were substituted into equation (1) and the values of IL,m were computed for 
months 25 through 36. The values of IS,m were similarly obtained for months 
25 through 36. The computations were made separately for continuing and 
new claimants. Although this method is illustrated for impacts on IB, IS, and 
SDA benefit amounts, a similar procedure was followed for impacts on other 
outcomes.
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7  The customer’s      
  perspective
Summary
• There is considerable uncertainty as to whether the New Deal for Disable People 
(NDDP) is cost-beneficial from the perspective of NDDP registrants, especially 
for continuing claimants. Much of this uncertainty is due to shortcomings in the 
administrative data used to estimate the effects of NDDP on incapacity benefits 
and employment and to benefits and costs that could not be measured. 
• The income of a typical NDDP registrant was probably increased by the programme, 
but not by a very large amount.
• The rather scant evidence that exists suggests that NDDP did not improve the 
health and the quality of life of registrants by very much, if at all.
• Once increases in work-related costs (e.g., childcare and commuting expenses 
and the value of time given up in going to work) are taken into consideration, 
it seems likely that a typical NDDP registrant benefited as a result of having 
participated in the programme but only to a very modest degree. 
• Because their Income Support (IS), Incapacity Benefit (IB) and Severe Disablement 
Allowance (SDA) payments fell by less, claimants who registered at small Job 
Brokers were better off than claimants who registered at large Job Brokers. 
Overall, NDDP appears to be most cost-beneficial for continuing claimants who 
registered at small Job Brokers and least cost-beneficial for new claimants who 
registered at large Job Brokers.
This section examines whether NDDP registrants are made better off by the 
programme. As a first cut, we measure net benefits from the perspective of NDDP 
registrants as changes in their incomes resulting from the programme. Table 7.1 
summarises the net effect of NDDP on the income of a typical continuing registrant 
and on the income of a typical new claimant. The table implies that net benefits are 
positive for the former and negative for the latter, but fairly modest in both cases. 
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The reduction in the income of a typical new claimant results because their increase in 
earnings is more than offset by reductions income transfers. Thus, the major benefit 
of NDDP from the perspective of the Government is a cost from the point of view 
of claimants. The net increase in income received by a typical continuing claimant is 
entirely attributable to tax credits that result from employment. Their gain in earnings 
is entirely offset by losses in incapacity benefit payments and Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Benefit and increases in indirect taxes.
Table 7.1  NDDP’s benefits and costs per registrant from the   
  customer’s perspective
 Continuing New 
 claimants claimants
Benefits  
Increases in earnings net of direct taxes £3,377 £1,414
Increases in Jobseeker’s Allowance £30 £33
Increases in Tax Credits £620 £260
Costs  
Increases in indirect taxes £136 -£60
Reductions in IB/IS/SDA receipts £3,165  £1,764 
Reductions in receipts from housing and council tax benefits £378 £158
Net benefits (benefits - costs) £348 -£155
Note: All values are in 2005 prices.
Although Table 7.1 indicates that the income of a typical new claimant fell somewhat 
as a result of NDDP, there are two reasons to believe that this estimate is downward 
biased: First, as previously mentioned, it was necessary to assume that the earnings 
of continuing and new NDDP registrants were the same when they were employed, 
namely £581 per month. However, it seems likely that the monthly earnings of 
the latter were actually larger than those of the former because new claimants are 
more likely than continuing claimants to have fairly recent work experience prior to 
registering with a Job Broker and thus, are likely to work more hours per month at 
a higher hourly wage once they obtain post-registration employment. Thus, their 
actual post-registration earnings may well exceed £581 per month. However, the 
earnings differential between continuing and new claimants would have to be 
large to influence the net benefits of new claimants very strongly. For example, if 
their monthly earnings were actually £781, rather than £581, an understatement 
of actual earnings of slightly more than one-third, the programme effect on their 
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net earnings would increase by a bit less than £500 (£1,414x(781/581) - £1,414).45 
Second, as discussed earlier, there is reason to expect that NDDP increases the hours 
of work of employed registrants, as well as increasing the level of employment of 
registrants. Again, it is unlikely that the net benefit estimates for new claimants in 
Table 7.1 are greatly understated as a result unless the programme effect on their 
hours was substantial. To illustrate, assume that the average hours of employed new 
claimants increased by one percentage point as a result of the programme. Because 
over 60 per cent of new claimants were employed during most of the months after 
they registered with NDDP (see Orr, Bell and Lam, 2007), given monthly earnings of 
£581, this would result in an average increase in earnings of £3.49 (.01x.60x£581) 
per month for a typical new claimant or a total of about £125 if the one percentage 
point effect on hours were to continue for 36 months. If the average impact on 
the hours of employed new claimants was five percentage points, rather than one 
percentage point, the effect on earnings would be £625, but a five percentage point 
impact seems very large. Note that there would be similar effects on continuing 
claimants, but they would be smaller because only about 40 per cent of them worked 
after registration. We conclude that if the estimates of the effect of NDDP on the net 
income of a typical new claimant were adjusted for both of these biases, it would 
probably turn positive, but it would be unlikely to be large. 
The estimates of net income that appear in Table 7.1 are little affected by the 3.5 
per cent discount rate that was used in their computation. For example, if a discount 
rate of 1.0 per cent is used instead, the net benefit estimate for a typical continuing 
claimant increases by a little over £100 and that for a new claimant declines by about 
£5. The findings are also relatively insensitive to allowing for a non-linear relation 
between earnings and tax credits and between earnings and Council Tax Benefit and 
Housing Benefit. If we assume, for example, that individuals in the bottom half of the 
registrant earnings distribution received £149 of tax credits and lost £8 of Council 
Tax Benefits and Housing Benefits during each month they worked (the values for 
individuals at the 25th percentile) and the corresponding figures for those in the top 
half of the registrant earnings distribution were £53 and £95 respectively (the values 
for individuals at the 75th percentile), the estimated net benefits for continuing 
claimants decline by £152 and those for new claimants decline by £65.
45 Because both new and continuing claimants who were employed were included 
in the sample used in estimating monthly earnings, if the £581 figure understates 
the earnings of the former, it must overstate the earnings of latter, thereby 
biasing the estimated effect of NDDP on the net income of continuing claimants 
upward. However, although new claimants are about 50 per cent more likely 
to be employed than continuing claimants, there are more than four times as 
many continuing claimants as new claimants (see Orr, Bell and Lam, 2007, Table 
A.12). As a consequence, the understatement of the earnings of new claimants 
would be much larger than the overstatement of the earnings of continuing 
claimants. Thus, the upward bias on the net earnings of continuing claimants 
is likely to be relatively small.
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The net benefit estimates are considerably more sensitive to extrapolating the 
programme impacts beyond the 36 months for which they were directly observed. 
For example, if it is assumed that NDDP had no impacts beyond the 36 month 
observation period, the estimated net benefits for continuing claimants change from 
a positive value of £348 to a negative value of -£724, while the net benefits for new 
claimants change from a negative value of -£155 to a positive value of £106. The 
change for new claimants is not too much of a concern as the estimate continues to 
hover around zero, but the change for continuing claimants is striking. It is mainly 
attributable to the fact that nearly half of the gain in earnings and tax credits that 
appear in Table 7.1 for continuing claimants are predicted to occur after 36 months, 
but over three-quarters of the losses in IB, IS and SDA receipts are predicted to occur 
within the 36 months observation period. Thus, the estimates of the gains and losses 
to continuing claimants are both diminished by assuming that impacts are zero after 
36 months, but the gains fall by considerably more.
While this finding for continuing claimants does demonstrate that the estimates of 
the effects of NDDP on the net income of this group are sensitive to how programme 
impacts are extrapolated, it seems unlikely that the income of continuing claimants 
was actually reduced by NDDP. A glance back at Figure 5.3 suggests that NDDP’s 
impact on the employment of continuing claimants was still slightly increasing at 
36 months. This impact clearly did not end at 36 months. If it continued at the level 
it reached at month 36 for a bit over another year, the effect of NDDP on the net 
income of continuing claimants would be positive. Moreover, as shown in Table 5.6, 
in estimating the regressions of changes in employment impacts over time, the linear 
specification fits the data for continuing claimants at least as well as the quadratic 
specification. Thus, it is possible that NDDP’s impact on employment lasted even 
longer than the quadratic regression that was used in extrapolating the employment 
impact for this group implies. If so, the net benefit for continuing claimants would 
be larger than the estimates that appear in Table 7.1 suggest.
The data that were used to estimate the NDDP employment impacts reported in Table 
5.3 were obtained from national tax records46. Unfortunately, these administrative 
data are subject to potentially serious reporting errors. On the one hand, the tax 
data are likely to miss some persons who find jobs as a result of NDDP and thereby 
understate impacts on employment. For example, persons who are below the tax 
threshold and the self-employed are not included. On the other hand, impacts on 
employment could be overstated because of the practice of coding missing job start 
and end dates to the first and last days of the tax year (e.g. 6 April 2002 and 5 April 
2003). This makes it appear that a subset of workers who worked only part of a tax 
year was employed in some months during which they were actually not working. 
For example, about 20 per cent of all jobs were coded as starting on 6 April, although 
46 See Orr, Bell and Lam (2007) for a description of these data.
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they actually started later.47  While these biases tend to work in the opposite direction, 
there is no way of knowing which is stronger.
The administrative data that Orr, Bell and Lam (2007) used to estimate NDDP’s impacts 
on the receipt of incapacity benefits is not subject to either of the reporting biases 
just discussed. Thus, we used these impact estimates in a sensitivity test. Specifically, 
we recomputed earnings assuming that all the individuals who left the IB, IS, and 
SDA as a result of registering for NDDP were employed while off these benefits. In 
other words, we derived the earnings increase resulting from NDDP by using the 
estimates of NDDP’s impact on months off incapacity benefits, which appear in Table 
5.1, instead of the estimates of NDDP’s impact on months employed, which are 
reported in Table 5.3. The results imply that the net benefits to registrants from NDDP 
are nearly £1,000 for both a typical continuing claimant and a typical new claimant. 
However, there is one reason to suspect that these estimates understate the true 
net benefits of NDDP to registrants and two reasons to suspect that they overstate 
them. They will understate them to the extent that NDDP induces registrants to take 
jobs for so few hours that they do not leave the incapacity benefit rolls. Operating 
against this bias is the fact that the incentives offered to Job Brokers encourage them 
to try to find full-time jobs for their registrants, not jobs with low hours. Moreover, 
the earnings of persons who work relatively few hours would presumably be rather 
low. The net benefit estimates will be overstated to the degree that some persons 
who exited IB, IS, or SDA as a result of NDDP were not employed the entire time they 
were off these benefits.48  For example, some probably replaced incapacity benefits 
with benefits from other programmes and others who were initially employed later 
lost their jobs without immediately, if ever, returning to incapacity benefits. It will 
also be overstated to the extent that some NDDP participants exited IB, IS or SDA as a 
result of increasing their hours of work, rather than because they took jobs. It seems 
likely that the latter two factors dominate the first, suggesting that the estimated 
net benefit of nearly £1,000 is best viewed as an upper bound.
47 See Orr, Bell and Lam (2007) for a more detailed discussion of both of these 
issues. They point out that although a preliminary analysis by Department For 
Work and Pensions (DWP) staff found that less than half the jobs reported by 
Job Brokers were found in their administrative data, the percentage of NDDP 
registrants who are reported as employed in their data is consistent with the 
percentage reported by Job Brokers and the percentage reported in the Survey of 
Registrants. They conclude that ‘taken together, [the two] factors are cause for 
treating the employment data with caution, though the close correspondence 
of reported employment rates with those from two other evaluation sources 
gives us confidence that the impact results for employment derived from these 
data are reliable’.
48 Only a little over half the sick and disabled persons leaving the IB and IS 
programmes directly entered employment in 1994 (Coleman and Kennedy 2005, 
Table 3.1). However, this percentage would be expected to be much higher for 
those who leave incapacity benefits as a result of participating in NDDP.
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We noted in Chapter 6 that in an auxiliary impact analysis using survey data, Orr, 
Bell and Lam (2007) estimated impacts on IB, IS and SDA receipt and payment 
amounts that are about one-third smaller than those they obtained using programme 
administrative data. We also indicated that they have greater confidence in the latter 
impact findings than the former. However, if we, nevertheless, take the survey-based 
findings at face value and, thus, assume that the incapacity impact estimates based 
on administrative data are overstated by a third, net benefits for continuing claimants 
would increase to £1,392 (from £348) and those for new claimants would become 
positive, increasing to £427 (from -£155). 
These net benefit values are probably too large, however, even if the impacts on 
incapacity benefit that were estimated with survey data are accepted as valid. The 
reason is that if the reduction in IB, IS and SDA that results from NDDP is overstated 
when certain covariates cannot be included in the impact regression, it is likely that 
the estimate of the increase in earnings that results from NDDP is also overstated 
when, as was the case, the same covariates are excluded from the impact regression. 
In other words, both impact estimates will be biased away from zero. This occurs 
because programme impacts on earnings and incapacity benefits will tend to be 
negatively correlated since increases in earnings cause reductions in IB, IS and 
SDA benefit amounts. Thus, if the impact on incapacity benefits shrinks as certain 
covariates are added to the regression used to estimate this impact, then so should 
the impact on earnings if the same covariates are included in the regression used to 
estimate NDDP’s effect on earnings (although not necessarily by a similar amount). 
Unfortunately, we cannot test this proposition because Orr, Bell and Lam (2007) were 
unable to estimate the impact of NDDP on earnings using survey data. Thus, it must 
remain a conjecture. Nevertheless, it seems likely that if the cost to NDDP registrants 
from reductions in incapacity benefits that appears in Table 7.1 is too large, then 
the benefit to registrants from earnings increases that is shown in the table is also 
overstated. These effects obviously tend to be offsetting. 
Overall, it seems likely that the average income of NDDP registrants was increased by 
the programme. The amount of this increase was probably fairly modest, especially 
for new claimants, with the exact amount depending on the degree to which the 
estimated impacts on employment were biased either upward or downward by 
reporting errors, the length of time the impacts on employment persisted, and the 
extent to which NDDP induced registrants who would have been employed, even in 
the absence of the programme, to increase their hours of work. 
The effect of NDDP on the incomes of registrants does not necessarily indicate whether 
the programme has made them better or worse off. There are other important 
considerations that, while more difficult to measure than effects on income, are 
highly relevant. For example, because NDDP increased the employment of registrants, 
it also increased such work-related expenses as childcare and commuting costs. 
Although no estimates of programme impacts on these costs are available, travel 
expenditures may be especially large for some disabled persons. Another potential 
cost of NDDP that is not reflected by changes in income, one that again may be 
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especially important to some disabled persons, particularly those with children, is 
the time that individuals must give up when they go to work. This time may be of 
considerable value to those relinquishing it. There is at least some previous research 
that suggests that, while these losses do not fully offset the improvements in earnings 
that result from increases in employment, the offset is substantial, probably not less 
than a quarter of the earnings increase and quite likely more (Bell and Orr, 1994; 
Greenberg, 1997, and Greenberg and Robins, 2005). If we assume conservatively 
that the offset is a quarter of the earnings increase, the estimated net increase in 
the average income of continuing claimants would fall by £844 (.25x£3,377), from 
£348 to -£496, and that for new claimants would fall by £354 (.25x£1,414), from 
-£155 to -£509.
In principle, the work-related costs associated with increases in employment could 
be potentially partially or fully mitigated by several non-monetary benefits that also 
result from these increases. For example, the self-esteem of disabled persons who 
become employed as a result of NDDP could improve, and NDDP registrants could 
be happier and healthier as a consequence of participating in the programme. 
However, the somewhat scant evidence that exists suggests that changes for the 
better in the quality of life and in the health of NDDP registrants were small at best. 
For example, although there were perhaps slight improvements, the self-reported 
level of satisfaction of NDDP registrants with their lives was fairly stable over time, 
(Kazimirski et al., 2005, pp. 173-175). Moreover, NDDP registrants do not appear to 
have increased their level of participation in social activities over time (Kazimirski et 
al., 2005, pp. 170-173). In addition, as seen in the previous sub-section, self-reported 
improvements in health status seem to have been small. It should also be borne in 
mind that even when positive changes in the health and the quality of life of NDDP 
registrants do seem to occur over time, it is not clear that such improvements can be 
attributed to NDDP or would have taken place even without the programme. 
In sum, it seems unlikely that the non-monetary benefits of increases in employment 
that resulted from NDDP were sufficient to offset costs associated with increased 
employment, especially those resulting from the time given up in going to work. As a 
consequence, unless NDDP substantially increases the hours of work of registrants who 
were employed, as well as their level of employment, NDDP’s impact on employment 
persists for longer than we predict or the estimated employment impacts were strongly 
biased downward by reporting errors, the programme probably resulted in no more 
than very modest improvement in the overall welfare of registrants.
Table 7.2 presents separate benefit and costs estimates for large Job Brokers (i.e. 
those with over 900 registrants) and small Job Brokers (those with fewer than 900 
registrants). The procedures followed in making these computations were similar 
to those used in computing the estimates in Table 7.1, except that the values are 
based on separate cost estimates for the two groups of Job Brokers and separate 
impact estimates for their customers. In interpreting Table 7.2, it is again important 
to bear in mind that it is not necessarily the case that differences between findings 
for large and small Job Brokers are attributable to size, per se. Such differences can 
result if large and small Job Brokers serve clients with different characteristics, operate 
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in different labour markets or choose to provide different sets of services. It is also 
important to keep in mind that only programme effects on the incomes of NDDP 
registrants are estimated. Other possibly important factors such as programme effects 
on work-related expenses, the availability of non-work time, self-esteem, happiness 
and health status are not measured.
Table 7.  Benefits and costs for large and small Job Brokers: the  
  customer’s perspective
  Continuing   New 
  claimants   claimants 
 Large Job  Small Job Large Job  Small Job 
 Brokers  Brokers Brokers  Brokers
Benefits    
Increases in earnings net  
of direct taxes £3,625 £3,092 £1,288 £1,491
Increases in JSA £66  £14  £60  £11 
Increases in Tax Credits £666 £568 £237 £274
Costs    
Increases in indirect taxes -£68 £322 -£224 £116
Reductions in IB/IS/SDA receipts £4,194  £2,178  £2,242  £1,195 
Reductions in receipts from  
housing and council tax benefits £405 £346 £144 £167
Net benefits (benefits – costs) -£174 £828 -£577 £298
Note: All values are in 2005 prices.
Table 7.2 indicates that NDDP has a positive impact on the incomes of incapacity 
benefit claimants who registered with small Job Brokers, especially in the case 
of continuing claimants, but a negative effect on the incomes of claimants who 
registered with large Job Brokers, especially new claimants. The differences between 
large and small Job Brokers do not occur because of differences in impacts on the 
employment, and hence the earnings, of claimants who registered with large and 
small Job Brokers. As shown in the fourth and seventh columns of Table 7.3, the 
estimates of employment impacts are usually fairly similar for large and small Job 
Brokers, although they are slightly larger for continuing claimants who registered 
with large Job Brokers and somewhat smaller for new claimants who registered with 
large Job Brokers. The findings mainly result because IS, IB and SDA benefit amounts 
fell by much more for the customers of large Job Brokers than for the customers of 
small Job Brokers (see Table 6.3). In other words, the very factor that accounted for 
net benefits being greater at larger Job Brokers from the Government’s perspective, 
caused NDDP to have a negative effect on the net incomes of the persons who 
registered with these Job Brokers.
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8  The societal perspective
Summary
• The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) appears to have positive benefits from 
a social perspective.
• Although this conclusion cannot be considered definitive because estimates of all 
the relevant factors are not available (e.g. the size of substitution effects and the 
relative value of pounds that are received by NDDP registrants and by taxpayers), 
it seems robust to a large number of considerations.
• Net social benefits are considerably larger for continuing claimants than for new 
claimants.
• The estimates imply that the benefits to society are around £4 or £5 for each 
pound the Government expended on NDDP in serving continuing claimants and 
around £2 for each pound expended on serving new claimants. 
• Net social benefits do not differ very much by Job Broker size.
Table 8.1 summarises NDDP’s estimated net benefits from the perspective of 
society as a whole. Economists generally consider the societal perspective more 
relevant than that of the separate components of society, such as the Government 
or programme customers, because it is more inclusive. Because NDDP customers 
and the Government are the two components of ‘society’ that are directly affected 
by the programme, and for which we have already presented costs and benefits, 
Table 8.1 was constructed by simply summing the costs and benefits for these two 
entities that were previously reported in Tables 6.1 and 7.1. Thus, any items that were 
previously counted as a cost from the Government’s perspective and a benefit from 
the registrant’s perspective (for example, increases in the payments of tax credits), 
or vice-versa, are exactly offsetting and do not appear in Table 8.1. It is important 
to recognise that there are other groups in society that may potentially be affected 
by NDDP, at least indirectly, even though their costs and benefits do not appear in 
Table 8.1. These groups include workers who did not go through the programme 
and taxpayers. We consider programme effects on these groups below. 
The societal perspective
10
Government’s payments to Job Brokers, which appear in Table 6.1 as ‘actual 
Government expenditures’, are not shown in Table 8.1. Instead, only the two 
alternative estimates of the total operating costs per registrant are reported. The 
reason is that costs to society should reflect total costs, not just the Government’s part 
of these costs. For example, if the Government’s payments are more than the total 
cost of operating NDDP, the Government is simply moving funds to Job Brokers, and 
there is no resulting cost to society because Job Brokers are part of society. On the 
other hand, if the Government’s payments are less than the total cost of operating 
NDDP, the resulting losses to Job Brokers are a cost to society and should be counted 
as such.49 For reasons previously discussed in detail, we have greater confidence in 
the smaller of the two alternative estimates of total operating costs.
Table 8.1 indicates that NDDP’s net social benefits are positive for both continuing 
customers and new claimants, although considerably larger for the former than the 
later. Social net benefits would be about £700 larger for continuing claimants and 
around £1,100 larger for continuing claimants than those presented in the table if 
the increases in earnings resulting from NDDP were computed using the estimates of 
NDDP’s impact on months off incapacity benefits impact estimates reported in Table 
5.1, rather than the estimates of NDDP’s impact on months employed reported in 
Table 5.3. As previously discussed, this probably provides an upper bound estimate 
of the net benefits resulting from NDDP. 
According to Table 8.1, NDDP’s benefits to society were between £3.77 and £4.93 
for each pound the Government expended on the programme in serving continuing 
claimants and between £1.58 and £2.07 per pound expended on the new claimant 
group. The source of the difference between the two claimant groups is NDDP’s larger 
impact on the employment and, hence, the earnings of continuing claimants. The 
apparently smaller net social benefit for new claimants is important because over 
time most continuing claimants who will ever register with NDDP will do so. Thus, 
most registrants will eventually be new claimants. 
49 As previously discussed, some unknown part of NDDP’s operating costs were 
subsidised by the European Social Fund, although we expect that these subsidies 
were relatively small. If areas outside the UK are not counted as part of ‘society’, 
programme operating costs will overstate society’s costs to the extent the 
subsidies existed and, as a result, net social benefits will be understated.
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Table 8.1  NDDP’s benefits and costs per registrant from the   
  societal perspective
 Continuing New  
 claimants claimants
Benefits  
Increases in earnings net of direct taxes £3,377 £1,414
Increases in direct tax revenues and  
National Insurance contributions £391 £164
Increases in employers’ National Insurance contributions £180 £75
Reductions in costs of administering IB/IS/SDA £22 £13
Costs  
Increases in costs of administering JSA £3 £1
NDDP operating costs (alternative estimates)  
Lower-bound estimates £804 £804
Upper-bound estimates £1,052 £1,052  
Net social benefits (benefits – costs)  
Based on the lower-bound costs £3,163 £861
Based on the upper-bound costs £2,915 £613
Note: All values are in 2005 prices.
The key finding of positive net social benefits is quite robust to various sensitivity 
tests. For example, as seen previously, the findings from both the Government and 
the claimant perspectives are quite sensitive to assuming that NDDP has no impacts 
beyond the 36 months for which they were directly estimated. If the same extreme 
assumption is again made, net social benefits for continuing claimants remain above 
£1,000 and those for new claimants remain above £500, even when computed with 
the upper-bound estimate of programme operating costs. Another important previous 
consideration was the possibility that the time that is given up when employment 
increases has considerable value to those who relinquish it. If we again assume, as 
in the previous subsection, that the value of this lost time is equal to one-quarter of 
the earnings increase that resulted from NDDP, net social benefits remain positive, 
falling to between £2,071 and £2,319 for continuing claimants and between £259 
and £507 for new claimants.
In all of the cost-benefit findings presented so-far, pounds gained or lost by the NDDP 
customers are treated as identical to pounds gained or lost by the Government. It 
is not clear that they should be. Costs to the Government imply that taxes must be 
higher than otherwise and benefits accruing to the Government imply that taxes can 
be lower than otherwise. On average, taxpayers have substantially higher incomes 
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than NDDP registrants50, many of whom have had relatively little attachment to the 
labour market for a number of years. There is a considerable literature that argues 
that the gains and losses of lower income persons should be valued more highly than 
the gains and losses of higher income persons (see Annex 5 of HM Treasury Green 
Book 2003 or Chapter 18 of Boardman et al., 2006 and the references therein). One 
reason for this is that the value individuals put on each additional pound they receive 
(i.e., their marginal utility of income) is likely to be higher for low income people 
than higher income people.51 
This issue is relevant for programmes that make low income people worse off and 
higher income people better off. As seen in Table 6.1, NDDP produces sizeable positive 
net benefits for the Government and, hence, presumably makes taxpayers better 
off. The findings for NDDP registrants is much less certain once increases in work-
related costs are taken into consideration, but they were probably also better off as 
a result of NDDP, although likely only marginally so. However, purely for the sake of 
illustration, let us assume that they were worse off by £500. Let us further assume 
that the net benefit amounts of £2,815 for continuing claimants and £1,016 for new 
claimants, the larger of the values that are reported in Table 6.1 for the Government, 
are correct estimates of the return from NDDP to taxpayers. Given these assumptions, 
the losses of registrants would have to be valued by society by almost six times as 
much as the gains of the Government (£2,815/£500) for net social benefits for 
continuing claimants to become negative and by over twice as much (£1,016/£500) 
for the net social benefits for new claimants to become negative. Although little is 
known about the value that society actually places on a pound received by a low 
income person relative to the value it places on a pound received by a higher income 
person, a two-to-one difference, let alone a six-to-one difference, appears rather 
large52, as does the assumed loss of £500 by those registering for NDDP. Moreover, 
50 For example, before taking account of housing costs, 16 per cent of the general 
population lived in households with incomes that were below 60 per cent of 
the median income in 2004-05, while 22 per cent of the population with one 
or more disabled adults lived in such households (Department for Work and 
Pensions HBAI Team 2006). After taking account of housing costs, the figures 
were 20 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively.
51 For a discussion of additional reasons for treating high and low income persons 
differently in cost-benefit analysis, see Chapter 18 of Boardman et al., (2006).
52 HM Treasury Green Book 2003, Annex 5, p. 4, has a table, which it is stresses 
is ‘merely illustrative’, that implies a pound received by a household in the 
bottom income quintile is worth about twice as much as a pound received by 
a household in the middle income quintile and further implies that a pound 
received by a household in the second income quintile is worth about twice as 
much as a pound received by a typical household in the fourth income quintile. 
The footnote prior to the previous one suggests that the incomes of households 
with and without disabled persons are unlikely to differ by as much as two 
quintiles.
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as discussed next, there are benefits to taxpayers from NDDP (the numerators of the 
ratios shown above) that have not yet been considered. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that NDDP’s net social benefits probably remain positive even after taking 
account of the possibility that the gains and losses of lower income people should 
be more highly valued than those of higher income people.
There are two potential benefits to taxpayers from NDDP that have so-far been 
ignored: First, as shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.3, NDDP substantially reduced the receipt of 
Incapacity Benefit (IB), Income Support (IS), and Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA) 
by programme registrants and increased their employment. If taxpayers positively 
value the fact that NDDP helps incapacity recipients leaving the IB rolls and going to 
work in and of itself – that is, beyond any tax savings they may receive – then this is 
a programme benefit, albeit one that is very difficult to measure.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, if the net benefits to the Government that 
are reported in Table 6.1 result in correspondingly lower taxes, economic distortions 
that are caused by taxes would be reduced. For example, taxes on earnings reduce 
incentives to work and taxes on investment reduce incentives to invest. These 
distortions (usually called ‘deadweight losses’ or ‘marginal excess tax burden’ by 
economists) result in substantial losses in economic efficiency. For example, after 
reviewing a number of US studies, Boardman et al. (2006, pp. 428-429) conclude 
that the loss to the economy from each additional dollar of taxes that are collected 
in the US is on the order of 40 cents or 40 per cent. Less evidence is available for the 
UK, but Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) economists have concluded that 
the efficiency loss from an additional pound of taxes in the UK is around 25 pence or 
25 per cent (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006). If we apply this 25 per cent 
figure to the estimates of Government benefits and costs in Table 6.1, the resulting 
calculations imply a benefit to taxpayers of £463 to £527 for each continuing claimant 
who registers in NDDP and £145 to £209 for each new claimant who registers.53  
Alternatively, the 40 per cent estimate for the US would imply a benefit to taxpayers 
of £741 to £843 and £232 to £334, respectively, for each continuing and new 
claimant who registers in NDDP.
Potentially, NDDP could impose costs on disabled persons who do not register for 
the programme, as well on non-disabled low-wage workers. For example, if NDDP 
registrants search harder for jobs or work more weeks or hours than they otherwise 
would, the resulting increase in labour supply will tend to reduce the equilibrium 
wage in the labour markets in which they find jobs. Thus, workers who are employed 
in the same labour markets could receive lower wages than they otherwise would. 
53 In making these computations, we multiply .25 by the net benefit estimates in 
Table 6.1 less the estimates of the increases in tax payments made by registrants 
and the increases in National Insurance contributions made by registrants and 
their employers. Increases in tax payments by registrants and their employers 
simply permit reductions in tax payments by non-registrants and their employers. 
On net, therefore, there should be little or no effect on economic efficiency.
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However, this effect is unlikely to be very large in practice, because the number of 
NDDP registrants who find jobs as a result of the programme is fairly small relative 
to size of the labour markets in which they compete. Moreover, the minimum wage 
should constrain downward wage pressure in low-wage labour markets. A potentially 
more important cost that might be imposed on workers who do not register for NDDP 
would result if registrants find jobs as a result of programme that would otherwise 
have been held by non-registrants. Not much is known about the magnitude of these 
so-called substitution effects, although one recent study suggests that they could 
be small (Blundell et al., 2002) for low wage workers in the UK. They are especially 
likely to be small if labour markets are tight and, as a consequence, alternative job 
opportunities are available to non-registrants. If labour markets are slack, however, the 
size of substitution effects could be substantial and NDDP’s net social benefits would 
be overstated. Although the national unemployment rate was relatively low during 
the years covered by the NDDP cost-benefit analysis (2001-2003), some Job Brokers 
operated in pockets of comparatively high unemployment. Thus, we suspect that 
substitution effects reduced NDDP’s social net benefits, but not by large amounts.
To summarise, there is some uncertainty concerning the social net benefits of 
NDDP. On the one hand, they could be significantly smaller than shown in Table 
8.1 if programme substitution effects are large, if the estimated impacts of NDDP 
are upward biased because of shortcoming in the administrative tax data used in 
computing them, if work-related expenses are high, or if registrants highly value the 
time they must give up to go to work. On the other hand, they could be substantially 
larger than shown in the table if registrants who find jobs as a result of NDDP are 
substantially undercounted in the administrative tax data; if NDDP had large impacts 
on the hours worked by employed registrants, as well as on the level of employment 
of registrants; if increases in the employment of the disabled are highly valued by 
taxpayers; or because, by allowing taxes to be lower than otherwise, NDDP reduces 
economic distortions caused by taxes. Taking all these considerations into account, 
as well as the less important ones discussed earlier, it seems highly probable that the 
net social benefits of NDDP are positive, although the precise values for continuing 
and new claimants could be either somewhat larger or somewhat smaller than those 
reported in Table 8.1.
Table 8.2 reports separate net social benefit estimates for continuing and new 
claimants who registered with large and small Job Brokers. Net social benefits are 
positive for all four groups. Moreover, they do not differ very much by Job Broker size. 
The key factor that that caused net benefits to be larger at larger Job Brokers from 
the Government perspective and smaller from the perspective of registrants - NDDP’s 
impacts on IS, IB and SDA payments - has no influence on net social benefits.
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Table 8.  Benefits and costs for large and small Job Brokers: the  
  societal perspective
  Continuing   New 
  claimants   claimants 
 Large Job  Small Job Large Job  Small Job 
 Brokers  Brokers Brokers  Brokers
Benefits    
Increases in earnings net  
of direct taxes £3,625 £3,092 £1,288 £1,491
Increases in direct tax revenues and 
National Insurance contributions £420 £358 £149 £173
Increases in employers’  
National Insurance contributions £193 £165 £69 £80
Reductions in costs of  
administering IB/IS/SDA £28 £14 £17 £8
Costs    
Increases in costs of  
administering JSA £2 £1 £1 £1
NDDP operating costs (alternative estimates)   
Lower-bound estimates £683 £1,084 £683 £1,084
Upper-bound estimates £1,038 £1,084 £1,038 £1,084
Net benefits (benefits – costs)    
Based on the lower-bound costs £3,581 £2,544 £839 £667
Based on the upper-bound costs £3,226 £2,544 £484 £667
Note: All values are in 2005 prices.
The societal perspective
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9  Conclusions
Part II of this report presents findings from an analysis of the costs incurred by 19 
Job Brokers in providing services to clients registered in the New Deal for Disabled 
(NDDP) programme. The cost data were obtained from a postal survey of Job Brokers 
and through face-to-face interviews with Job Brokers at their premises. Additional 
cost data were provided by the Job Brokers who were interviewed during follow-up 
telephone calls and by correspondence. Selected variables that were obtained from 
the postal survey of Job Brokers and from a survey of NDDP registrants (cohort 1, 
wave 1) were also used in the analysis presented in this report.
The sample size is small. Twenty Job Brokers were interviewed, but one was excluded 
from the analysis because of inconsistent and incomplete data (see Section 1.6.1 
of Part II). However, the total number of Job Brokers operating between April 2002 
and March 2003 was 61. Hence, the 19 Job Brokers in the sample represent a little 
under a third of all those delivering the programme over that period. As the number 
of client registrations claimed by the Job Brokers in the sample also accounted for just 
under one-third of all those recorded (see Section 2.2), the sample is representative 
in terms of Job Broker size.
Part III of the report provides the results of a cost-benefit analysis of NDDP. This 
analysis is based on both the NDDP cost analysis presented in Part II of the report and 
the NDDP impact analysis conducted by Orr, Bell and Lam (2007). Because Orr, Bell 
and Lam’s impact estimates are limited to the first 36 months after registration in 
NDDP, the cost-benefit analysis also relies heavily on predictions of impacts that occur 
beyond this point. Findings from the cost-benefit analysis are presented separately 
for continuing claimants of incapacity benefits and new (or returning) claimants. 
Separate cost-benefit results are also reported for large and small Job Brokers.
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9.1  Job Broker costs and profitability
The cost to Job Brokers of serving a typical registrant is probably between £600 and 
£900. However, there is great variation among the Job Brokers in the costs that they 
bear. Much of this variation seems attributable to differences in Job Broker size; larger 
Job Brokers with more registrants incur substantially lower costs for each registrant 
they serve. 
In addition to the cost incurred by Job Brokers in serving registrants, Jobcentre Plus 
incurs costs of over £100 per registrant in administering NDDP. Thus, the total cost 
of NDDP is £700 to £1,100 per registrant.
Thirteen of the 19 Job Brokers in the sample suffered net losses. The average Job 
Broker incurred a loss of over £300 per registrant, although there is great variation 
among Job Brokers in terms of profits and losses. Job Brokers with relatively few 
registrants tend to lose money, whilst larger Job Brokers tend to be profitable (see 
Section 3.3.2). Indeed, it may not be possible for smaller Job Brokers to continue to 
participate in NDDP unless their outcome payments are considerably increased. Yet, 
over half of all the NDDP registrants who are registered with the Job Brokers in the 
sample appear to be currently served by Job Brokers who are making a profit.
Because the costs of smaller Job Brokers tend to be relatively high and their placement 
and sustainment ratios tend to be relatively low (see Section 3.4.4), Job Broker size 
is also strongly inversely related to costs per job entry and costs per sustainment (see 
Section 4.5). 
9.2  Other factors
There is less certainty about the effects of factors other than size on the costs and 
profitability of Job Brokers. However, there is some evidence that the cost per 
registrant increases as a Job Broker’s sustainment rate increases (see Section 3.4.2). 
The analysis also suggests that costs incurred by public and private sector Job Brokers 
are £300 to £400 higher per registrant than costs incurred by other Job Brokers (see 
Section 3.4.2), whilst the profits of Job Brokers that are in the public or private sectors 
appear to be around £500 lower per registrant than those of other Job Brokers (see 
Section 3.4.3). Neither the types of services that a Job Broker provides nor whether 
it had been previously involved in earlier initiatives with a similar client group seems 
to influence either its costs per registrant (see Section 3.4.2) or its profitability (see 
Section 3.4.3).
9.3  Cost-effectiveness of NDDP
Including expenses borne by Jobcentre Plus in administering NDDP, as well as those 
borne by individual Job Brokers, the cost per placement was approximately £2,000 
to £3,000 and the cost per sustainment was £4,000 to £5,000 (see Section 4.5). The 
earnings of those who sustain employment are quite likely to exceed the cost that a 
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relatively efficient Job Broker incurs in achieving a sustainment. However, this way 
of looking at the cost-effectiveness of Job Brokers will be quite misleading if many 
NDDP registrants who find work would have gained employment without the help 
of the NDDP programmes. Costs that result from the programme can only be offset 
by increases in earnings or reductions in incapacity benefit payments that also result 
from the programme – that is, by NDDP’s impacts on earnings and incapacity benefit 
payments. Hence, a cost-benefit analysis was conducted to determine whether 
the benefits resulting from NDDP exceed the programme’s costs. Finding from this 
analysis appear in Part III of this report and are summarised next.
9.4  Cost-benefits of NDDP
.4.1 Key findings
The cost-benefit analysis was conducted from three different perspectives: that of 
the Government, that of programme registrants, and that of society as a whole.
Taking account of both reductions in incapacity benefit payments received by NDDP 
registrants and the cost of administering these benefits, NDDP was found to reduce 
the Government’s budgetary requirements by around £2,500 for a typical continuing 
claimant who registered and by about £800 to £1,100 for an average new claimant 
who registered. In terms of the costs of NDDP, this is a considerable saving. For each 
pound expended on NDDP, the Government saved between £3.41 and £4.50 for 
continuing claimants and between £1.71 and £2.26 for new claimants in benefit 
payments and administrative expenditures (see Chapter 3). The conclusion that NDDP 
is cost-beneficial for both groups of customers from the Government’s perspective 
appears to be highly robust to the assumptions that underlie it. Separate cost-benefit 
analyses of large and small Job Brokers (i.e. those with more than and fewer than 
900 registrants) found that the benefits received by the Government exceeded the 
Government’s costs for both groups of Job Brokers. However, net benefits from the 
Government’s perspective, appeared to be far greater for the larger Job Brokers than 
for the smaller ones.
The findings for programme registrants are much less definitive, particularly in the case 
of continuing claimants. It appears likely that a typical NDDP registrant was probably 
better off as a result of the programme, but this increase in welfare was probably 
quite modest (see Chapter 7).  Because their incapacity benefits fell by less, however, 
it is evident that claimants who registered with small Job Brokers were better off 
than claimants who registered with large Job Brokers. The most important sources 
of uncertainty about net benefits from the perspective of NDDP registrants result 
from limitations in the data used to estimates programme impacts on employment 
and incapacity benefit payments and from the absence of information about how 
much registrants valued the time they gave up to work and whether, in addition to 
increasing the proportion of NDDP registrants who were employed, the programme 
also increased the hours of work of employed registrants.
Conclusions
114
The net benefits of NDDP to society as a whole are very likely positive. However, they 
seem to be considerably larger for continuing claimants than for new claimants. 
For example, the reported estimates are £2,915 to £3,163 for continuing claimants 
and £613 to £861 for new claimants. For each pound the Government expended 
on NDDP, the resulting social benefits were estimated to be £4 to £5 for continuing 
claimants and around £2 for new claimants (see Chapter 8). 
Net social benefits do not seem to differ greatly by Job Broker size. This is because 
programme impacts on employment and, hence, earnings also do not differ greatly 
by Job Broker size. However, during the period covered by our analysis, large Job 
Brokers received considerably more incentive payments per registrant than small Job 
Brokers, because they placed a greater percentage of their registrants in jobs and a 
larger percentage of their registrants sustained their jobs for at least six months (see 
Section 3.4.4). This perhaps suggests that some rethinking should be done about the 
structure of NDDP incentive payments. In addition, it is not evident from our results 
that increasing the size of incentive payments pays off in increasing placement or 
sustainment rates (see Section 3.4.4).
Although they are almost surely positive, the actual net benefits received by society 
could be either somewhat smaller or larger than the amounts just mentioned. The 
most important sources of this uncertainty are the lack of information about the 
following factors: the size of possible programme substitution effects, the value 
registrants put on the time they give up in order to go to work, the extent to which 
NDDP increases the hours of working registrants and the degree to which NDDP 
significantly reduces economic distortions caused by taxes by allowing taxes to be 
lower than otherwise. An additional important cause of uncertainty is reporting errors 
in the administrative tax data used to estimate NDDP’s impact on employment.
.4. Current relevance of findings
The cost-benefit analysis is based on cost data and impact estimates that pertain to 
a period between 2001 and 2003, when NDDP was relatively new. Since then, as 
experience has been gained in operating the programme, it has changed in important 
ways. Thus, care should be taken in applying the findings reported above to the 
current version of the programme. However, it is possible to conjecture a bit about 
how certain specific programmatic changes might alter the cost-benefit findings if 
the analysis were to be repeated with recent data.
The findings described above for new and returning claimants are probably 
increasingly more relevant than those for continuing claimants. Over time, the pool 
of individuals who were receiving incapacity benefits when NDDP was extended 
nationally in 2001 and who will ever voluntarily register for the programme has 
steadily diminished, leaving new and returning claimants as an increasingly important 
source of registrants. However, some persons who became incapacity claimants since 
2001 may not register until their health permits and that may take several years. Thus, 
the impact of NDDP on them may be more similar to NDDP’s effects on continuing 
claimants than its impact on new claimants.
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In general, NDDP should have become more cost-beneficial over time as both DWP 
and Job Brokers learned about how to operate the programme more effectively and 
as ineffectual Job Brokers were weeded out. In fact, Orr, Bell and Lam (2007) provide 
some evidence that programme impacts on reducing the amount of incapacity benefits 
received increased substantially after NDDP had been operating for a few years. In 
addition, they also provide evidence of a moderate increase in NDDP’s impact on the 
employment rate of continuing claimants (but not new claimants). However, there 
has been at least one change to the programme that might operate in the other 
direction. In October 2003, the definition of sustainable employment was reduced 
from six months to three months, reducing the incentive of Job Brokers to keep placed 
customers employed after three months and, hence, possibly reducing the impact 
of NDDP on employment. Nonetheless, Job Brokers were required to continue to 
provide support for a minimum of six months after customers began working.
There have been other changes to NDDP that may have changed the composition 
of the customer group being served and this, in turn, may have influenced how 
cost-beneficial the programme currently is. For example, the incentive payment 
for registering incapacity benefit claimants has been increased from £104 to £300. 
This could conceivably result in increasing the proportion of registrants who are 
relatively difficult to place in jobs. In addition, as part of the Pathways to Work Pilots54, 
Jobcentre Plus personal advisers recommend that incapacity benefit claimants who 
they consider job-ready, register with Job Brokers. This could also result in increasing 
the registration of more difficult to place claimants. Although these changes might 
cause an increasing share of the Job Broker caseload to be made up of relatively 
difficult to place claimants, programme impacts for such claimants (i.e. the difference 
between their receipt of incapacity benefits and their employment level with NDDP and 
without NDDP) could actually be larger than those for more readily placed claimants. 
For example, Orr, Bell and Lam (2007) found that NDDP’s impacts on incapacity 
benefit payment amounts were larger for older claimants than younger claimants, 
for claimants in relatively more rural areas and for claimants who are further from 
the labour market (as measured by their probability of finding work in the next two 
years without NDDP). Their findings for programme impacts on the employment of 
continuing claimants were similar, while those for impacts on the employment of 
new claimants were somewhat erratic but tended to be in the opposite direction. 
Thus, it is possible that these compositional changes could cause NDDP to become 
somewhat more cost-beneficial from the Government perspective for both new and 
for continuing claimants (the incapacity benefit payments these registrants receive 
might fall, on average) and from the societal perspective for continuing claimants (the 
average earnings of such registrants might rise) but not new claimants. Programme 
effects on the incomes of the average new claimant would decline if NDDP’s impact 
54 The Pathways to Work Pilots requires incapacity benefit claimants to take part 
in Work Focused Interviews at Jobcentre Plus with personal advisors. This pilot 
programme was initially tested in seven Jobcentre Plus districts starting in 2003 
and 2004 but is gradually being extended to cover one-third of the UK. In the 
remainder of the country, Pathways to Work will be delivered by private and 
voluntary sector providers from October 2007.
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on incapacity benefits is larger for harder to place new claimants, but its impact on 
the employment of such claimants is smaller. The implication for the income of a 
typical continuing claimant is less apparent. If NDDP’s impacts on incapacity benefits 
and employment are both relatively larger for harder to place continuing claimants, 
this would tend to affect income in opposing directions.
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This survey is being conducted by the Centre for Research in Social Policy, on behalf of the 
Department for Work and Pensions.  The survey forms part of the evaluation of the New Deal for 
Disabled People national extension, and the research aims to help improve the services that Job 
Brokers provide.  The information given will be held in confidence and used for research purposes 
only.  It will not be possible to identify individuals or individual organisations from the information 
produced as a result of this research. 
If you have any questions, concerns or difficulties with this questionnaire, please contact Abigail 
Davis at the Centre for Research in Social Policy 
Tel:  01509 223369 
Fax:  01509 213409 
Email:  a.a.i.davis@lboro.ac.uk
Thank you for your help. 
Module A About your organisation 
Firstly, we would like to ask you some questions about the organisation you work in. 
A1
What is the name of your organisation? 
___________________________________________________ 
A2
Which category best describes your organisation: 
(Tick one only) 
 Public sector ?
 Private sector ?
 Voluntary sector ?
 Mixture ?
 Other (please describe below) ?
 __________________________________________ 
A2x
Is your organisation registered as a charity? 
 Yes ?
 No ?
A3
What is the extent of the area you deliver NDDP services to: 
(Please tick the largest area that applies) 
  Local ?
  Regional ?
  National ?
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A3a
Please enter the number of Local Authorities you cover 
 _____ 
About your Partner organisations 
In order to understand the service you provide for NDDP clients, we are interested in finding out 
about organisations, agencies and other professionals you involve in your delivery of this service.  
You may refer clients to them for services or experience, or they may supply advice or support to 
your organisation. 
A4
Please complete the following table: 
Name and address of partner 
organisation 
Type of 
organisation
Role of partner 
organisation 
Main services delivered 
Public ?
Private ?
Voluntary ?
Mix ?
Strategic ?
Advisory ?
Delivery ?
Other ?
Public ?
Private ?
Voluntary ?
Mix ?
Strategic ?
Advisory ?
Delivery ?
Other ?
Public ?
Private ?
Voluntary ?
Mix ?
Strategic ?
Advisory ?
Delivery ?
Other ?
Public ?
Private ?
Voluntary ?
Mix ?
Strategic ?
Advisory ?
Delivery ?
Other ?
Public ?
Private ?
Voluntary ?
Mix ?
Strategic ?
Advisory ?
Delivery ?
Other ?
NB  If necessary, please attach an additional sheet. 
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Module B About the area served 
We would now like to ask you about the job market in the area(s) you deliver NDDP services to. 
B1
Which statements do you think best describe the labour market conditions for NDDP programme 
participants in the area(s) you serve: 
(Tick all that apply) Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly 
 Agree     Disagree
There are few jobs for people on NDDP 
who would like to work ? ? ? ?
There are jobs with a limited number of employers 
for people on NDDP who would like to work ? ? ? ?
There are plenty of jobs for people on NDDP 
who would like to work ? ? ? ?
There are jobs with a wide range of employers  
for people on NDDP who would like to work ? ? ? ?
Module C About your clients 
In order to understand the service you provide for NDDP clients properly, we now need to ask you 
for some information about the people you help with this scheme.  Firstly, how they find out about 
you, and why they contact you. 
C1
How do people find out about the NDDP service that you provide? 
(Tick all that apply) 
 NDDP letter ?
 Permitted Work Rules mailing/letter ?
 NDDP leaflet ?
 Advertising ?
 Internet/email ?
 Personal contact ?
 Jobcentre plus staff (inc. interview with Personal Adviser/DEA) ?
 Friend or relative ?
 Employer ?
 Training provider ?
 Advice or Welfare rights worker ?
 Voluntary/Disability organisation ?
 Doctor or other health professional ?
 Saw the office/called in after passing the office ?
 Social worker/social services worker ?
 Day Centre ?
 Other (please specify below) ?
  ____________________________________ 
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C2
Why do your NDDP clients contact you? 
(Tick all that apply) 
All Majority Minority None 
for help with moving back to work ? ? ? ?
to find out whether they are able to get back to work ? ? ? ?
to increase their working hours ? ? ? ?
to find a job that is tailored to their needs ? ? ? ?
for help with finding training ? ? ? ?
for help with getting or increasing their benefits ? ? ? ?
they think it is compulsory ? ? ? ?
they think they would lose their benefits if they did not ? ? ? ?
to get more information about their benefits position ? ? ? ?
it seemed a good idea ? ? ? ?
it was an opportunity to talk about their  
situation/ prospects with someone else ? ? ? ?
it was arranged for them by someone else ? ? ? ?
other reasons (please specify below) ? ? ? ?
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
It is helpful for us to understand the steps new clients go through when they first approach you 
about enrolling on NDDP.  The next questions are about your procedures. 
C3
When a new NDDP client comes to you, do you: 
(Tick one) 
 Arrange a pre-registration meeting to assess the suitability of NDDP for the client ?
 Assess the suitability of NDDP for the client and register them at the same time ?
 It depends (please explain on what it depends below) ?
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
C3x
If it depends, how do you decide what to do? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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C4
Where do you hold your pre-registration/registration meetings? 
(Tick all that apply) 
 At our head office ?
 At whichever branch is nearest/most convenient for them ?
 At a neutral venue (e.g., Health Centre/ Community Centre) ?
 At the client’s home ?
 Somewhere else (please specify below) ?
 _________________________________________________ 
C5
On average, how many meetings would you expect to have with a client from first contact to 
registration? 
(Tick one) 
 One ?
 Two ?
 Three ?
 Four ?
 More than four ?
C6
How long would you expect these meetings to take, in total? 
(Tick one) 
 One hour ?
 Two hours ?
 Three hours ?
 Four hours ?
 More than four hours ?
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Module D More about your clients 
We would now like to ask you about the NDDP clients you see, to find out more about their needs, 
attitudes and expectations. 
D1
What proportion of your NDDP clients fit the descriptions below? 
(Percentage)       0     1-25    26-50    51-75    76-100 
Nearly job ready, minimum assistance required ? ? ? ? ?
Expected to be job ready within the next 6 months ? ? ? ? ?
Expected to be job ready in more than 6 months  
but within a year from now ? ? ? ? ?
Expected to be job ready in more than one year 
from now  ? ? ? ? ?
It depends ? ? ? ? ?
D2
Your NDDP clients are likely to have different attitudes towards work.  To what extent do the 
following statements apply to your NDDP clients? 
(Tick one for each statement) 
Strongly Agree Disagree  Strongly 
 Agree   Disagree
For most, having almost any job is better than  
being unemployed ? ? ? ?
Generally, they see it as their responsibility 
to find a job ? ? ? ?
Generally, they are prepared to take any job they  
can do, not just a job in their usual occupation ? ? ? ?
They should not be expected to take a new job  
earning less than they were earning in their last job ? ? ? ?
If they had enough money to live comfortably for  
the rest of their lives, most would still want to work ? ? ? ?
Having a job is very important to them ? ? ? ?
Once they have a job they usually feel it is important 
to hang on to it, even if they don’t really like it ? ? ? ?
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Module E About the employers you have contact with through NDDP 
We would now like to ask you about the employers you have contact with when helping NDDP 
clients. 
E1
Which statement best describes your experience of (local) employers’ attitudes to employing 
someone who is on NDDP? 
(Tick one only)    None Minority Majority All
They are positive about it and already 
employ people who have registered for NDDP  ? ? ? ?
They are positive about it, but do not have 
any employees who have registered for NDDP  ? ? ? ?
They are unsure about employing people on the  
NDDP programme, but would be prepared to try it ? ? ? ?
They are unsure about employing people on the  
NDDP programme, and would be reluctant to try it ? ? ? ?
They do not recruit people who have registered 
for NDDP  ? ? ? ?
E2
What types of employment opportunities are available from (local) employers? 
(Tick all that apply) 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry ?
Fishing ?
Mining and quarrying ?
Manufacturing ?
Electricity, gas and water supply ?
Construction ?
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles,  
motorcycles and household goods ?
Hotels and restaurants ?
Transport, storage and communication ?
Financial intermediation ?
Real estate, renting and business activities ?
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security ?
Education ?
Health and social work ?
Other community, social and personal service activities ?
E2a 
What level of jobs are available from these employers?   
(Tick all that apply) 
     All  Majority  Minority  None
 Professional ? ? ? ?
 Intermediate ? ? ? ?
 Skilled non-manual ? ? ? ?
 Skilled manual ? ? ? ?
 Semi-skilled ? ? ? ?
 Unskilled ? ? ? ?
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E3
Approximately how many employers do you have contact with in connection with NDDP? 
(Tick one only)  1-25 ?
 26-50 ?
 51-100 ?
 101-200 ?
 201-500 ?
 More than 500 ?
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Module F About the people who work for your organisation 
We would now like to find out more about the people delivering NDDP who work for your 
organisation. 
F1 
What proportion of the staff who deal directly with NDDP clients have: 
(Percentage)       0     1-25    26-50    51-75    76-
100 
Degree or Higher degree (MA, MSc, PhD) ? ? ? ? ?
6 or more months experience working on other  
labour market programmes ? ? ? ? ?
6 or more months experience working 
with the client group ? ? ? ? ?
F2 
On average, how many cases would each member of front line staff be allocated? 
  __________ 
F3 
How are clients allocated to staff? 
(Tick one only) 
 Clients are allocated by rotation ?
 Clients are allocated to whoever is available ?
 Clients are allocated to whoever has fewest clients at that point ?
 Clients are allocated depending on the support they require ?
Clients are allocated depending on the nature of their illness/disability ?
 Clients are allocated depending on their geographical location ?
 Clients are allocated alphabetically by surname ?
 Other (please specify below) ?
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
F4 
How is work on each NDDP case allocated among staff? 
(Tick one only) 
 All staff deliver all of the available services ?
 Staff specialise in different aspects of the service  
 (e.g., assessment, benefit advice, CV writing, training) ?
 Staff specialise in dealing with people with  
 different types of illness/disability ?
 Other (please specify below) ?
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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F5 
What access do clients have to staff? 
(Tick all that apply) 
 Staff are available whenever clients drop in ?
 Staff are available by appointment only ?
 Staff can be contacted during office hours only ?
 Staff can be contacted out of office hours (e.g., via pager) ?
 Clients can leave a message with an answering service/ 
 answering machine out of office hours ?
 Clients can contact a helpline manned by staff during office hours ?
 Clients can contact a helpline manned by staff outside office hours ?
 Staff will visit clients at work/home during office hours ?
 Staff will visit clients at work/home outside office hours ?
 Other (please specify below) ?
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Module G About the services you provide for NDDP clients 
We would now like to ask you some questions about the services your organisation provides for 
NDDP clients, and services that are provided for your NDDP clients by other organisations, agencies 
or professionals. 
G1
Which statement best describes the way your organisation approaches its work with NDDP clients? 
(Tick all that apply) Disagree Disagree Agree Agree 
 Strongly   Strongly 
Our main aim is to find jobs for our clients ? ? ? ?
Our main aim is to equip clients to find work  
for themselves  ? ? ? ?
Our main aim is to help people gain skills and  
confidence, which may help them to find employment ? ? ? ?
Our main aim is to work with clients to help them to 
achieve their goals, whether these are work-related or not ? ? ? ?
G2
Which services do you provide in-house for NDDP clients? 
(Tick all that apply) 
 CV preparation ?
 Basic skills training (e.g., literacy, numeracy) ?
 Soft skills training (e.g., confidence building,  
 communication skills) ?
 Key skills training (e.g., computer skills, telephone skills) ?
 Job searching ?
 Job matching ?
 Benefits advice ?
 Careers advice ?
 Work experience ?
 Other help or advice ?
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G3
For what reasons do you refer NDDP clients to other organisations/agencies/professionals 
(Tick all that apply) 
 Clients require more intensive support than we can offer ?
 Clients are insufficiently job ready for us to help them ?
 To acquire further educational qualifications ?
 Basic skills training (e.g., literacy and numeracy) ?
 Soft skills training (e.g., confidence building, communication skills) ?
 Key skills training (e.g., computer skills, telephone skills) ?
 Job searching ?
 Job matching ?
 Benefits advice ?
 Careers advice ?
 To gain work experience/ a work taster ?
 To gain work experience within a voluntary organisation ?
 To get specialist help with their illness/disability ?
 To get specialist help with other problems (e.g., alcohol/drug addiction) ?
 Other help or advice ?
G4
How is NDDP clients’ progress monitored? 
(Tick all that apply) 
 Regular review meetings with the client (weekly/fortnightly/monthly) ?
 Regular review meetings with the client and the employer ?
 Regular telephone contact with the client ?
 Regular telephone contact with the client and the employer ?
 Questionnaire sent to client  ?
 Questionnaire sent to client and employer ?
 There is no formal monitoring system in place ?
 Other (please specify below) ?
________________________________________________________________ 
G5
What types of support do you provide for your NDDP clients as they go into/once they are in 
employment? 
(Tick all that apply) 
 Appointing a job coach/mentor/buddy within the workplace ?
 Accompanying client to work for initial period ?
 Assisting client with travel arrangements/route planning ?
 Face-to-face intervention with employer on client’s behalf ?
 Assistance with organisation of personal/domestic commitments  ?
 Access to support network (e.g., newsletters, self-help groups,  
 open sessions) ?
 Other (please specify below) ?
________________________________________________________________ 
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G6
How do you monitor employers’ satisfaction with the NDDP services you provide? 
(Tick all that apply) 
 Questionnaire completed by employer  ?
 Employer asked for feedback during follow-up contacts ?
 Employers invited to communicate criticisms/comments/suggestions 
 in literature distributed to them ?
 There is no formal monitoring system in place ?
 Other (please specify below) ?
________________________________________________________________ 
G7
How do you monitor your clients’ satisfaction with the NDDP services you provide? 
(Tick all that apply) 
 Questionnaire completed by client  ?
 Client asked for feedback during follow-up contacts ?
 Clients invited to communicate criticisms/comments/suggestions 
 in literature distributed as part of the registration process ?
 There is no formal monitoring system in place ?
 Other (please specify below) ?
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
G8
Some people who contact you will not be eligible for NDDP or the services provided may not be 
appropriate for them, and so they are not registered for the programme.  What services do you 
provide for these people? 
(Tick all that apply) 
 None ?
 None, people are referred to other providers ?
 CV preparation ?
 Basic skills training (e.g., literacy, numeracy) ?
 Soft skills training (e.g., confidence building, communication skills) ?
 Key skills training (e.g., computer skills, telephone skills) ?
 Job searching ?
 Job matching ?
 Benefits advice ?
 Careers advice ?
 Other help or advice (please specify below) ?
 _________________________________________________________ 
 _________________________________________________________ 
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Module H About the costs of delivering NDDP 
As part of the evaluation of New Deal for Disabled People it is important for us to look at the costs 
of delivering the programme, and the help that the programme provides for participants.  For this 
reason, we would like to ask for your co-operation in supplying some basic financial information 
relating to how much it costs your organisation to deliver the services it provides for NDDP clients.  
All information given will be held in confidence and used for research purposes only.  It 
will not be possible to identify individuals or individual organisations from the 
information produced as a result of this research.
At this stage we are not collecting any cost information.  However, if asked, would you 
be able to provide information on: 
H1 Number of staff employed, by job title Yes ? No ?
H2 Number of staff, by job title, who have direct contact  
with NDDP clients Yes ? No ?
H3 What other DWP programmes your organisation  
Delivers Yes ? No ?
H4 How staff time use is monitored Yes ? No ?
H5 Percentage of time spent on NDDP by staff, by 
job title      Yes ? No ?
H6 Staff turnover level     Yes ? No ?
H7 Staff training and recruitment costs   Yes ? No ?
H8 Staffing costs (i.e., salary costs)   Yes ? No ?
H9 In-house service costs     Yes ? No ?
H10 Who you pay to provide external services  Yes ? No ?
H11 Monitoring of external service provision (quality,  
attendance, etc.)     Yes ? No ?
H12 External service provision costs    Yes ? No ?
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Module I Other costs to your organisation 
We also need to take into account the money your organisation spends on general running costs 
and other expenditure necessary to enable your organisation to deliver the NDDP programme.  All 
information given will be held in confidence and used for research purposes only.  It will 
not be possible to identify individuals or individual organisations from the information 
produced as a result of this research.
I1
At this stage we are not collecting any cost information.  However, if asked, would you 
be able to provide information on: 
Cost of overheads  
(e.g., lighting, heating, rent, cleaning and maintenance of your premises, 
salaries, computer equipment, telephone bills, furniture, 
marketing, administration, other costs)  
Yes ? No ?
Finally, we would like to ask you about how you publicise your service. 
I2
What marketing of your NDDP services do you do/have you done, and do you think they have been 
cost effective? 
(Tick all that apply) Method    Cost         Not cost      Don’t  
   used      effective    effective      know
Newspaper advertising ? ? ? ?
Email/internet advertising ? ? ? ?
Radio advertising ? ? ? ?
Television advertising ? ? ? ?
Careers/Job Fairs ? ? ? ?
Mobile bus/van ? ? ? ?
Promotional literature at Jobcentre(s) ? ? ? ?
Promotional literature at doctors’ surgeries ? ? ? ?
Promotional literature at Health Centres ? ? ? ?
Promotional literature at Community Centres ? ? ? ?
Promotional literature at Voluntary/ 
Disability organisations ? ? ? ?
Other (please specify below) ? ? ? ?
___________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you very much for your help. 
Please return your completed questionnaire in the FREEPOST envelope provided (no stamp required) 
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Appendix B 
Letter to Job Broker and pro-
formas
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Name
Address 1
Address 2
Address 3
Address 4
Postcode Direct Line: +44 (0)1509 223369
 Fax: +44 (0)1509 213409
 E-mail: a.a.i.davis@lboro.ac.uk
 WWW url: http://www.crsp.ac.uk
30 April 2003
Dear 
Evaluation of New Deal for Disabled People – Cost Benefit Analysis
Further to our recent telephone conversation, I should like to thank you for agreeing 
to participate in our research, and to confirm that Professor David Greenberg and I 
will be visiting you on (Day) (Date) at (Time). 
The purpose of our visit will be to gather information about the cost of staff time spent 
on NDDP, as well as some additional information about the overheads you incur, and 
any payments to other organizations that help you to deliver the programme. We 
anticipate spending about an hour and a half with you, but this will vary, depending 
on local circumstances. All the information you provide will remain strictly confidential 
and will only be seen by the research team. Individual Job Brokers will not be identified 
in any reporting of the analysis.
Attached is a pro forma that indicates the type and amount of information we are 
collecting. This will give you an idea of the questions we will be asking in the interview, 
and the format in which we will require the data. The forms will be completed by 
the research team, using the information we gather during our visit, but please feel 
free to complete as much of it in advance as you feel appropriate. 
Thank you again for taking part in our research. If you require any further information, 
please do not hesitate to contact me at the number/email address above. I look 
forward to meeting you on (Date).
Yours sincerely
Abigail Davis 
Research Assistant 
Enc
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR TABLE ON IN-HOUSE COSTS
A. List each employee who works directly with NDDP clients by job title. If more than 
one employee with the same job title does the same work with clients, they can 
be listed on the same line. [Employees who are listed on the same line should 
perform similar sets of functions or duties with NDDP clients.] Alternatively, if 
it is more convenient, each employee can be listed on a separate line. [If each 
employee with the same job title is listed on a separate line, repeat the job title, 
but identify the employee as ‘Employee A’, Employee B’, and so forth.] The 
NDDP-responsibilities of the employee or employees listed on each line should 
be briefly described on a separate sheet.
B. Indicate the number of full-time equivalent employees listed on each line. For 
example, 2 full-time employees and 3 half-time employees with the same job 
title would count as 3.5 full-time equivalent employees. 
C. Indicate the gross salary of the employee or employees listed on each line. (If 
more than one employee is listed on a line, provide the average salary.) By ‘gross 
salary,’ we mean prior to deductions. However, if overtime pay is received more 
than half the time, then gross salary should include overtime pay.
D. Indicate the value of the fringe benefits (i.e. additional payroll costs not included 
in salary) received by the employee or employees listed on each line. This should 
include any employer payments for pensions and National Insurance. It should 
also include any employer bonus payments if not included in column (C). (If 
more than one employee is listed on a line, provide the average value.)
E. Indicate whether the salary and fringe benefit values on each line pertain to a 
year, a fortnight, a month, or a week. If data is entered in column (G) instead 
of columns (C), (D) and (F), column E should still be completed.
F. Indicate the approximate percentage of work time that the employee or 
employees listed on each line devotes to NDDP activities. (If more than one 
employee is listed on a line, provide the average value.) [Note: this is intended 
to take account of the possibility that some of the employees who work directly 
with NDDP clients do so only part of the time they are on the job and perform 
other, non-NDDP activities the remainder of their time.]
G. As indicated, the NDDP costs accrued by the employee or employees listed on 
each line is computed in column (G). The Job Broker does not need to make 
this calculation, as CRSP will use a spreadsheet to do it. However, if this value is 
available directly—for example, through an accounting system set-up to track 
NDDP costs—then the Job Broker can simply fill in column (G), rather than 
columns (C) (D) and (F). The information for column (E) should still be entered. 
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ADDITIONAL NEEDED INFORMATION ABOUT IN-HOUSE COSTS
1. The overhead rate. The “overhead rate” is defined as overhead costs divided by 
total costs. Overhead costs include various non-salary costs such as expenditures 
on telephones, computers, furniture, and rental payments for physical facilities. 
(It can alternatively be defined as total costs divided by non-overhead costs.) For 
purposes of the cost analysis, overhead costs should also include administrative 
costs - that is, the salary and fringe benefit costs of staff who do not directly 
work with programme clients, but either supervise or help those who do work 
directly with programme clients (e.g. secretaries and IT personnel). If these 
latter costs (i.e. administrative costs) are not included in the numerator used in 
computing the overhead rate, then they should be listed in the in-house cost 
table, along with the costs of employees who do work directly with NDDP clients. 
[An alternative approach, if needed, to obtaining the cost of overhead is to 
multiply total expenditures on each item (e.g. computers, rental space, telephone, 
supervisor’s salaries, secretaries salaries) by the fraction of the Job Broker’s total 
staff cost devoted to NDDP work.]
2. Payments for support services. Net payments made in a typical month to provide 
out-of-house support services for clients (e.g. training, transportation, child care, 
uniforms, etc.). [Emphasis is on net payments because some payments are loans, 
rather than grants. If annual amounts are available, then divide by 12 to obtain 
the ‘typical’ monthly amount. Determine whether this value is also accounted 
for in the table for outside organisations.]
3. Special purchases made specifically for NDDP. List each, briefly describe, and 
obtain the cost of each.
4. Work-related expenditures by clients. Collect whatever is available and document 
what the figures cover. [It is recognised that this item may not be available, but 
if some information is available, we would like to obtain it.]
5. Unit costs. Ideally, unit costs should include the full cost of providing one unit 
of each service that is provided in house—that is, salary, fringe benefits, and 
overhead. Thus, for example, unit costs should measure the full cost of providing 
one hour of counselling or one week of training. [It is recognised that unit cost 
estimates may not be available, but to the extent they are, we would like to 
obtain them.]
OTHER INFORMATION
1. Number of clients registered on NDDP.
2. Have we missed any other costs incurred in connection with NDDP?
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